Without using the internets, what aircraft won the Battle of Britain?

[Stardrake]

Although Hitler's decision to invade Russia during any other month than July and not being done conquering it by end of August helped a lot. (It's not only the Russian winters. At least then, being an immense country with bad roads, made the mud in spring and fall almost as bad as the winter).

It helped, yes, but I think the level of blunder that represented has been exaggerated. Germany came close to taking Moscow (not necessarily a knockout blow, but in a nation which at the time was basically held together by fear of Stalin, losing the capital would have been a major blow to his credibility as a dictator and may have lead to his overthrow) and was initially welcomed as liberators in much of the western Soviet Union (and threw that away by being Those Wacky Nazis).

If they'd prepared better for the winter, managed to not lose the hearts and minds campaign to Stalin of all people, and generally not underestimated Russia quite so badly, Barbarossa could have had a quite different outcome. Weather aside, it's also questionable whether there'd have ever been a better time to invade Russia - Stalin had just gutted the Red Army, and waiting would have given the Soviet military a chance to build back up again, possibly towards Stalin deciding to attack Germany as soon as he decided the odds were good.

So, between how close they actually came and the possibility that Germany didn't attack Russia at a time of its choosing than Russia might attack Germany at a time of it's own choosing, I don't think the choice to invade Russia when they did was really the colossal [censored]-up that many historians present it as.

Now, realistically speaking, of course, Germany would probably have been much better off manipulating Stalin into attacking Finland or Poland first, presenting itself as the protector of Eastern Europe, and avoiding war with Britain, France and, ultimately, the US altogether. But that would have required a level of subtlety, patience and political acumen that the Nazis lacked.

[factotum]

And here I was under the impression that it was the decision by the German leadership to stop attacking airfields and production facilities and instead go after civilian targets that lead to the ultimate outcome of the Battle of Britain.

But that mainly happened due to the decision to send bombers to attack Berlin after some lost German planes accidentally bombed some British homes on one of their air raids, so by that criterion, it's whatever bombers took part in that Berlin raid that won the Battle of Britain.

[Kaeso]

Although Hitler's decision to invade Russia during any other month than July and not being done conquering it by end of August helped a lot. (It's not only the Russian winters. At least then, being an immense country with bad roads, made the mud in spring and fall almost as bad as the winter).

If I'm not mistaken, Hitler could've won against Russia if only he had used some sense. If I'm not mistaken, the Russians didn't really practice scorched earth tactics in WW2, and even then airdrops would've trivialized it. The biggest problem is that Hitler couldn't pick his priorities. His army could either go to Stalingrad, the Soviet Union's industrial center as well as a very sentimental city (it's named after Stalin, after all) or the Caucasus oil fields and their wealth in resources.

Hitler decided to go for both by splitting up his army. The result? The army at Stalingrad got encircled and the Caucasus oil fields were never exploited. 70% of the Nazi war machine was sent out on a wild goose chase that contributed nothing to the war effort except greatly weaken Germany in a time where the odds were already turning against them (The Brits and Free French had won smashing victories at Bir-Hakeim and El-Alamein, while Pearl Harbor meant America had joined the war).

When Hitler split his armies, the war was already lost. The following three years were just very, very stubborn Nazis preferring to send millions of young men to their deaths to surrendering.

[Coidzor]

But that mainly happened due to the decision to send bombers to attack Berlin after some lost German planes accidentally bombed some British homes on one of their air raids, so by that criterion, it's whatever bombers took part in that Berlin raid that won the Battle of Britain.

Somehow I missed that part of the Battle of Britain. I guess it really was a lot more interesting than I had given it credit for.

[Asta Kask]

I don't think any airplane back then was equipped with Internet access.

[Stardrake]

When Hitler split his armies, the war was already lost. The following three years were just very, very stubborn Nazis preferring to send millions of young men to their deaths to surrendering.

It's a little more complicated than that - the Nazis knew they had impressive stuff down the pipeline (including their own bomb project, even if in the end the scientists involved supposedly decided that defeat was a lesser evil than Hitler with nuclear weapons) and a campaign that had had one reversal could have another. For much of that time, it was plausible - from their perspective - that the war was winnable, even if from the perspective of history we can look at it and say 'Yes, THIS is when Germany's defeat became inevitable!'

There's also the question of who to surrender to. Stalin was never going to accept anything short of total surrender once he smelled victory, and even the most dovish Germans feared Russian reprisals in the event of a German surrender... rightly, as it turned out. In fact, after Hitler died and saner heads took over, German strategy basically turned into 'make the point where the Russians and Anglo-Americans meet as far east as possible' - not knowing that the division of Germany after their surrender had already been decided on. (From the German perspective, trying to engineer a war between the Russians and Americans right there - from some anecdotes it came close, including some shooting incidents - might have been even better, but if there were any deliberate attempts to pull this off, I don't know of them).

Even if they could have surrendered to Britain and the US and kept the Russians out, the fear would have been that the surrender terms there would have been even harsher than Versailles... and history shows that they were. The onset of the Cold War and recognition that West Germany was too valuable strategically to destroy helped to save it (along with cooler heads prevailing and pointing out just how much of a humanitarian disaster they were about to create) but the Morgenthau Plan that preceded the Marshal Plan would have created a country that literally couldn't feed most of its population.

