Got a Real-World Weapon or Armor Question? Mk. VI

[Raum]

Could you explain this in more detail, please?

"In wars that the U.S. have been involved in since the end of World War II; the ratio of U.S. combat troops to combat service support and support have gone from 4 support soldiers to 1 infantryman to 7 support soldiers to 1 infantryman in Iraq and Afghanistan." - Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn

So, using the combat to support troop ratio, we're arguably a less efficient fighting force today than in WWII. Probably not very surprising giving all the technological changes. That same ratio can be used to measure efficiency of different forces - assuming you have access to all the numbers. It isn't really cut and dry...special forces units often pull support from regular troops, Marines get support from the Navy, etc. It's just one potential measurement with its own inherent flaws. That's why I said 'better' is largely opinion. It will depend on everything from personal bias to what they're intended to do. As Mike G mentioned, you need the right tool for the job.

[Crow]

The numbers are flawed though.

What the numbers don't show is efficiency in regards to actual combat effectiveness. While the ratio of support soldiers is higher, it can be argued that increases in combat effectiveness since WWII actual make for a more efficient force than it's WWII counterpart.

[Raum]

The numbers are flawed though.

Yes. That's why I said there were 'inherent flaws' with using such a measurement. Even so, it's mildly useful for comparing forces with similar functions in the same time frame.

Compare USMC to US Army for example. Though there are flaws even there as I pointed out above.

[Dervag]

Yes. That's why I said there were 'inherent flaws' with using such a measurement. Even so, it's mildly useful for comparing forces with similar functions in the same time frame.

Compare USMC to US Army for example. Though there are flaws even there as I pointed out above.

But is this a reliable correlation? Has anyone graphed this, or is it just a tool that people with small support forces use to sneer at people with large ones? I mean, the Japanese Army in the Pacific had a very low ratio of support to front liners; they often staged amphibious landings with negligible logistics followup. But that didn't make them the most potent army in the theater, and when the logistics-heavy US got into gear, they got pushed back over and over.

"In wars that the U.S. have been involved in since the end of World War II; the ratio of U.S. combat troops to combat service support and support have gone from 4 support soldiers to 1 infantryman to 7 support soldiers to 1 infantryman in Iraq and Afghanistan." - Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn

So, using the combat to support troop ratio, we're arguably a less efficient fighting force today than in WWII. Probably not very surprising giving all the technological changes. That same ratio can be used to measure efficiency of different forces - assuming you have access to all the numbers. It isn't really cut and dry...special forces units often pull support from regular troops, Marines get support from the Navy, etc. It's just one potential measurement with its own inherent flaws. That's why I said 'better' is largely opinion. It will depend on everything from personal bias to what they're intended to do. As Mike G mentioned, you need the right tool for the job.

The problem I see is that the weight of the spearshaft doesn't necessarily say much about how sharp the point is, as it were.

A fighter-bomber pilot will have a swarm of support crew just to keep his plane flying and armed... but he's probably doing a lot more damage than an equivalent number of riflemen and their support troops. Certainly nearly as much.

So I question the proposition that this can be used as a reliable measure of troop quality, or of the effectiveness of an army of X thousand soldiers (including support troops).

I consider rifles with a "bolt-action" to be bolt-action rifles. This applies to Dreyse Needle Rifles, as much as it does to an SMLE or 1903 Springfield. While I suspect that the original question referred to later magazine bolt-action rifles, the fact that earlier bolt-action rifles were also interpreted as being better employed in defensive actions is valid.

Likewise I don't consider something like a lever-action Winchester (which has a magazine) to be a bolt-action rifle.

By the way these are all "breech-loaders", as are M-16s, AK-47s and Vickers machine guns. I believe you mean "single shot" breech-loader.

...Darnit.

Look, you're right, but I think you're missing the spirit of the question in the name of technical precisionism.

[Raum]

So I question the proposition that this can be used as a reliable measure of troop quality, or of the effectiveness of an army of X thousand soldiers (including support troops).

It doesn't measure quality. It measures efficiency, and, as previously mentioned, it's not perfect at that.

Going back to what started this:

That's all opinion...well mostly. In general, the smaller the force the more elite. Another potential measure is the ratio of fighting troops to support troops. You'll probably get many different answers though. :)

I was attempting to point out two different potential methods of measurement of many possible ways to measure a force's 'eliteness'. There are many different measurements you could use.

