Got a Real-World Weapon or Armor Question? Mk. VII

[dsmiles]

If C is Chemical, B is Biological and N is Nuclear, the what does the R in CBRN stand for?

Radiological. Why it's separate from Nuclear, I'll never know. The meanings are close enough to the same that they could have left it alone. They probably got tired of hearing NBC = NoBody Cares.

[lsfreak]

If C is Chemical, B is Biological and N is Nuclear, the what does the R in CBRN stand for?

Radiological, I believe. My assumption - I don't actually know for sure - is that Nuclear deals with the detonation of a nuclear weapon, Radiological deals with dirty bombs and raw nuclear material rather than the aftereffects of a nuclear explosion.

[Galloglaich]

Sadly; there is nothing really that has historically survived. None of the axe-fighting cultures wrote anything down about it, there's been no surviving 'sport forms' or off-shoots and stuff like that like there has been with fencing.

That is not entirely true, the Norse for example wrote a lot of stories which had passages about axe-fighting, including some technical details. There are also many other depictions of fighting with axes in European literature, but there are no actual manuals as such, at least not from Europe.

But I think there may be a Mameluke manual which might have some axe stuff in it and there is probably something from India as well.

G.

[Galloglaich]

With all due respect for the US Armed Forces; some other modern military organisations have had just as much, or arguably more actual combat experience in recent years, and haven't elected to drop it from training.

One can roll out the usual comments that it's good aggression and confidence training. They're obvious. It does also teach infantry a someone greater respect for their own weapon system: Soldiers who wave firearms around in a frankly reckless manner suddenly stop doing it when it has a pointy bit on the end that they might take their own eye out with: It's a rather more immediate fear than that of the firearm discharging.

As for being useless: The British Army have fixed bayonets for modern warfare on several occasions in the last 30 years, so it's clearly not a completely pointless martial exercise, either. Unless one considers the British Army green and inexperienced in the field of modern warfare?

What actually disturbs me greatly is the fact that it's being shelved because there isn't time in the 10 week basic training for it. Fair enough: Other skills are more useful and should take priority... BUT:
We aren't at actual war. We have no conscription. There is no need to rush training: Ten weeks isn't enough time to teach a grunt how to effectively fight anyway. Bayonet training hardly takes weeks. Just extend the training schedule. Why is the US Army rushing green troops out of Basic?

I agree, but I think they are rushing green troops out of Basic (and letting criminals into the military and relaxing various other standards) because money is tight. This thing waxes and wanes. Bayonett training has come and gone; whether or not it's used in battle it is valuable because it enhances morale and fighting spirit, much like paratroop training for the 82nd Airborne and amphibious training for Marines.

You also see this change in different stages of a war and fluctuating economic conditions with things like body armor, sidearms, transportation, medical support, veterans support and etc.

I think the truth is this news reflects how our militry is stretched to the breaking point financially and on a whole lot of other levels.

G.

[dsmiles]

I think the truth is this news reflects how our militry is stretched to the breaking point financially and on a whole lot of other levels.

No kidding. We see it every day. Undermanned (womanned?) / underpaid / overworked.

[Galloglaich]

On the Soviets, I would also say that they had a qualitative as well as quantitative superiority over the Luftwaffe by late 1944, and definitively by 1945, at least within the performance envelope which related to Close Air Support.

Luftwaffe were under orders not to engage Yak 3's at altitutde under 5000 meters from 1944 onward, IIRC, which tells you a lot. The La-5FN and La-7 were significantly better than any other German fighter except the very rare Fw -190D, and arguably better than those. The Yak 9 was a close match for the best variants of the Me 109 and Fw 190A. The Sturmovik was vastly more effective than Stukas which were still being used on the front-line or even the more specialized German C.A.S aircraft from Henschel etc. The only real advantage the Luftwaffe had was in jets but the jets they had were fairly useless for tactical operations.

The lend-lease did have a huge effect on spare parts, and also on front line fighters (P-39s, P-40s, and Hurricanes put them close to parity with Luftwaffe fighters, closing a wide gap from the early Soviet fighters) and tactical bombers (esp. A-20) during the crucial turning-point period of the war in 1942 / 1943. But by 1944 the Soviets were producing plenty of materiel...

G.

[Psyx]

That is not entirely true, the Norse for example wrote a lot of...

I think it's a bit optimistic to say 'a lot of' as regards Norse writings. There are tantalising glimpses that point us to the martial skills and 'tricks' that were seen as being 'uber', but without a description of the basics, it's all kinda fluffy and pretty useless. Certainly nobody can look a serious historian in the eye and claim to have properly and fully interpreted Norse axe techniques.