Probably the best-case scenario for Germany after the war had turned against them would have been if Operation Valkyrie had succeeded, and the new government had appealed to the West on behalf of Eastern Europe.

[Killer Angel]

I'd say that the BoB was lost by Germany, because in the end there wasn't the Operation Sea Lion.
Even with a more effective air supremacy by Luftwaffe, you cannot conquer an Island without a landing.

I don't recall an example even in fiction... (unless you consider "winning" a wh40k exterminatus)

[Kaeso]

It's a little more complicated than that - the Nazis knew they had impressive stuff down the pipeline (including their own bomb project, even if in the end the scientists involved supposedly decided that defeat was a lesser evil than Hitler with nuclear weapons) and a campaign that had had one reversal could have another. For much of that time, it was plausible - from their perspective - that the war was winnable, even if from the perspective of history we can look at it and say 'Yes, THIS is when Germany's defeat became inevitable!'

There's also the question of who to surrender to. Stalin was never going to accept anything short of total surrender once he smelled victory, and even the most dovish Germans feared Russian reprisals in the event of a German surrender... rightly, as it turned out. In fact, after Hitler died and saner heads took over, German strategy basically turned into 'make the point where the Russians and Anglo-Americans meet as far east as possible' - not knowing that the division of Germany after their surrender had already been decided on. (From the German perspective, trying to engineer a war between the Russians and Americans right there - from some anecdotes it came close, including some shooting incidents - might have been even better, but if there were any deliberate attempts to pull this off, I don't know of them).

Even if they could have surrendered to Britain and the US and kept the Russians out, the fear would have been that the surrender terms there would have been even harsher than Versailles... and history shows that they were. The onset of the Cold War and recognition that West Germany was too valuable strategically to destroy helped to save it (along with cooler heads prevailing and pointing out just how much of a humanitarian disaster they were about to create) but the Morgenthau Plan that preceded the Marshal Plan would have created a country that literally couldn't feed most of its population.

Probably the best-case scenario for Germany after the war had turned against them would have been if Operation Valkyrie had succeeded, and the new government had appealed to the West on behalf of Eastern Europe.

Some interesting points which nuance what I've said earlier. One minor nitpick though: the Versailles treaty wasn't as harsh as Hitler made it out to be. I remember BBC writing an article that actually shows Versailles was pretty lenient (point 9 in the list).

But back to WW2, I guess that even if German command agreed that the war was winnable, surrendering to the Soviet Union was not exactly a pleasant prospect. That, and perhaps seeing the Slavic peoples as untermenschen had something to do with it as well.

EDIT: This does make me wonder something in relation to the websites rules. Where does history end and politics begin?

[Brother Oni]

EDIT: This does make me wonder something in relation to the websites rules. Where does history end and politics begin?

When Roland starts eyeing the ban stick.

[Aedilred]

I'd say that the BoB was lost by Germany, because in the end there wasn't the Operation Sea Lion.
Even with a more effective air supremacy by Luftwaffe, you cannot conquer an Island without a landing.

I don't recall an example even in fiction... (unless you consider "winning" a wh40k exterminatus)

The Anglo-Zanzibar war might count, if you'd call that a conquest. There were land troops involved in securing buildings, but they were native defectors rather than part of the "invasion" force. Of course, that's kind of a special case, and not really comparable to the Battle of Britain...

[Mrc.]

I've read the first page but I just thought I'd add a few things; my grandpa was the gunner in a Bristol Bomber and boy did he have a few tales to tell!

The Spitfire was much faster than the Hurricane, enabling it to more reliably go for the enemy fighters. The Hurricane was able to withstand more punishment due to its size and the materials it was made of. The German planes, having flown from Germany, were often low on fuel and were thus unable to engage in protracted dogfights without risk of having to ditch on the return journey, and if the pilots were shot down they were captured and unable to return to duty. Britain was also turning out a great deal more planes than Germany, so even if the Germans were able to replace the downed pilots, the missing planes were of great concern. Anti-aircraft fire was unreliable at best though, so is easy to discount.

[factotum]

The Anglo-Zanzibar war might count, if you'd call that a conquest.

Wasn't that the war that lasted somewhat less than an hour? (Spoilers: the British won ).

[Stardrake]

I'd say that the BoB was lost by Germany, because in the end there wasn't the Operation Sea Lion.
Even with a more effective air supremacy by Luftwaffe, you cannot conquer an Island without a landing.

That's kinda my point in one of my earlier posts: the aim of the Battle of Britain was to achieve air superiority. Why did they want air superiority? So the Royal Air Force wouldn't be able to interfere with Operation Sea Lion.

Some interesting points which nuance what I've said earlier. One minor nitpick though: the Versailles treaty wasn't as harsh as Hitler made it out to be. I remember BBC writing an article that actually shows Versailles was pretty lenient (point 9 in the list).