A measurement of "how elite" something is will be opinion until you define factors that make that thing "elite". Please don't get overly hung up on one potential measurement of many.

[fusilier]

...Darnit.

Look, you're right, but I think you're missing the spirit of the question in the name of technical precisionism.

Hehe. :-)

Actually, my point about the defensive nature of bolt-action rifles still remains. When the famous Lebel 1886 was introduced, it had a magazine, and greater long range accuracy (even more so when they introduced the Balle D, i.e. spitzer bullet). This gave it a better rate of fire, and increased the effective range. To take advantage of the increase range, the troops had to be stationary, and if firing from fixed positions (where the rifles could easily be rested), it would be even better.

All this is true for the Chassepot rifle during its time period. While the minie ball had provided an increase in accuracy at range, it wasn't necessarily used at longer ranges. Studies from the American Civil War, show most officers not opening up fire until around 100 yards; about the same range smoothbore muskets would start firing. The exceptions where troops were allowed to open fire at longer ranges, were often defended upon the basis that it released some stress and calmed the men down, i.e. that it was not supposed to be effective fire. However, the increased accuracy of the Minie gun appears to have increased the casualty rates. During the Franco-Sardinian-Austrian War of 1859, the French typically charged the Austrians en masse with much "fury" (Furia Francese), rather effectively, although casualties could be heavy. The Austrians applied this lesson when they fought the Prussians in the Austro-Prussian War. But the Prussians were armed with faster firing needle rifles, and the tactic was a total disaster.

The French were paying attention. They had been developing their own breech-loading weapon. The Chassepot, while it had the same rate of fire as the Dreyse Needle Gun, had a better gas-seal and superior range. The tactic was for the infantry to find good positions where their longer ranged weapons could be more effective, dig in, and let the enemy charge. When the French could get their act together (and the Prussians had a huge advantage in terms of coordination at the strategic level), they were able to put up a fairly good fight. The Prussians however had good rifled, breachloading artillery, and that helped balance out the superiority of the French small arms.

I think many of those conditions would hold true for a magazine fed bolt-action rifle (or even a well made semi-automatic rifle). Longer effective range means that under the right circumstances they could be inflicting casualties on their opponents before they could close with faster firing weapons. A properly planned defensive posture would be the most reliable way to generate such conditions. However, once the enemy closes, then the faster-firing weapon will have an advantage . . . one that could be mitigated by fortifications, but only so much.

All this is being done in the absence of things like artillery and air-support though.

[a_humble_lich]

Actually, my point about the defensive nature of bolt-action rifles still remains...

You could argue that the defensive nature of bolt action rifles also lead to the nature of the trench warfare of WWI. When the riflemen in the trenches were mostly all armed with more defensive weapons (and the best close quarters weapon they had may have been the bayonet), the fighting naturally lead itself to defensive trench warfare.

Although, I admit there were other, possibly far more important, defensive weapons which were important in WWI--namely machine guns and artillery.

[fusilier]

You could argue that the defensive nature of bolt action rifles also lead to the nature of the trench warfare of WWI. When the riflemen in the trenches were mostly all armed with more defensive weapons (and the best close quarters weapon they had may have been the bayonet), the fighting naturally lead itself to defensive trench warfare.

Although, I admit there were other, possibly far more important, defensive weapons which were important in WWI--namely machine guns and artillery.

I think there are a lot factors involved, but you are on to something. The general thinking around the time seems to have been to dig in -- even in small shallow trenches, and use the rifle from behind that (this is when personal entrenching tools started to be issued). Digging trenches (or rifle pits), was something that was expected, even if the theory was only to secure a temporary position.

I think some aspects of the bolt-action rifle clearly influenced this attitude, but also there was the general sense of evolving tactics. Communications before WW1 were very primitive, and at the tactical level, really no different than they were in the Napoleonic Wars. So a commander had to be able to shout orders to his troops (or use bugle commands). The tactics didn't call for the amount of initiative that developed later. The books still included "close order" formations that were basically lining up the soldiers shoulder-to-shoulder, in one or two ranks! Although there was more emphasis on open order tactics. Command and control, therefore, required denser formations of soldiers, but these denser formations were at risk from the increased firepower of new weapons. The answer seems to have been to take (or build) cover, to reduce exposure.