I think the truth is this news reflects how our militry is stretched to the breaking point financially and on a whole lot of other levels.

It could be worse: You could have the 7th largest economy and the third largest military budget... instead of being top of the pile.

At least the US Forces get most of what they want within... oooh... 10 years of asking for it! The British military has been operating with outdated and frankly duff kit for decades.

[fusilier]

The way I understand it, the marching exercises are purely disciplinary in nature.

Well, yes, I was being a bit tongue-in-cheek. :-)

I have an anecdote that relates to this. In the most recent Alamo movie, I helped train the Mexican Infantry. We spent a solid week (not much, but quite a bit in the movie business), drilling different groups and weeding out those who couldn't learn it quick enough. Afterwards the extras were organized into various companies. They were actually looking pretty good, and their maneuvers were pretty tight. When filming began they would collect all the extras in a central area, and as they were needed for different shots call out a particular company or two to a certain location. The commanders (typically reenactors) of the companies would form up their units and march them to the shot.

Well, some of the extras didn't like all this marching and complained to the assistant directors. The reenactors warned the leadership that if they stopped marching it would be detrimental, but they didn't listen and gave into the complaining extras. Discipline fell apart pretty quickly, and even though we spent a couple of days retraining them on set it never completely recovered. :-(

Due to some annoying policies, and unfair (or just negligent) management, I wasn't involved in the early days of filming. By the time I rejoined the action, they had already abandoned marching, and there were some pretty stupid situations. For example there was a scene where our company would advance about 40 yards, but something wasn't right in the background, and we kept having to "reset" back to our original position and do it over again. Instead of simply about facing and marching back to our position, we *had* to break the formation, and reform it which took considerably longer.

[fusilier]

Good stuff! Yeah the Arsenal was impressive. I wasn't aware of the details about the Studio

G.

Yeah, I need to see if I can find my source for that again, but I'm pretty sure that Bologna was a student run university. I think Paris was the model for the master (professor) run university.

Students were often protected by the local clergy, and were eventually given the status of clerics (I'm not sure when that began). Conflicts with townspeople were well known (classic Town and Gown relationships), but sometimes they also ran afoul of other religious institutions:

The scholars of Paris, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, had to face the mortal enmity of the monks of the Abbey of St Germain, the meadow in front of which was claimed by the Faculty of Arts. The sight of Paris students walking or playing on the Pré-aux-clercs had much the same effect upon the Abbot and monks as the famous donkeys had upon the strong-minded aunt of David Copperfield, but the measures they took for suppressing the nuisance were less exactly proportioned to the offence. One summer day in 1278, masters and scholars went for recreation to the (p. 132) meadow, when the Abbot sent out armed servants and retainers of the monastery to attack them. They came shouting "Ad mortem clericorum," death to the clerks, "verbis crudelibus, ad mortem ad mortem, inhumaniter pluries repetitis." A "famous Bachelor of Arts" and other clerks were seriously wounded and thrown into horrible dungeons; another victim lost an eye. The retreat into the city was cut off, and fugitives were pursued far into the country. Blood flowed freely, and the scholars who escaped returned to their halls with broken heads and limbs and their clothes torn to fragments. Some of the victims died of their wounds, and the monks were punished by King and Pope, the Abbot being pensioned off and the Abbey compelled to endow two chaplains to say masses for scholars. Forty years later the University had again to appeal to the Pope to avenge assaults by retainers of the Abbey upon scholars who were fishing in the moat outside the Abbey walls. The monks, of course, may have given a different version of the incidents.

http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/20958

This is a fairly old book (1912), and assumes you speak latin (which I don't), and understand life in a modern (i.e. 1912) Scottish university. Nevertheless, that is one of my favorite, and certainly most morbid, stories about medieval university life.

[Stephen_E]

Correction, they were fielding more in every area of war material. Without lend-lease, the red army would have utterly lost the war in the air, and this would have arguably put their entire war effort at risk. Lend-lease was ridiculously huge in specialist things, like aviation supplies. I don't recall the details, but for some things, the US was providing 80%+ of the supply used. Supply moving stuff, like railway machinery, was even more drastic.

You have to be careful about the Lendlease.
It definitely help the Soviets a lot, but it didn't become significant until early 42, by which time the Axis had already blown their best chance of actually defeating the Soviets.

And as regard air combat, air power doesn't take territory. It helps but when it comes down to it you need troops to actually take territory.
I don't know what the Luftwaffe was like early 42, but I do know that by Stalingrad their ability to support the 6th army in Stalingrad was pretty limited. They simply never had the numbers.

Stephen E

[Norsesmithy]

Or the supplies or the resources.