Financially and territorially, it was pretty lenient. Symbolically and politically, though, it was nasty - the treaty effectively banned Germany from having a military that could stand up to any of its neighbours, leaving it in the embarrassing position of being reliant on the goodwill of said neighbours for security until Hitler tore it up - a particularly glaring issue at a time when everyone was looking to the Soviet Union with increasingly wary eyes. It didn't help that while the reparations were technically limited to its ability to pay, they did leave Germany particularly vulnerable to the Great Depression. That's not the fault of the Treaty per se, but it does mean that in the historical and financial circumstances, Germany was in a worse shape economically ten years after WW1 than France was ten years after the Franco-Prussian War or West Germany after WW2.

It also didn't help that, historically, Germany thought it was accepting a much more lenient offer made by the US, and France rammed through something significantly harsher, backed by the threat of resuming the war after Germany had already voluntarily withdrawn to its pre-war borders. While it's likely that Germany would have been forced to accept the terms after a few more months of fighting regardless, there was a certain feeling that they'd been made the victims of a bait-and-switch.

So... it was lenient in some respects, incredibly harsh in others (there are few treaties that leave a theoretically sovereign nation effectively defenceless), and its effects compared to other treaties got exacerbated by other events.

EDIT: This does make me wonder something in relation to the websites rules. Where does history end and politics begin?

Good question. I'd presume anything that references current events.

[Aedilred]

Wasn't that the war that lasted somewhat less than an hour? (Spoilers: the British won ).

That's the one! There is debate over precisely how long it lasted, largely to do with technicalities, but somewhere between 38 and 45 minutes.

[Avilan the Grey]

It helped, yes, but I think the level of blunder that represented has been exaggerated. Germany came close to taking Moscow (not necessarily a knockout blow, but in a nation which at the time was basically held together by fear of Stalin, losing the capital would have been a major blow to his credibility as a dictator and may have lead to his overthrow)

I highly doubt even a conquering of Moscow would have actually conquered the nation. Russia is just too big, and Germany's army was just too small.

[Eldariel]

That's kinda my point in one of my earlier posts: the aim of the Battle of Britain was to achieve air superiority. Why did they want air superiority? So the Royal Air Force wouldn't be able to interfere with Operation Sea Lion.

More precisely, they needed something to offset the fact that the Royal Navy controlled the channel. They couldn't just expect to smash through the navy with their own with the strength being what they were so the only way Operation Sea Lion could ever happen was if Germany had some way to protect their landing ships from the Brits just sinking them and they figured air superiority would be what they needed. It's not a bad call either, looking at the war in pacific and how big a part the air forces and Carriers played compared to the more traditional fighting ships (I wanna say "battle ships", but that would no doubt be confused with battleships).

I highly doubt even a conquering of Moscow would have actually conquered the nation. Russia is just too big, and Germany's army was just too small.

Honestly, with Caucasus Oil Fields they could've had a chance. Having to use synthetic fuels (and the shortage there-of) was a huge hurdle for Germany, in addition to the whole "winter"-thingy of course. But an army that can't move isn't much good.

[Killer Angel]

That's kinda my point in one of my earlier posts: the aim of the Battle of Britain was to achieve air superiority. Why did they want air superiority? So the Royal Air Force wouldn't be able to interfere with Operation Sea Lion.

More precisely, they needed something to offset the fact that the Royal Navy controlled the channel. They couldn't just expect to smash through the navy with their own

At a certain point, it was clear the Luftwaffe couldn't afford the losses ratio with air raids. I would have taken my chances with U-boots and air escorts to convoys.

In an Axis and Allies game, I won the war taking England "almost" by surprise, while i was losing in the russian meatgrinder. But I don't know if we can compare the two things...

[Eldariel]

At a certain point, it was clear the Luftwaffe couldn't afford the losses ratio with air raids. I would have taken my chances with U-boots and air escorts to convoys.

I mean, even if you manage successfully landing a large swathe of troops, then what? You need to not only get troops to land but also some means to supply them and if the channel is controlled by Britain, those troops are gonna starve, run out of ammunition, fuel, etc. I greatly doubt Brits will just hand their resources to the invaders and trying to feed 10k or 100k troops over an enemy-controlled channel is gonna be a thing. Hell, even in Normandy the Allied forces were forced to stop expanding the beachhead simply because of the lack of a sufficient supply of materiel (they lacked ports). And this is with complete naval and aerial superiority. Large-scale landings with no supporting ground offensive that can complete the surround and relieve the landing forces are pretty darn hard to pull off at the best of times, and Britain is a bit big to just occupy just like that.

[Gnoman]

I highly doubt even a conquering of Moscow would have actually conquered the nation. Russia is just too big, and Germany's army was just too small.

It doesn't matter how large a country is if you kill it's will to fight, and the USSR was far from one big happy family. Fear of Stalin's vengance played a far more significant role in keeping that empire together than any slogan or national identity could have. Take Moscow, and even if Stalin gets away, he goes from an unstoppable avatar of revenge to a deposed tinpot struggling to hold on to any scrap of power.

It is also important to remember that BARBAROSSA went in later and in lesser strength than the plans called for due to Mussolini's failed Greek adventure. When the entry of Greece into the war opened the entire southern flank of the Axis to Allied attack, Germany had no choice but to take units intended for BARBAROSSA and use them to knock out the new threat, while holding off long enough to ensure that they were fighting only one enemy at a time.