I think something that is over-looked when people speculate on the causes of stalemate on the Western Front, is aerial reconnaissance. For the first time, both sides seemed to have a very good idea about the location of their enemy. Early in the war, enemy planes were usually ignored by other aircraft, and had little to fear from ground fire. I think that this unprecedented level of intelligence helped prevent surprise flanking maneuvers, and other such actions, at the strategic level. Combined with other technological and doctrinal factors stalemate and trench warfare was the result.

[Subotei]

You could argue that the defensive nature of bolt action rifles also lead to the nature of the trench warfare of WWI. When the riflemen in the trenches were mostly all armed with more defensive weapons (and the best close quarters weapon they had may have been the bayonet), the fighting naturally lead itself to defensive trench warfare.

Although, I admit there were other, possibly far more important, defensive weapons which were important in WWI--namely machine guns and artillery.

Quite - I agree with your second statement. I read somewhere (cant recall where unfortunately) that very few men in WWI actually fired their rifles in combat. Artillery and machine guns did the damage, and infantry in assaults (defending and attacking) used grenades at close quarters.

I think there are a lot factors involved, but you are on to something. The general thinking around the time seems to have been to dig in -- even in small shallow trenches, and use the rifle from behind that (this is when personal entrenching tools started to be issued). Digging trenches (or rifle pits), was something that was expected, even if the theory was only to secure a temporary position.

I think some aspects of the bolt-action rifle clearly influenced this attitude, but also there was the general sense of evolving tactics. Communications before WW1 were very primitive, and at the tactical level, really no different than they were in the Napoleonic Wars. So a commander had to be able to shout orders to his troops (or use bugle commands). The tactics didn't call for the amount of initiative that developed later. The books still included "close order" formations that were basically lining up the soldiers shoulder-to-shoulder, in one or two ranks! Although there was more emphasis on open order tactics. Command and control, therefore, required denser formations of soldiers, but these denser formations were at risk from the increased firepower of new weapons. The answer seems to have been to take (or build) cover, to reduce exposure.

I think something that is over-looked when people speculate on the causes of stalemate on the Western Front, is aerial reconnaissance. For the first time, both sides seemed to have a very good idea about the location of their enemy. Early in the war, enemy planes were usually ignored by other aircraft, and had little to fear from ground fire. I think that this unprecedented level of intelligence helped prevent surprise flanking maneuvers, and other such actions, at the strategic level. Combined with other technological and doctrinal factors stalemate and trench warfare was the result.

I think you've made two good points here. Firstly the scale of the defences made tactical surprise for the attacker very hard to achieve. To get infantry through the defences massive artillery and supply preparations were needed, allowing the enemy ample time to prepare thanks to the fact the preparations could not be kept hidden. Generally on the western front the Germans had the advantage of higher ground and also observations from balloons and planes.

Secondly, whilst the scale of battles had increased, the range at which command and control of troops on the battlefield could be acheived had barely moved since Napoleon's day, as you said. After the well laid plans for the initial assault (which very often achieved its objectives) control of the battle was difficult as there was not effective way for the commanders on the spot to reorganise to face whatever fluid situation was in front of them. Radios were too bulky (one developed specifically for the trenches required 12 men to carry it); field telephones relied on wires which were very vulnerable to being cut (in the battlezone wires were generally considered reliable if they were buried 6 feet down - not possible in attack); signal flags were obscured; the only way to communicate with the rear effectively was by runners, which faced the gauntlet of enemy artillery fire and so generally arrived late or not at all. One estimate of the average time for a signal to reach Divisonal HQ from the front was 10 hours, (and 10 hours back again!) (Keegan). Reinforcements, supplies and artillery support were therefore generally not there in time to do much good against the inevitable counter attack. As the war went on this led to over-elaborate planning, as the only way generals could actually influence battles was in advance.

The Germans developed stormtrooper tactics, where assault troops were trained to use their initiative in the attack to exploit local gains, rather than waiting for direction from above that would never come. These infantry were very effective later in the war.

[Dervag]

Quite - I agree with your second statement. I read somewhere (cant recall where unfortunately) that very few men in WWI actually fired their rifles in combat. Artillery and machine guns did the damage, and infantry in assaults (defending and attacking) used grenades at close quarters.