The German advance was halted before lend lease was contributing to the sharp end of the stick in Russia (though Lend Lease and pre Lend Lease shipments of railway cars did important things, like save the tooling for the manufacture of T34 tanks), for a multitude of reasons. The weather was an important factor, as is the fact that the Sovs were finally managing to replace the assets that were taken by surprise in the initial assault, but one of the biggest reasons IMO, was that Germany's ability to keep the army well supplied was exhausted, due to things like the fact that they were shipping artillery shells to the front by horse cart, and using obsolete tanks to tow tanker trailers of petrol (about as efficient as spilling fuel on the ground and waiting for it to run to your destination).

Russia simply had too much in the way of manpower, industrial capacity, and strategic resources for Germany to defeat on her own, and Germany's political and strategic posture denied her the allies she might have used to make a sporting go of it.

Where Lend Lease comes in is allowing Russia to devote her efforts towards driving the Germans back and then taking Berlin. I'm not saying that it wouldn't have happened anyways, but Lend Lease certainly moved the timetable up significantly.

[RationalGoblin]

I have a silly question: Was the Morthschalag, or Mordhau technique an actual, serious use of a sword, or is just some joker on Wikipedia making stuff up deliberately?

[lsfreak]

I have a silly question: Was the Morthschalag, or Mordhau technique an actual, serious use of a sword, or is just some joker on Wikipedia making stuff up deliberately?

It's serious, and exactly what the article describes. You can see a couple demonstrations buried in here, a grosses messer one at 1:16, and one at the very end of here.

[Spiryt]

I have a silly question: Was the Morthschalag, or Mordhau technique an actual, serious use of a sword, or is just some joker on Wikipedia making stuff up deliberately?

He would have to be quite a joker to make up medieval like illustrations too.

Link


Generally, such grip and strike would be somehow extreme case of halfswording, and most probably wouldn't be sensible in most cases, but obviously would be used sometimes, since it's described in sources.

[Cogidubnus]

I have a silly question: Was the Morthschalag, or Mordhau technique an actual, serious use of a sword, or is just some joker on Wikipedia making stuff up deliberately?

Yes, it was. It's depicted in the sources.

In addition, in a book by John Waller (an experienced re-enactor), this blow is used in the following circumstances.

Combatant A swings his sword up towards his opponent's groin, passing forward on the right leg. B passes backward with his right leg, gripping his sword by the hilt with his right hand and near the point with his left hand, beat parrying the cut away if his movement has not taken him out of distance. He then rotates the hilt of his blade forwards with the left hand, moving his right hand onto the blade below the guard, passing forward with his right leg and striking for A's head with the hilt of his blade.

Just to put in the sort of context you'd use it in. Basically, after that sort of parry or to give you an opportunity to hook your opponent's blade.

[Brainfart]

He would have to be quite a joker to make up medieval like illustrations too.

There was a rather amusing case of fail committed by some silly **** who decided to use a similar depiction of the mordschlag in a demotivational poster. Clear case of not doing the research.

[Psyx]

Russia simply had too much in the way of manpower, industrial capacity, and strategic resources for Germany to defeat on her own, and Germany's political and strategic posture denied her the allies she might have used to make a sporting go of it.

Actually; that's a bit of a misconception. The Soviets was WOEFULLY short of manpower at several points in the war. Many formations were lucky to be at half strength, and only Guards formations tended to resemble the TO&E tables. low-ranking Commissars and other 'non-teeth' members of the armed forces were handed rifles to fight alongside the infantry.
Their industrial capacity near the beginning of conflict was pathetic too. Stalin had instigated his five-year plans to get the Russians up to modern industrial standards, but the third plan (which was cancelled after 2 years due to the war) was well behind it's goals, and the Soivet Union was still in poor industrial state at the commencement of hostilities.

[Stephen_E]

Actually; that's a bit of a misconception. The Soviets was WOEFULLY short of manpower at several points in the war. Many formations were lucky to be at half strength, and only Guards formations tended to resemble the TO&E tables. low-ranking Commissars and other 'non-teeth' members of the armed forces were handed rifles to fight alongside the infantry.
Their industrial capacity near the beginning of conflict was pathetic too. Stalin had instigated his five-year plans to get the Russians up to modern industrial standards, but the third plan (which was cancelled after 2 years due to the war) was well behind it's goals, and the Soivet Union was still in poor industrial state at the commencement of hostilities.

Strength of formation - Once formations have seen combat 80% is about as good as you ever expect to be able to field at any one time.
So 50% is only poor, not shocking. And after the initial Barbarossa, going into 42 spring, I suspect if you looked at the German formations, many were little better.