[Avilan the Grey]

It doesn't matter how large a country is if you kill it's will to fight, and the USSR was far from one big happy family. Fear of Stalin's vengance played a far more significant role in keeping that empire together than any slogan or national identity could have. Take Moscow, and even if Stalin gets away, he goes from an unstoppable avatar of revenge to a deposed tinpot struggling to hold on to any scrap of power.

It is also important to remember that BARBAROSSA went in later and in lesser strength than the plans called for due to Mussolini's failed Greek adventure. When the entry of Greece into the war opened the entire southern flank of the Axis to Allied attack, Germany had no choice but to take units intended for BARBAROSSA and use them to knock out the new threat, while holding off long enough to ensure that they were fighting only one enemy at a time.

I still maintain that it would have been highly unlikely, and the cost of the operation would at any rate been too high for Hitler anyway; even if he eventually defeated Russia, he would not be able to control all of it, or even control the physical areas his army had conquered, because of lack or resources. The oil fields would have helped, but it still would not have been enough.
Besides, this was pre-Soviet Union, so the term "empire" is not really as relevant. Even the Russian core lands would still have been too large to hold for long.
Anyway, my point is that even if Hitler had never declared war on western Europe, he would have struggled VERY hard to keep control over conqured Russian territory for any length of time. With a two-front war going? No way. Ever. Not a chance.

Edit: On topic: Some people would also argue Messerschmitt Bf 109, because it was already at the BoB too old for it's role, really. I have no real knowledge in the matter, but I have seen this argument.

[Stardrake]

It doesn't matter how large a country is if you kill it's will to fight, and the USSR was far from one big happy family. Fear of Stalin's vengance played a far more significant role in keeping that empire together than any slogan or national identity could have. Take Moscow, and even if Stalin gets away, he goes from an unstoppable avatar of revenge to a deposed tinpot struggling to hold on to any scrap of power.

Pretty much - even with the SS and the Gestapo being insane, there were auxiliaries recruited from western USSR that continued fighting with Germany as late as mid-1944 when it was clear that Germany was losing. A symbolic blow like taking Moscow would have been very hard for Stalin to maintain his credibility afterwards.

Other things to consider is that while the Soviet Union is a big country geographically-speaking, most of the important parts of it, particularly back then, were in the west, including most of the population, arable land, and, until relocated behind the Urals, manufacturing industries. To a certain extent, Russia got as big as it did because no one else really cared about Siberia. If Germany had been able to take Moscow in the 1941-1942 winter and kept going at a similar rate as before, odds are pretty good that while Russia wouldn't have been conquered per se, it would have been reduced to a state where it was no longer capable of effectively fighting back.

Moscow also has military as well as symbolic significance, as a major rail and communications hub in a country that, back then, didn't have a lot of infrastructure further east and where, as noted above, travel by road is notoriously difficult at many times of the year. While Germany probably would not have been able to immediately make use of the Moscow rail hub, losing it would have made it quite a bit hard for Stalin to keep Russia organised even if it did stay loyal.

It is also important to remember that BARBAROSSA went in later and in lesser strength than the plans called for due to Mussolini's failed Greek adventure. When the entry of Greece into the war opened the entire southern flank of the Axis to Allied attack, Germany had no choice but to take units intended for BARBAROSSA and use them to knock out the new threat, while holding off long enough to ensure that they were fighting only one enemy at a time.

Now, that part I didn't know, although it doesn't surprise me.

I still maintain that it would have been highly unlikely, and the cost of the operation would at any rate been too high for Hitler anyway; even if he eventually defeated Russia, he would not be able to control all of it, or even control the physical areas his army had conquered, because of lack or resources. The oil fields would have helped, but it still would not have been enough.
Besides, this was pre-Soviet Union, so the term "empire" is not really as relevant. Even the Russian core lands would still have been too large to hold for long.
Anyway, my point is that even if Hitler had never declared war on western Europe, he would have struggled VERY hard to keep control over conqured Russian territory for any length of time. With a two-front war going? No way. Ever. Not a chance.

Edit: On topic: Some people would also argue Messerschmitt Bf 109, because it was already at the BoB too old for it's role, really. I have no real knowledge in the matter, but I have seen this argument.

Errr... the Soviet Union most definitely was the Soviet Union during WW2. It formed in the 20s.

As for the rest - as I indicated in my above post, Germany found plenty of allies within the western Soviet Union from people who hated Stalin and greeted the invaders as liberators. They squandered a lot of this by believing too much in their own propaganda, treating those people as untermensch, and ending up being regarded as worse than Stalin... and even then, there were partisan groups that fought both sides because they still couldn't accept allying with Stalin. For a lot of the Soviet Union, all Germany needed to do was to be better than Stalin - not exactly a tall order, but one that in many parts they failed nonetheless - and they wouldn't have needed an occupying army.

Add that to my previous point that Germany didn't need to push all the way to Vladivostok to knock Russia out of the war - it's questionable whether Hitler cared about Siberia at all, and even if he did, once he'd captured the critical regions Germany probably could have gobbled up the rest of Siberia at its leisure, much like the way the Tsars absorbed it in the first place.