The catch is that the infantry are armed with relatively poor weapons for the offense, because they haven't got the weight of fire to make up for the loss of accuracy that goes with firing on the move. So the attacking infantry aren't going to be able to suppress the defender's machine guns in a firefight... whereas troops with semiautomatic or automatic rifles could.

[fusilier]

I think you've made two good points here.

[. . .]

The Germans developed stormtrooper tactics, where assault troops were trained to use their initiative in the attack to exploit local gains, rather than waiting for direction from above that would never come. These infantry were very effective later in the war.

Good points there too. Carrier Pigeons were also used, but they could only send messages to fixed points. Dogs were sometimes used as well.

Infiltration tactics have an interesting history. Arguably the first to use many of the aspects of late war "stosstruppen" (shock troop) tactics on a large scale were the Russians, in the surprisingly successful Brusilov Offensive of 1916. Besides the increased training, and greater initiative, given to shock troops there were other significant improvements. Firstly, they were expected to attack weak points, then penetrate to the rear to isolate strong points. Secondly, the preceding bombardment was to be very short (a matter of hours, rather than days) but very intense, and precise. The idea was to not allow the enemy time to move up reinforcements. The Germans wouldn't even register their artillery; they simply took very careful measurements and made detailed calculations, to achieve as much surprise as possible.

The problem of logistics and artillery keeping up with the attackers was still present. Although successful attacks could now gain much more ground than before.

The response to infiltration tactics was to allow more flexibility and initiative on the defense. Abandoning the idea of a "continuous line" of defense, for one of isolated strongholds. Individual commanders could decide when to fall back on pre-designated strong-points, and when to conduct counter-attacks, rather than waiting for detailed orders from HQ. This lesson was applied after the Caporetto disaster in 1917, but not completely by some of the forces on the Western Front by the time the 1918 German Spring Offensive rolled around. A problem with this defensive strategy was evidenced after the Austrian offensive in July of 1918. The Italians held them off, but with individual battalions, and even companies, retreating and counter-attacking as they saw fit, they were, from an organization point of view, in complete disarray! Units were scattered all over the place, and supply lines a tangled mess. All this took some time to work out before a large-scale counter attack could be delivered.

[fusilier]

The catch is that the infantry are armed with relatively poor weapons for the offense, because they haven't got the weight of fire to make up for the loss of accuracy that goes with firing on the move. So the attacking infantry aren't going to be able to suppress the defender's machine guns in a firefight... whereas troops with semiautomatic or automatic rifles could.

I've actually participated in a WW1 reenactment, and once you're in no mans land there's precious little to shoot at with a rifle. Especially if the trenches are well built with loop-holes, the enemy doesn't have to expose himself. Machine guns might be able to provide enough covering fire, but even that's not guaranteed. You are too exposed to lay down good covering fire with rifles while some members advance. Creeping barrages could be useful. But basically Dervag is right. Italian Arditi (special assault units, sometimes considered quasi-special forces) primary weapons were knives and grenades, with carbines for defense.

[a_humble_lich]

But one can ask if WWI armies had been armed with more effective offensive weapons at the onset, would the trench warfare have even started. In the early stages before the trenches started both the Germans and French tried much more offensive tactics. The French position was with enough elan they'd win. If they'd had submachine guns and assault rifles then, they could have perhaps been effective before the trenches were dug.

Of course this is very speculative.

[fusilier]

But one can ask if WWI armies had been armed with more effective offensive weapons at the onset, would the trench warfare have even started. In the early stages before the trenches started both the Germans and French tried much more offensive tactics. The French position was with enough elan they'd win. If they'd had submachine guns and assault rifles then, they could have perhaps been effective before the trenches were dug.

Of course this is very speculative.

If I recall correctly the French were actually planning on transitioning to a semi-automatic rifle prior to the outbreak of WW1. It seems like these plans got shelved, and not until just before WW2 did they take up such plans again.

At anyrate, I do think that the weapons, and tactics, did encourage trench warfare. However, I think that aerial reconnaissance was a major factor in strategic "stalemate." Assuming that stalemate at the strategic level doesn't necessarily imply trench warfare.

