Are we evil?

[Coidzor]

You might even say that they're nasty, brutish, and short.

[Devils_Advocate]

A point often made in discussions like this is that someone could conceivably have any sort of value system at all. And, well, yeah. But seeking only to spread misery and suffering, to give an extreme example, is evil, no matter how internally consistent one's priorities are. Saying that a course of action is moral, ethical, right, etc. doesn't just mean that it's endorsed by a value system that could conceivably exist, or even just that it's endorsed by a value system that does exist.

Some people will say stuff like "'Doing what's right' is still just doing what you want to do" as though that constitutes a criticism, but the idea that your motives are impure if you want to do what you're trying to do makes no sense. Of course you want to do what you try to do, otherwise you wouldn't try to do it! If morality truly had nothing to do with our goals, then we'd have no reason to pay it any heed. But that doesn't mean that we can't distinguish moral concerns as different from -- and more important than -- other concerns.

The idea that we change every moment intellectually, emotionally and molecularly is technically accurate but misses the point. "The same as me" has never been a technical point.

That's kind of what I was saying. Technically speaking, if A is B, then A has all of the properties of B and B has all of the properties of A. When we say that A was B, we seem to mean something like that, but a lot vaguer as far as I can tell. Anyway, let me try to explain the perceived relevance.

The idea that two selfish rational agents can act towards their mutual detriment has been well explored; see the prisoner's dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, etc. And one can argue on that basis that selfishness is bad and altruism is good. Unfortunately, that doesn't seem to quite go far enough, as it's possible for two groups to act to each others' mutual detriment as well. The problem with hurting others for your own benefit isn't that you benefit, it's that others get hurt. Hurting those who you care about less for the benefit of those who you care about more has the same problem. Maximizing everyone's total welfare would seem to require valuing everyone's welfare equally, as presumably favoring some beings over others tends to yield worse results on the whole, regardless of whether the favored beings are "you" or not.

I doubt that the concept of the self holds up under much scrutiny, but that's not actually my main concern here, as I feel that it's a lousy basis for ethical decision-making even if it does hold up. And that group favoritism has a lot of the same ethical problems as selfishness, if not all of the same ethical problems. I do suspect that relating to others works rather similarly to thinking about one's own potential future, though. It's often described as being able to "see yourself in" someone else's circumstances.

It's also missing a mark to say that these values are recent. They aren't. These values show up at least three thousand years ago, and they keep achieving spontaneous genesis among different groups.

And human history is, like, how long? And beliefs existing at all is rather a different thing from them being commonly held. I'm not sure you appreciate how mild the phrase "has only really gained any widespread popularity in relatively recent times" is. I was just trying to counteract what seemed like a sort of implicit absolute claim.

[Murska]

A point often made in discussions like this is that someone could conceivably have any sort of value system at all. And, well, yeah. But seeking only to spread misery and suffering, to give an extreme example, is evil, no matter how internally consistent one's priorities are. Saying that a course of action is moral, ethical, right, etc. doesn't just mean that it's endorsed by a value system that could conceivably exist, or even just that it's endorsed by a value system that does exist.

Some people will say stuff like "'Doing what's right' is still just doing what you want to do" as though that constitutes a criticism, but the idea that your motives are impure if you want to do what you're trying to do makes no sense. Of course you want to do what you try to do, otherwise you wouldn't try to do it! If morality truly had nothing to do with our goals, then we'd have no reason to pay it any heed. But that doesn't mean that we can't distinguish moral concerns as different from -- and more important than -- other concerns.

A mind could conceivably have pretty much any values. And acting according to those values would be 'right' or 'good' in their morality. Just as it might be 'wrong' or 'evil' in ours. Saying that an action is moral, ethical or right means that it is endorsed by our value system, which in most humans is close enough to most other humans that we can make judgments like that even over several minds that technically have slightly differing valus. That's all. This doesn't mean that the concepts right and wrong are meaningless. They are very important to us, directing our actions and judging the actions of others based on our values. But there's nothing beyond ourselves that gives them meaning.