On the 109E - I don't think it was too old (although its replacements were already in development), but it was unsuited for the role it was asked to fill as a strategic escort. This was, in fact, the purpose the 110 was supposed to fulfill - but in practice, it turned out that the 110 simply wasn't a match for a single-engined fighter in a dogfight. It is a valid point, though, that what probably saved Britain was that the Luftwaffe never had a true strategic arm - both its fighters and bombers were intended for tactical use and just weren't suitable for long-range strategic bombing campaigns.

[Philistine]

Interestingly, the Germans would use a similar distribution in the daylight bombing campaigns, except they did it the other way around - they used the by then basically obsolete 109G to oppose enemy fighters, while the 190s took on the bombers, even though the Butcher Bird had a better performance, basically because the Focke-Wulf also had a lot more durability and firepower. The 109 really only lasted as long as it did because, like the British 2-pounder antitank gun earlier in the war, the Germans couldn't afford to lose production of new fighters long enough to switch to more up-to-date designs, so they made do with making constant upgrades to the 109 in a frantic attempt to keep up. If jets were available, all of the piston-engined fighters were expected to dogfight while the jets attacked the bombers, although again, opportunistically knocking down a bomber was not frowned on.

It's perhaps worth noting that the Bf109G (and K) had a significantly higher critical altitude than the Fw190A, which gave them a significant advantage over the 190s against the escorting fighters (as those tended to be some thousands of feet above the bombers). Meanwhile the 190s greater firepower gave them a similar edge in knocking down bombers. A number of Luftwaffe aces continued to prefer late-model Bf109s to the contemporary Fw190 marks right up to the end of the war, opining that the Fw was easier for a novice to fly but that the right pilot could get more out of the Messerschmidt.

Once jets were available, no few of the piston-engined types found themselves flying CAP over the jet bases and not intercepting bombers (or escort fighters) at all: the jets were at their most vulnerable when taking off and landing, and the Allies were quick to capitalize on that.

On the American aircraft: the P-47 was an effective single-engined heavy fighter, but lacked the legs for the escort role - when the P-51 arrived, the P-47's greater armour, firepower (eight .50s versus the US standard, including on the Mustang, of six) and carrying capacity made it an important aircraft for ground attack and air cover of Allied ground forces. The P-51, of course, provoked the famous quote from Goering ("when I saw Mustangs over Europe, I knew the war was lost") - until the Mustang was introduced, the US daylight bombing campaign was actually on the verge of having to give up due to the casualties they were taking, and the Mustang turned that around. Until then, it was still in principle possible for Germany to stall the Eastern Front until some new technical or tactical development allowed them to regain the initiative - with their industry being smashed by constant bombing, though, it was all over.

Well... The P-47 (to some extent) and the P-38 (to a much greater extent) flew missions to rather longer ranges in the PTO than their compatriots did with identical machines in the ETO: the difference was flying technique, taught at the level of the operational squadrons. So it seems likely that more could have been done with the existing fighter types, even if the Mustang had never been mated with the Merlin. And then the late-war P-47N added a wet wing which allowed it to accompany B-29s all the way from the Saipan and Tinian to the Japanese Home Islands (P-51 squadrons tasked with the same mission were based on Iwo Jima, halfway between the Marianas and the Japanese mainland), though of course a type which only served in the PTO isn't relevant to the question of "Which USAAF pursuit type did the most to wreck the Jagdwaffe?" (I believe the suggestion that this was the P-47 was probably based on kill counts, rather than on the mission profiles flown by each type. There's also possibly an argument that the P-47s, which arrived in theater well before P-51s did, skimmed off much of the "cream" of the Jagdwaffe, so that the P-51s faced less-experienced opposition - much the same argument is sometimes made for the F4F and P-40 in the Pacific, where IMO it's easier to justify.)

Incidentally, regarding who was winning the Battle of Britain before the Blitz started - from what I've read, a lot of historians consider that Fighter Command was within a couple of days of collapse as an effective force when they got their reprieve. The Germans at that point, though, still had a lot of reserves, even though they were losing at a greater rate (it wasn't actually until the very last stages that the Luftwaffe collapsed as an effective force). The attackers in an air campaign, assuming roughly equivalent capabilities (so not talking about most modern conflicts here...) is naturally going to have higher losses due to having bombers around, being further from bases, pilots bailing out onto enemy rather than friendly territory, and so on. The question is whether the attackers can sustain these losses - the Luftwaffe could.

A lot of ink has been spilled to that effect over the years, mostly based on anecdotal accounts from the participants; but more recent scholarship - looking at squadron readiness reports in particular, and other documentary evidence which was kept classified until relatively recently - has revised that estimate. As I stated above, the RAF was replacing planes and pilots faster than the rate of loss even before the Germans switched to bombing civilian populations; conversely, the Germans were losing planes and pilots faster than their rate of replacement throughout the campaign. So it wasn't really a case of the Luftwaffe being able to absorb the losses; it was more a case of Luftflotte 2 being continuously ground down while Fighter Command just kept getting stronger. That's the exact opposite of what the Germans needed to happen.