I also think that there are other factors that need to be looked at. The Eastern Front was more mobile than the Western. Why? They dug trenches there too. I've wondered if it was simply a matter of the ratio of men per unit-length of front lines being lower. If there weren't enough aircraft to prevent the occasional strategic surprise. Did a lack of infrastructure have an effect?

--EDIT--
Wikipedia claims it was the length of the front, and a lack of communications that made defensive lines weaker, and prevented the defender from quickly containing a breakthrough.

[Fortinbras]

So is there any advantage to using howizters over aircraft or is on the ground field artillery on its way out?

[Storm Bringer]

both ground and air have their advantages:

tube arty has, compared to air, presistance. a Jet can carry half a dozen bombs, and absolutely flatten two or three targets, but then it must head back to it's airfield to re-arm. An arty firebase, assuming you can supply it properly, can project force over a target area for months if need be. Once in place, it can be called upon at a moments notice, and respond quickly to a urgent call for support. If your fighting over one area a lot, then having arty for fire support would be a great boon.

air, on the other hand, has great flexibility, and a considerable psycological effect. Serveral times, in the fighting in afgan and Iraq, the mere appearence of a jet fighter caused the enemy milita to go to ground, or at least make them slacken thier attacks for a moment.

[Thiel]

Air units also have the ability to respond very fast, something artillery can't do, unless it's already there. A jet can take off from its airbase and be at the target within minutes, whereas even the best artillery will need at least an hour or two to get there and deploy the guns. And if the terrain is very rough, it might not be able to deploy there at all.

But, as Storm Bringer said, once its there, it can keep up the attack for a very long time.

[Storm Bringer]

I think it's another case of different tools being betterfor different jobs. if you have a lot of trouble in one smallish area, then moving a battery of guns into a covering position would make more sense than using air support. However, if you have a lot of smaller trouble spots spread over a wide area, then aircraft can cover that better than guns could.

[Raum]

There are too many things air power simply can't do for it to replace artillery. You can't deploy manned aircraft with your front line troops, you use mortars and howitzers. You can't harden aircraft enough to continue to operate under heavy fire, you can dig in artillery. Aircraft can't stay on target 24/7, they need to refuel and rearm. Artillery can stay deployed and have fuel and munitions brought to it. That's not a complete list either.

It's worth noting that several generals have claimed air power would eliminate the need for ground armies since WWII. They've all failed to prove the point. Combined arms is still the requirement.

[Subotei]

At anyrate, I do think that the weapons, and tactics, did encourage trench warfare. However, I think that aerial reconnaissance was a major factor in strategic "stalemate." Assuming that stalemate at the strategic level doesn't necessarily imply trench warfare.

I also think that there are other factors that need to be looked at. The Eastern Front was more mobile than the Western. Why? They dug trenches there too. I've wondered if it was simply a matter of the ratio of men per unit-length of front lines being lower. If there weren't enough aircraft to prevent the occasional strategic surprise. Did a lack of infrastructure have an effect?

--EDIT--
Wikipedia claims it was the length of the front, and a lack of communications that made defensive lines weaker, and prevented the defender from quickly containing a breakthrough.

After their failure in the initial attack on France, the Germans went on the defensive in the West, and tried to knock Russia out first as they realised they were the weaker power, and this would free up Austrian and German troops for use in the West.

On the western front they prepared formidable defensive positions along a line specifically chosen for defence, fell back to it and basically sat there until 1918. Militarily this was sensible, as the front was short and easier to hold than in the east. Unfortunately they didn't knock out the Russians early enough for their plan, and America joining the war finished any chance they had. In general terms the German defences in the west were therefore more formidable because they were deliberately sited and constructed due to this policy. The French and British on the other hand were therefore taking the offensive, and so while they did construct defences, they did not devote the effort to the extent the Germans did. They hardly ever fell back to a more defensible position. The British in particular were noted for occupying dreadfully exposed (militarily and in terms of conditions) forward positions that the Germans would never have done.

On the Eastern front there was no way the fortifications or manpower could be so concentrated as in the west due to the length of front - this lead to a more mobile form of warfare.

Rather than battering at these western defences, the British and French should've used their control of the seas to greater effect. Gallipoli was a decent idea, from that point of view, but poorly exectuted.