The idea that two selfish rational agents can act towards their mutual detriment has been well explored; see the prisoner's dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, etc. And one can argue on that basis that selfishness is bad and altruism is good. Unfortunately, that doesn't seem to quite go far enough, as it's possible for two groups to act to each others' mutual detriment as well. The problem with hurting others for your own benefit isn't that you benefit, it's that others get hurt. Hurting those who you care about less for the benefit of those who you care about more has the same problem. Maximizing everyone's total welfare would seem to require valuing everyone's welfare equally, as presumably favoring some beings over others tends to yield worse results on the whole, regardless of whether the favored beings are "you" or not.

I would dispute this. If you act in a way that is to your own detriment, you are not acting rationally. Rationality means winning. In the example of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational actor will cooperate by default, but punish defectors. Two rational agents will cooperate the entire time. In the case of a singular Prisoner's Dilemma, two rational agents will still cooperate, because if they simulate the other side in their situation, a defection would result in two defects and cooperation would result in two cooperations. This is part of timeless decision theory.

It's rather simple if you think of it like this. If you are selfish, you want what's good for you. Therefore, you want to take actions that benefit you. If you operate under the assumption that whoever you're playing against acts like you do, you will avoid causing harm on them, so as to avoid them mirroring your decision.

[SiuiS]

And human history is, like, how long?

I agree with everything else you said, but my point was very much that as long as humans have been capable of metathought and had time for metathought, these concepts arise spontaneously throughout history. Just because I have a number that's comfortable doesn't mean the concept is wrong. It means I don't want to quibble with someone who insists history is only really four thousand years, or history before Rome was unreliable, or other such bunk.

I would dispute this. If you act in a way that is to your own detriment, you are not acting rationally. Rationality means winning. In the example of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational actor will cooperate by default, but punish defectors. Two rational agents will cooperate the entire time. In the case of a singular Prisoner's Dilemma, two rational agents will still cooperate, because if they simulate the other side in their situation, a defection would result in two defects and cooperation would result in two cooperations. This is part of timeless decision theory.

Rational means able to think clearly, sensibly and logically. If you value a group then personal loss is rational; everyone who decided not to murder someone who upset them because that's bad for society does this. Selfish means for the self. Something that is done not for the self but still gratifies you through degrees is not selfish. The idea that anything you enjoy is basically selfish is a technicality that has outlived it's purpose. It's not relevant. It's obfuscation.

[Murska]

Rational means able to think clearly, sensibly and logically. If you value a group then personal loss is rational; everyone who decided not to murder someone who upset them because that's bad for society does this. Selfish means for the self. Something that is done not for the self but still gratifies you through degrees is not selfish. The idea that anything you enjoy is basically selfish is a technicality that has outlived it's purpose. It's not relevant. It's obfuscation.

What does thinking clearly, sensibly and logically mean then? Especially 'sensibly'. But other than that, I agree - I don't really understand why you quoted me though. Selfishness has nothing to do with rationality, as rationality is orthogonal to values. You have some set of values to which you have arrived through one method or another, and rational actions are ones that contribute towards those values in the most effective way.

[Donnadogsoth]

{scrubbed}

[Murska]

{scrubbed}

Well, a lot of animals are capable of discovering physical principles such as 'if I knock this shell with this rock, it cracks open and I get food'. And all life is capable of using them, otherwise it wouldn't exist in the first place. Yet, the vast majority of humans are incapable of discovering more universal principles such as quantum mechanics, which are still not in any way fundamentally different from more simple approximations - they're not true and finished, simply more accurate models.

[SiuiS]

What does thinking clearly, sensibly and logically mean then? Especially 'sensibly'. But other than that, I agree - I don't really understand why you quoted me though. Selfishness has nothing to do with rationality, as rationality is orthogonal to values. You have some set of values to which you have arrived through one method or another, and rational actions are ones that contribute towards those values in the most effective way.

You don't understand why I would quote you saying "someone acting selflessly is not acting rationally" and follow up with an explanation of how acts not in your own best interest can indeed be rational? I feel it's self evident. Am I wrong?

[Murska]

You don't understand why I would quote you saying "someone acting selflessly is not acting rationally" and follow up with an explanation of how acts not in your own best interest can indeed be rational? I feel it's self evident. Am I wrong?