And it gets worse. Even if Fighter Command had been driven out of the 11 Group airfields in the southeast, there was a contingency plan in place to move them north into 12 Group bases - from which they could still reach the Channel to cover attacks on a potential invasion fleet, even if they didn't have sufficient loiter time to patrol over the Channel protecting friendly shipping. With the Bf109s already at the limits of their endurance simply reaching London, there was really no chance that the Luftwaffe would have been able to do anything about bases which were even farther past the Channel. So even if everything went perfectly for them, the Luftwaffe was never going to get air supremacy over the Channel and southern England - or even true air superiority on more than a temporary, local basis.

What really saved Britain, though, was the weather. With the technology at the time, there was a fairly narrow window in which a cross-channel invasion could succeed, and the RAF held out long enough for Germany to miss that window. Switching to the Blitz instead, while still not a good strategic decision (mind you, it's from experience in WW2 that we now know that civilian bombing isn't worth it as a military tactic, even putting the moral questions aside) was in part an acknowledgement that Operation Sea Lion wasn't going to happen that year.

Eh, what really saved Britain was the RN. The Luftwaffe and the KM together weren't going to be able to stop the Home Fleet from smashing an attempted cross-Channel landing at will: the KM basically had no heavy units available after Norway, and U-Boats had lousy odds against fast-moving, maneuvering warships; the Luftwaffe for its part fielded mostly twin-engined horizontal bombers which were just not suitable for attacking warships at sea, plus relatively small numbers of Ju87s and Ju88s which could attack more accurately by diving on their targets... but which were desperately vulnerable to flak or fighters either one while doing so. Oh! And no torpedo bombers, so good luck dealing with the RN's heavy units. So even with total air supremacy, which the Luftwaffe could never have achieved, Sea Lion was a pipe dream.

If I'm not mistaken, Hitler could've won against Russia if only he had used some sense. If I'm not mistaken, the Russians didn't really practice scorched earth tactics in WW2, and even then airdrops would've trivialized it. The biggest problem is that Hitler couldn't pick his priorities. His army could either go to Stalingrad, the Soviet Union's industrial center as well as a very sentimental city (it's named after Stalin, after all) or the Caucasus oil fields and their wealth in resources.

Hitler decided to go for both by splitting up his army. The result? The army at Stalingrad got encircled and the Caucasus oil fields were never exploited. 70% of the Nazi war machine was sent out on a wild goose chase that contributed nothing to the war effort except greatly weaken Germany in a time where the odds were already turning against them (The Brits and Free French had won smashing victories at Bir-Hakeim and El-Alamein, while Pearl Harbor meant America had joined the war).

When Hitler split his armies, the war was already lost. The following three years were just very, very stubborn Nazis preferring to send millions of young men to their deaths to surrendering.

There really just aren't a lot of credible scenarios that have Germany flat-out defeating the USSR in WW2. The place is too big, the logistics net is too primitive, the front keeps widening the farther east you go (which adds more strain to the logistics net) - there are a lot of problems, beyond "us[ing] some sense," to the point that it's fair to ask whether using sense would result in an invasion of the USSR at all under any circumstances.

Oherwise... The Soviets absolutely practiced scorched earth tactics in WW2. And no, airdrops couldn't trivialize that. (Though they did try at Stalingrad. It failed spectacularly. The Luftwaffe didn't have anywhere near the lift required to support multiple Field Armies, plus all their associated vehicles, heavy guns, combat aircraft... Even today, nobody has that much airlift.) Finally - by 1942, when the question of Stalingrad vs the Caucasus came up, it was already too late for Germany to win as winter (and German logistical exhaustion) had given the Soviets time to regroup and recover.

I highly doubt even a conquering of Moscow would have actually conquered the nation. Russia is just too big, and Germany's army was just too small.

Supposedly the real command target was some significant distance east of Moscow, leaving Moscow's value as primarily symbolic (and because all the rail lines converged there).

More precisely, they needed something to offset the fact that the Royal Navy controlled the channel. They couldn't just expect to smash through the navy with their own with the strength being what they were so the only way Operation Sea Lion could ever happen was if Germany had some way to protect their landing ships from the Brits just sinking them and they figured air superiority would be what they needed. It's not a bad call either, looking at the war in pacific and how big a part the air forces and Carriers played compared to the more traditional fighting ships (I wanna say "battle ships", but that would no doubt be confused with battleships).

The Pacific War featured aircraft and units specifically armed and trained to attack ships, as well. The Luftwaffe of 1940? Not so much.

At a certain point, it was clear the Luftwaffe couldn't afford the losses ratio with air raids. I would have taken my chances with U-boots and air escorts to convoys.

That's not workable. The U-Boats aren't fast enough submerged to engage warships moving at speed (unless some skipper happens to get very lucky and find something coming right down his throat), and aren't strong enough to fight it out on the surface. The Luftwaffe doesn't have a way to deal with heavy warships at all, and even against light warships has only a very limited number of aircraft capable of dive bombing (which is still no guarantee against a maneuvering target, especially for pilots not trained in naval attack).

It doesn't matter how large a country is if you kill it's will to fight, and the USSR was far from one big happy family. Fear of Stalin's vengance played a far more significant role in keeping that empire together than any slogan or national identity could have. Take Moscow, and even if Stalin gets away, he goes from an unstoppable avatar of revenge to a deposed tinpot struggling to hold on to any scrap of power.