The Soviet industrial setup was indeed much poorer man for man than the "western" countries, but they had much more "men", and even with the 5 year plans been behind schedule they were vastly improved on the days of the Czar. And crucially the German ability to destroy that industry was limited by the size of the country.

As Norsesmithy pointed out the bulk of German transport system in Russia was horse. The German industry couldn't produce enough transport to even reduce horse transport down to a minority role.

It's a old myth that the Germans hadn't expected the war to last to winter so they didn't have winter uniforms. They did have winter uniforms and other equipment, back in Germany. They didn't have the transport capacity to ship them to the soldiers at the front.

Stephen E

[Psyx]

A formation at 50% strength is -by all conventional military thinking - not combat worthy. not even close. To be honest; anything more than 25% losses is crippling, both in terms of organisation, combat capability and morale.

The Soviets went through cycles of hurling troops to their deaths, and then running out. We have this opinion that Stalin's 'Quantity has a quality all of its own' quote reflected the Soviet strategy, but the truth is that they didn't have sufficient manpower to take losses like that in any sustainable manner.

Agreed on the Winter kit thing. Logistically; it was a choice between jackets and ammunition.
Although if someone ever told me 'We're starting a land war in Asia', I'd be packing a jacket...

[Yora]

though to be fair, they never got that far.

[fusilier]

A formation at 50% strength is -by all conventional military thinking - not combat worthy. not even close. To be honest; anything more than 25% losses is crippling, both in terms of organisation, combat capability and morale.

You're going to have to qualify that claim. Units during the American Civil War were typically at 50% prescribed strength, or less, even before they reached their first battle.

[Norsesmithy]

A formation at 50% strength is -by all conventional military thinking - not combat worthy. not even close. To be honest; anything more than 25% losses is crippling, both in terms of organisation, combat capability and morale.

The Soviets went through cycles of hurling troops to their deaths, and then running out. We have this opinion that Stalin's 'Quantity has a quality all of its own' quote reflected the Soviet strategy, but the truth is that they didn't have sufficient manpower to take losses like that in any sustainable manner.

Agreed on the Winter kit thing. Logistically; it was a choice between jackets and ammunition.
Although if someone ever told me 'We're starting a land war in Asia', I'd be packing a jacket...

50% strength is unacceptable from the point of view of a modern western (American) commander, but was not at all unusual before the era of our modern volunteer army. We aren't talking about 50% losses, we are talking about companies that are actually overstrength platoons, and similar.

What I meant by manpower is that Russia had reserves of men to train, and replace their losses, and build their forces. Germany did not. Germany had to pull men who should have been left working in war vital industries, or even left to farm.

Sure, there were battles where Russia suffered from acute issues of manpower, due to transportation or training issues, but Russia went from the desperation of Stalingrad to the Hammer wielded by Zhukov. Germany was not able to draw up her forces in the same way, and still maintain a useful wartime economy.

[Mike_G]

Historically, even with 50% losses, many units have continued to fight and to function.

large percentage losses of actual combat troops happens a lot. A platoon only has to lose 3 or 4 guys to be down 10%. A squad is down that much with the first casualty. No decent rifle platoon ever became nonoperational because they had 4 guys hit.

Now a division's paper strength include the transport guys, the cooks, the bakers, the mechanics, and the guy who waters the major's oak leaves. But the losses are usually in the rifle platoons, so a 25% loss to a division is probably half the guys who actually do the shooting.

[Stephen_E]

Also keep in mind that if people amongst the cooks ect are sick or considered non-operational for some reason, then that takes down the percentage of effectives while having liitle effect on the normal combat effectiveness.

I say normal because I remember reading about the WW2 Nth African campaign where a NZ unit (comapany I think) had been cut off and surrounded in a retreat. It was presumed lost until a british force came apon it by accident and releived it. The cooks were fighting on the frontline by that time.
Despite that it was still combat effective and wanted the retreating british force that had releived them to join in a counter attack,
They were most disappointed to be told they had to retreat. Crazy bastards. lol

Stephen E

[Psyx]

You're going to have to qualify that claim. Units during the American Civil War were typically at 50% prescribed strength, or less, even before they reached their first battle.

It was what I was taught at RMAS, so I dare-say it's pretty accurate and backed up by a fair few military theorists and quite a lot of practical experience. However, I don't have citable sources to hand.

the guy who waters the major's oak leaves.

/chuckle

but Russia went from the desperation of Stalingrad to the Hammer wielded by Zhukov.

I believe that well into 1943, the Soviet TO&Es were/are viewed as somewhat of an optimistic joke. I should probably have a look at the population figures of Russia at the time, but the wide-scale employment of women in roles such as mortar teams would tend to point to an actual man-power shortage, not just a deficit in training.