[Edmund]

After their failure in the initial attack on France, the Germans went on the defensive in the West, and tried to knock Russia out first as they realised they were the weaker power, and this would free up Austrian and German troops for use in the West.

You know, for the "weaker power" they held their own extremely well against the combined might of 3 other powers, and kicked the snot out of two of them, all the while providing troops for the other front and coming up with a fair few military innovations on the way.

[Tyndmyr]

There are too many things air power simply can't do for it to replace artillery. You can't deploy manned aircraft with your front line troops, you use mortars and howitzers. You can't harden aircraft enough to continue to operate under heavy fire, you can dig in artillery. Aircraft can't stay on target 24/7, they need to refuel and rearm. Artillery can stay deployed and have fuel and munitions brought to it. That's not a complete list either.

It's worth noting that several generals have claimed air power would eliminate the need for ground armies since WWII. They've all failed to prove the point. Combined arms is still the requirement.

I would not be surprised if this is eventually overcome. UAVs, 24/7 on station aircraft, solar powered stuff...if you can eventually overcome the operational limitations, there's no reason the strategic role can't shift.

Mind you, this likely won't happen for a while, but the role of aircraft has dramatically expanded over it's history, and I would bet it'll continue to do so.

[lsfreak]

While I'm no expert, I would also guess that for the [current] cost of a single combat mission using guided weapons, you can have an artillery battery pounding away for quite some time. There's also the cost of the artillery itself versus the aircraft, and the training involved. Towed artillery is damned cheap compared to a strike fighter or even a UAV; a quick Wikipedia search gives the following:
Predator UAV - 4.5 million
Reaper UAV - 10.5 million
Apache helicopter - 18 million
F-16 - 27 million
F-35 - 83 million
M198 howitzer - 530,000
M777 howitzer - 4.5 million (this was the only unlisted; based on price for those being sold to India and Australia)

[Yora]

You know, for the "weaker power" they held their own extremely well against the combined might of 3 other powers, and kicked the snot out of two of them, all the while providing troops for the other front and coming up with a fair few military innovations on the way.

This is about the only saving grace of german military history. When we lost, it took much more than than any other military could stand against. ^^

[Edmund]

This is about the only saving grace of german military history. When we lost, it took much more than than any other military could stand against. ^^

I was talking about the Russians actually. Nobody ever considered Germany the 'weaker power', especially not the Germans.

The Germans survived primarily by dumb luck (Masurian Lakes, Jutland, Romania) and a few clever ruses (Lenin). Also by using the Austrians as a big meaty shield.

[Subotei]

You know, for the "weaker power" they held their own extremely well against the combined might of 3 other powers, and kicked the snot out of two of them, all the while providing troops for the other front and coming up with a fair few military innovations on the way.

I agree. Of France, Britain and Russia, Russia was in the weakest position - though thats not to belittle their efforts. The German game plan was to knock out France - when that didn't happen Russia was the obvious target, as there was no way to get at Britain at the time. It think its fair to say Russia was weak militarily - certainly in equipment terms - not manpower. And the events of August 1914 must've led the Germans to believe they were beatable.

[Mike_G]

I would not be surprised if this is eventually overcome. UAVs, 24/7 on station aircraft, solar powered stuff...if you can eventually overcome the operational limitations, there's no reason the strategic role can't shift.

Mind you, this likely won't happen for a while, but the role of aircraft has dramatically expanded over it's history, and I would bet it'll continue to do so.

I don't doubt that we will find new applications for air power, but Air Power was going to make ground forces obsolete Any Minute Now for the last 65 years.

The air power lobby has vastly overstated its capabilities. Air superiority is nice and all, but it doesn't mean anything without boots on the ground. Ground based artillery can be sited in a hardened bunker, and once you've registered it, you can shoot it all day, adjusting fire and pounding a target until it's gone, without burning fuel or risking expensive aircraft and trained pilots who have a limited time over target, and do it cheaper.

[Johel]

I don't doubt that we will find new applications for air power, but Air Power was going to make ground forces obsolete Any Minute Now for the last 65 years.

The air power lobby has vastly overstated its capabilities. Air superiority is nice and all, but it doesn't mean anything without boots on the ground. Ground based artillery can be sited in a hardened bunker, and once you've registered it, you can shoot it all day, adjusting fire and pounding a target until it's gone, without burning fuel or risking expensive aircraft and trained pilots who have a limited time over target, and do it cheaper.