It is also important to remember that BARBAROSSA went in later and in lesser strength than the plans called for due to Mussolini's failed Greek adventure. When the entry of Greece into the war opened the entire southern flank of the Axis to Allied attack, Germany had no choice but to take units intended for BARBAROSSA and use them to knock out the new threat, while holding off long enough to ensure that they were fighting only one enemy at a time.

It doesn't matter how large your army is if you can't keep it in supply, and the Germans were at the end of their logistical tether even before General Winter put his hand in; trying to send a larger force east, or moving the existing forces farther east, would have placed an even greater strain on the inadequate and unsuitable road and rail network in the western USSR. Perversely, attacking with greater force, or the existing force meeting with greater success, would almost certainly have led to the attack bogging down sooner than it did.

[Avilan the Grey]

Errr... the Soviet Union most definitely was the Soviet Union during WW2. It formed in the 20s.

As for the rest - as I indicated in my above post, Germany found plenty of allies within the western Soviet Union from people who hated Stalin and greeted the invaders as liberators. They squandered a lot of this by believing too much in their own propaganda, treating those people as untermensch, and ending up being regarded as worse than Stalin... and even then, there were partisan groups that fought both sides because they still couldn't accept allying with Stalin. For a lot of the Soviet Union, all Germany needed to do was to be better than Stalin - not exactly a tall order, but one that in many parts they failed nonetheless - and they wouldn't have needed an occupying army.

Add that to my previous point that Germany didn't need to push all the way to Vladivostok to knock Russia out of the war - it's questionable whether Hitler cared about Siberia at all, and even if he did, once he'd captured the critical regions Germany probably could have gobbled up the rest of Siberia at its leisure, much like the way the Tsars absorbed it in the first place.

On the 109E - I don't think it was too old (although its replacements were already in development), but it was unsuited for the role it was asked to fill as a strategic escort. This was, in fact, the purpose the 110 was supposed to fulfill - but in practice, it turned out that the 110 simply wasn't a match for a single-engined fighter in a dogfight. It is a valid point, though, that what probably saved Britain was that the Luftwaffe never had a true strategic arm - both its fighters and bombers were intended for tactical use and just weren't suitable for long-range strategic bombing campaigns.

Let me rephrase that: The Soviet Union as we know it was not yet formed. None of the main European "Eastern" (a term originating with the cold war) countries were yet occupied by Russia. Poland, Bulgaria, Romania etc etc were still not members of the Soviet Union.

As Philistine points out, the command center had already evacuated Moscow. It was just a figure head. An important one, especially since Stalin at the last minute elected to stay instead of going east, but still not the "Head" of the "snake" anymore.

Andyes, you are right. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 was old, but not fully obsolete, and the platform was still upgraded, but Hitler had a bit of a fetish for mixed, unoptimized solutions, at least when it came to the airforce.

[Stardrake]

Well... The P-47 (to some extent) and the P-38 (to a much greater extent) flew missions to rather longer ranges in the PTO than their compatriots did with identical machines in the ETO: the difference was flying technique, taught at the level of the operational squadrons. So it seems likely that more could have been done with the existing fighter types, even if the Mustang had never been mated with the Merlin. And then the late-war P-47N added a wet wing which allowed it to accompany B-29s all the way from the Saipan and Tinian to the Japanese Home Islands (P-51 squadrons tasked with the same mission were based on Iwo Jima, halfway between the Marianas and the Japanese mainland), though of course a type which only served in the PTO isn't relevant to the question of "Which USAAF pursuit type did the most to wreck the Jagdwaffe?" (I believe the suggestion that this was the P-47 was probably based on kill counts, rather than on the mission profiles flown by each type. There's also possibly an argument that the P-47s, which arrived in theater well before P-51s did, skimmed off much of the "cream" of the Jagdwaffe, so that the P-51s faced less-experienced opposition - much the same argument is sometimes made for the F4F and P-40 in the Pacific, where IMO it's easier to justify.)

From my reading, a large part of this was the different environmental conditions in the Pacific - the P-38 in particular just performed better in the Pacific, even before considering the different opposition*. The American-designed engines just didn't perform as well in the colder air over Europe as they did in the Pacific. Different flying techniques might also have helped, but engines do often work better at certain outside temperatures - I don't have my books on hand to double-check, but from memory German and British engines, including the Merlin, were (unsurprisingly) better optimised for European conditions and didn't fare as well in hotter climates unless appropriately modified.

I'm not sure about the P-47 having done more to wreck the Jagdwaffe - from what I've read, the Jagdwaffe was winning the daylight air war until the Mustang arrived. It's possible that the P-47 did get higher actual kill counts, and the tactical missions it flew when taken off strategic escort duties would have allowed it to do so, but it was the Mustang that saved the daylight bombing campaign. Now, the P-47N was certainly a beast at long-range work, and was probably developed in part in response to Europe (again, don't have my books on hand) but didn't hit squadrons in time to take part in the European campaign.