[fusilier]

It was what I was taught at RMAS, so I dare-say it's pretty accurate and backed up by a fair few military theorists and quite a lot of practical experience. However, I don't have citable sources to hand.

Yes, I don't doubt that, but it clearly doesn't apply to all time periods. Perhaps it has to do with operational planning? In planning some sort of action a battalion at 50% shouldn't be considered a battalion. Or something along those lines?

[Psyx]

Obviously it's period-sensitive to some degree and most applicable in late C20 warfare as taught. Although I suspect that it might not be a bad rule of thumb across various periods, given considerations of morale. If half your mates are dead, you aren't going to feel great about doing any more fighting, unless you are already up to your neck in it. I suspect that historically, a formation at 50% strength is pretty likely to rout, given half a chance.

War is not a great leveller: Junior Officers typically die faster than anyone else on the battlefield, with NCOs not too far behind in the running. Thus a 50% casualty rate will mean a high-that-that proportion of Officers and NCOs being 'absent', with a knock-on effect on cohesion and organisation. If you have half your men, but only a quarter of your C&C, things are not good.

For operational purposes, 75% is the key number: One wouldn't commit a unit that was operating below that level to any offensive action/operation, and would rotate it out-of-line if it was at all viable to do so. There's no point flogging a horse with three legs, and reserves are there for a reason.
At 50% the unit might as well not be there, and it effectively isn't worth considering on a strategic level.

[Tyndmyr]

Yup. The eastern front was a notorious meat grinder...and both sides frequently used very optimistic organization to downplay the true nature of the fight, and the losses taken.

For instance, as the germans got pushed back, they, in theory, still had plenty of divisions between them and the russians. It's just that those divisions had taken so ridiculously many casualties that they were not functional as such a unit.

Obviously, not an ideal way to run a war, but both germany and russia had a certain degree of disconnect between the guys on top and the guys on the front lines. Happens with everyone to some extent, but it was arguably more common there.

[Storm Bringer]

I have a history book somewhere, where, at one point, a panzer officer form the Stalingrad Kessel is flown out to meet Hitler and explain to him the realities of the Front. The officer sees quite clearly that his efforts had no effect, as hitler, after listening to his tale of woe, then turns to the Big Board behind him and points out the devisions that were forming for a counterattack as they spoke. these were the same divsions that the panzer offcer knew were little more than a brigade of infantry and maybe a companys worth of running (ie working) armour. And that he'd just told hitler that they were in this state.

it was the point where this panzer officer lost his faith in hitler, as it was clear he was totally disconnected between what his Big Board said and what was on the ground, and wasn't willing to listen.

[fusilier]

Obviously it's period-sensitive to some degree and most applicable in late C20 warfare as taught. Although I suspect that it might not be a bad rule of thumb across various periods, given considerations of morale. If half your mates are dead, you aren't going to feel great about doing any more fighting, unless you are already up to your neck in it. I suspect that historically, a formation at 50% strength is pretty likely to rout, given half a chance.

War is not a great leveller: Junior Officers typically die faster than anyone else on the battlefield, with NCOs not too far behind in the running. Thus a 50% casualty rate will mean a high-that-that proportion of Officers and NCOs being 'absent', with a knock-on effect on cohesion and organisation. If you have half your men, but only a quarter of your C&C, things are not good.

For operational purposes, 75% is the key number: One wouldn't commit a unit that was operating below that level to any offensive action/operation, and would rotate it out-of-line if it was at all viable to do so. There's no point flogging a horse with three legs, and reserves are there for a reason.
At 50% the unit might as well not be there, and it effectively isn't worth considering on a strategic level.

It sounds like you are talking about battle losses? A typical ACW regiment would often be at less than 50% strength by the time they reached their first battle. This was due to a variety of reasons, disease, desertion, etc. While those could have an effect on morale the losses occurred over an extended period of time. Replacements were not common in the volunteer army, so any losses incurred usually lasted until the unit was mustered out (2 to 3 years typically). Many units ended their service with 30 or 40 men per company (out of an authorized 100).

Battle casualties inflicted could sometimes be horrendous, like in WW1. Those units appear to keep fighting as commanders lose control over the battle once it begins. However, they would typically receive replacements to bring them up to full strength as soon as possible. Although in some situations depleted units may have been amalgamated until they had a chance to retire from the combat zone. By the end of the war attrition had taken its toll on the Central Powers and their plans had to acknowledge undersized units.

It seems reasonable to me that if a unit takes 25%+ casualties in a given action, it should be pulled out of line and at least given an extended rest (and hopefully replacements).