I feel there is unresolved confusion there. I said acting in your own detriment is not acting rationally. If you are acting against your values, you are acting irrationally. However, depending on what your values are, sacrificing your own life to save a friend might be perfectly rational.

[Donnadogsoth]

Well, a lot of animals are capable of discovering physical principles such as 'if I knock this shell with this rock, it cracks open and I get food'. And all life is capable of using them, otherwise it wouldn't exist in the first place. Yet, the vast majority of humans are incapable of discovering more universal principles such as quantum mechanics, which are still not in any way fundamentally different from more simple approximations - they're not true and finished, simply more accurate models.

No, that's just trial and error, no hypothesis, no principle involved. When the animal discovers (or rediscovers, as will usually be the case) the, eg, principle of universal gravitation, then we have...an animal of a species-level higher value than all other animals. And if the aliens can do that, they're on that level too, and if they can't, they're not. But there's no telling us we're not on that level, and so there's no telling us that preying on us or anyone on that level is not evil.

[Murska]

No, that's just trial and error, no hypothesis, no principle involved. When the animal discovers (or rediscovers, as will usually be the case) the, eg, principle of universal gravitation, then we have...an animal of a species-level higher value than all other animals. And if the aliens can do that, they're on that level too, and if they can't, they're not. But there's no telling us we're not on that level, and so there's no telling us that preying on us or anyone on that level is not evil.

So what principles exactly are counted? Fire? Wheel? Newtonian mechanics? If a species figures out those but then notices that they are in error, yet is unable to figure out special relativity, what then? Or if they follow a different path entirely?

What if humanity had not discovered the scientific method? Were all humans pre-1600s not human?

[Cuthalion]

Well, Murska's evil.

[Donnadogsoth]

So what principles exactly are counted? Fire? Wheel? Newtonian mechanics? If a species figures out those but then notices that they are in error, yet is unable to figure out special relativity, what then? Or if they follow a different path entirely?

What if humanity had not discovered the scientific method? Were all humans pre-1600s not human?

Fire would be the great touchstone here. Man is the animal who cooks his food. We cannot be sure that hominids predating the use of fire were human, but we can be sure that all after were, even if pockets of descendents here and there remained ignorant of the use of fire.

The aliens in question came here somehow, presumably they had access to a higher form of "fire" that powered their flight from star to star. If they didn't, it would be a point of high dialogue between the two species to see how they had progressed from evolutionary inchoate to starfaring outside of the use of fire.

[Coidzor]

So what principles exactly are counted? Fire? Wheel? Newtonian mechanics? If a species figures out those but then notices that they are in error, yet is unable to figure out special relativity, what then? Or if they follow a different path entirely?

What if humanity had not discovered the scientific method? Were all humans pre-1600s not human?

Defining true sapience is a job for philosophers, xenologists, and neuro-science rather than armchair fans of a comic based on a table top roleplaying game.

We don't need any special considerations like that when we've already got "ability to hold a cogent dialogue" on the table anyway.

If Turing Tests weren't apparently useless things put on by a bunch of silly people who, as far as I've been able to determine, have a significant overlap with the AI researchers who it has been found would routinely let a malicious AI out of its box, that'd be the next step for determining how to categorize something if it can communicate with us.

[Murska]

Fire would be the great touchstone here. Man is the animal who cooks his food. We cannot be sure that hominids predating the use of fire were human, but we can be sure that all after were, even if pockets of descendents here and there remained ignorant of the use of fire.

The aliens in question came here somehow, presumably they had access to a higher form of "fire" that powered their flight from star to star. If they didn't, it would be a point of high dialogue between the two species to see how they had progressed from evolutionary inchoate to starfaring outside of the use of fire.

So, basically, the defining point of moral worth is the ability to invent the use of fire? How about a hypothetical species that is vastly more intelligent than us but lives underwater?