*Explanation (I'm sure Philistine knows this, but for those who don't): There were basically two design philosophies for fighters in WW2. The British, Americans, and Germans took an approach of relatively heavy, well-armed and -armoured fighters with powerful engines. The Japanese and the Italians went for agility over power, looking to outmaneuver and outdogfight their opposition. Generally, the latter philosophy lost out due to not having enough firepower (a pair of rifle-caliber machine-guns was common, which worked in 1918 but not so much in 1940...), but the Zero was an exception because it added a couple of 20mm cannon that could knock down its opposition. The reason the Zero reigned supreme early on was because opposing pilots tried to dogfight it, which was taking on its strengths - when the Allies learned to use their own strengths (basically, using the superior speed, firepower, and armour to make passes and refusing to allow the Japanese to dogfight) the Zero fared less well. The P-38 in the Pacific was particularly effective with this tactic, making it one of the most feared opponents for Japanese fighters.

When fighters of the same philosophy clashed, though, a dogfight was the default because neither side had a sufficient speed advantage to make passes (until jets appeared on the scene, of course). So the P-38 in Europe lacked the agility to dogfight with a 109 or 190, or the speed to make effective passes, and so was largely ineffective as an air-to-air fighter in that theater.

For anyone wondering why I didn't mention the USSR - they had a third philosophy that mixed the two. Basically, light airframes and armaments, but with more of a focus on engine power - the theory being that it didn't matter how much firepower you had if you couldn't hit your target, or how much armour you had if your opponent couldn't hit you. This combination worked very well for aces - but, of course, the majority of the Russian pilots weren't aces, and the lack of firepower and armour hurt them. However, it made the Russian aircraft a popular choice for the experienced pilots of international squadrons who could make the best use of the aircraft.

Let me rephrase that: The Soviet Union as we know it was not yet formed. None of the main European "Eastern" (a term originating with the cold war) countries were yet occupied by Russia. Poland, Bulgaria, Romania etc etc were still not members of the Soviet Union.

You're thinking of the Warsaw Pact - the Soviet Union never formally encompassed those countries, although it did make them into puppet states. The Soviet Union became the Soviet Union as soon as Russia became communist in 1922, and did consist of an empire that went beyond Russia itself, including Ukraine from the beginning and having absorbed the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) in 1940.

[Avilan the Grey]

You're thinking of the Warsaw Pact - the Soviet Union never formally encompassed those countries, although it did make them into puppet states. The Soviet Union became the Soviet Union as soon as Russia became communist in 1922, and did consist of an empire that went beyond Russia itself, including Ukraine from the beginning and having absorbed the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) in 1940.

Ah. Hey it's still only Wednesday. Too early in the week to be fully awake. My bad. Yes, I was thinking of the Warzaw pact.

[factotum]

On the 109E - I don't think it was too old (although its replacements were already in development)

I know we're not supposed to use the Internets here, but I was curious so I went and looked it up. The 109's first flight was in May 1935. The Hurricane arrived in November of that year, and the Spitfire in March 1936--so there was only a matter of months between the flights of these aircraft. That doesn't seem like a significant difference to me, so I'd have to agree that it seems more likely the 109 was being used in a role it wasn't suited for rather than it being too old to be useful.

[Avilan the Grey]

I know we're not supposed to use the Internets here, but I was curious so I went and looked it up. The 109's first flight was in May 1935. The Hurricane arrived in November of that year, and the Spitfire in March 1936--so there was only a matter of months between the flights of these aircraft. That doesn't seem like a significant difference to me, so I'd have to agree that it seems more likely the 109 was being used in a role it wasn't suited for rather than it being too old to be useful.

The history of early aviation is really incredibly rapid. Even more so than for cars. the time between Kitty Hawk and the Spitfire is... not that long. It's amazing what war can do

[Killer Angel]

I mean, even if you manage successfully landing a large swathe of troops, then what? You need to not only get troops to land but also some means to supply them and if the channel is controlled by Britain, those troops are gonna starve, run out of ammunition, fuel, etc. I greatly doubt Brits will just hand their resources to the invaders and trying to feed 10k or 100k troops over an enemy-controlled channel is gonna be a thing. Hell, even in Normandy the Allied forces were forced to stop expanding the beachhead simply because of the lack of a sufficient supply of materiel (they lacked ports). And this is with complete naval and aerial superiority. Large-scale landings with no supporting ground offensive that can complete the surround and relieve the landing forces are pretty darn hard to pull off at the best of times, and Britain is a bit big to just occupy just like that.

At least, I would have failed while trying to accomplish something EPIC, rather than throwing my resources into a black hole...


Anyway, mandatory soundtrack!

Spoiler: Relevant text for the OP

Show

Ten ME-109's out of the sun
Ascending and turning out spitfires to face them

[factotum]

The history of early aviation is really incredibly rapid. Even more so than for cars. the time between Kitty Hawk and the Spitfire is... not that long. It's amazing what war can do

Ah, but by that criteria the 109 should have been *better* than the Spitfire and Hurricane, considering it was being developed while Germany was actually at war while the other two were peacetime developments.

[Avilan the Grey]

Ah, but by that criteria the 109 should have been *better* than the Spitfire and Hurricane, considering it was being developed while Germany was actually at war while the other two were peacetime developments.

Again, Hitler had his priorities wrong.
Thank god.