While I completely agree with you about the necessity of ground troops, I need to point out that Air Power didn't make ground forces obsolete because Modern World's military strategy went from "Bomb them to oblivion" to "Protect the population & establish democracies".

If your aim is simply to destroy your enemy without taking too much casualties or even risking casualties, then air strikes are the way to go. Bomb his army, his bases, his cities, his population, his little dog and anything coming close to the border, this until they plea for mercy. And when they do, charge ridiculous war indemnities on them to cover your expenses...

When I was a kid, we watched in awe the NATO campaign against Serbia. A whole nation was put on its knees with nothing but air strikes.
Sure, if we speak money, it was costly. A lot more than if we had simply massively given weapons and ammunitions to Albanians and Croatians and say "-Go !! Now is your chance !!". But NATO took very few casualties.

Now, if your aim is to destroy your enemy at the lowest financial cost possible... well, ground troops ARE cheap. Especially infantry. And if your aim is to control a territory without butchering the locals into submission, then yes, you need ground forces to hold and police said territory.

But this means that your nation is either too poor to afford an air force or is a respectable democracy that can't afford to slaughter civilians. Or both of this.

[Mike_G]

While I completely agree with you about the necessity of ground troops, I need to point out that Air Power didn't make ground forces obsolete because Modern World's military strategy went from "Bomb them to oblivion" to "Protect the population & establish democracies".

If your aim is simply to destroy your enemy without taking too much casualties or even risking casualties, then air strikes are the way to go. Bomb his army, his bases, his cities, his population, his little dog and anything coming close to the border, this until they plea for mercy. And when they do, charge ridiculous war indemnities on them to cover your expenses...

When I was a kid, we watched in awe the NATO campaign against Serbia. A whole nation was put on its knees with nothing but air strikes.
Sure, if we speak money, it was costly. A lot more than if we had simply massively given weapons and ammunitions to Albanians and Croatians and say "-Go !! Now is your chance !!". But NATO took very few casualties.

Now, if your aim is to destroy your enemy at the lowest financial cost possible... well, ground troops ARE cheap. Especially infantry. And if your aim is to control a territory without butchering the locals into submission, then yes, you need ground forces to hold and police said territory.

But this means that your nation is either too poor to afford an air force or is a respectable democracy that can't afford to slaughter civilians. Or both of this.

If you continue this line of thinking, then the ICBM makes everything else obsolete.

You can bomb the crap out of a country, but until you can have a guy with a rifle stand on it, you don't control it.

You fight a war to gain something, be it territory, resources, or whatnot. You don't gain anything from obliterating a nation. The best you can hope to do is bomb them until they say "Uncle!" And that is usually a lot of bombing, which is only feasible when you so out resource the enemy that it better not be Plan A.

[Johel]

If you continue this line of thinking, then the ICBM makes everything else obsolete.

You can bomb the crap out of a country, but until you can have a guy with a rifle stand on it, you don't control it.

You fight a war to gain something, be it territory, resources, or whatnot. You don't gain anything from obliterating a nation. The best you can hope to do is bomb them until they say "Uncle!" And that is usually a lot of bombing, which is only feasible when you so out resource the enemy that it better not be Plan A.

You get my point : define why you fight the war, then you can estimate whether or not you really need ground troops.

If you have the power to project your forces across the planet and your own population doesn't worry too much about the welfare of other people, then you can control other countries simply by making clear you can bomb them to the stone age if necessary. Let them govern themselves but ask for tribute and forbid military infrastructure above what is necessary to police their own territory.

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Irak (not the current Irak...) is a good example.
For 10 years, the blocus, combined with the "Oil-for-Food" program basically guaranteed that the rest of the world would get cheap petrol from Irak without even having to put troops on Iraki territory.
Sure, it was a dictatorship and the welfare was low...but the fact is that the Gulf War's victors got a tribute without having to occupy the land.
Each time Saddam got cocky, he received a few slaps on the head, Desert Fox being only the most massive of such slaps.

If you cannot project your forces as easily or if your population opposes blind destruction, then you need to occupy the territory yourself. And then ground forces are necessary.