It seems very artificial to me. It's not carving reality at the joints. And it still doesn't answer the question - what objective force has the right to define 'right' in this manner? I would bet that said hypothetical species of underwater geniuses would disagree with this criterion. What makes us right and them wrong? Or, for that matter, a species that has forsaken scientific progress entirely in favour of maximizing the happiness of their individual people, or a remnant of a starfaring species that has lost all of their educated people in a catastrophe and is left subsiding on the scraps of their ancestors.

[Donnadogsoth]

So, basically, the defining point of moral worth is the ability to invent the use of fire? How about a hypothetical species that is vastly more intelligent than us but lives underwater?

It seems very artificial to me. It's not carving reality at the joints. And it still doesn't answer the question - what objective force has the right to define 'right' in this manner? I would bet that said hypothetical species of underwater geniuses would disagree with this criterion. What makes us right and them wrong? Or, for that matter, a species that has forsaken scientific progress entirely in favour of maximizing the happiness of their individual people, or a remnant of a starfaring species that has lost all of their educated people in a catastrophe and is left subsiding on the scraps of their ancestors.

An hypothetical submarine species would still, in principle, be able to recognise the genius of a terranean fire-using species, and vice versa. They are both committing acts of hypothesis and discovery of ideas. The particular ideas are not the question, the possibility of discovering ideas at all is the question. Fire is the most convenient touchstone, as I said. If the capacity for discovering ideas--whether that capacity is employed not--isn't the basis for defining rights, nothing is.

[Eldan]

Still, though. It doesn't sound like a very practical definition. A species living in a vastly different physical environment, like under water or in an atmosphere that isn't conductive to fire, would have no concept of fire. Would that mean they would only count if some outsider explained fire to them?

[Murska]

An hypothetical submarine species would still, in principle, be able to recognise the genius of a terranean fire-using species, and vice versa. They are both committing acts of hypothesis and discovery of ideas. The particular ideas are not the question, the possibility of discovering ideas at all is the question. Fire is the most convenient touchstone, as I said. If the capacity for discovering ideas--whether that capacity is employed not--isn't the basis for defining rights, nothing is.

If your moral worth is defined by your capacity to discover specific, universal scientific principles, then would that not mean that only a few genius scientists have any moral worth at all in our own species?

[Donnadogsoth]

Still, though. It doesn't sound like a very practical definition. A species living in a vastly different physical environment, like under water or in an atmosphere that isn't conductive to fire, would have no concept of fire. Would that mean they would only count if some outsider explained fire to them?

They would only count if a mutual principle could be discovered. Otherwise, we would have no conclusive evidence they exist in the realm of ideas.

If your moral worth is defined by your capacity to discover specific, universal scientific principles, then would that not mean that only a few genius scientists have any moral worth at all in our own species?

Not at all. The uniqueness of a discovery is not what matters morally, but the capacity for apprehension itself. In most people that will mean rediscovering principles originally discovered by others. The principle remains: man is worthy of being treated as a higher species because he can discover said principles, one way or another.

[SiuiS]

I feel there is unresolved confusion there. I said acting in your own detriment is not acting rationally. If you are acting against your values, you are acting irrationally. However, depending on what your values are, sacrificing your own life to save a friend might be perfectly rational.

That's a technicality with enough wiggle room to be a useless statement. Things that exist do indeed exist; hit things are hit; things you do are things you do; following your heart is not not following your heart. Useless.

What do you mean by that? What purpose does it serve to point out that when a thing happens, it happened?

[Murska]

That's a technicality with enough wiggle room to be a useless statement. Things that exist do indeed exist; hit things are hit; things you do are things you do; following your heart is not not following your heart. Useless.

What do you mean by that? What purpose does it serve to point out that when a thing happens, it happened?

Well, a poster mentioned that rational agents can act to the detriment of themselves in things like Prisoner's Dilemma. I answered that it is not so, as rational agents do not act in a way that is to their own detriment. The distinction matters. I'm not sure what you are trying to say, however.

[HalfTangible]

So some background, I was watching this new fall anime Parasyte -the maxim- where these parasites come to earth, bond with existing lifeforms (usually humans), take over their bodies and then proceed to eat people. When the main character asks one of these parasites "You guys are monsters, why are you doing this?" the parasite responds with "We're not monsters, we're eating humans for food." At this point there have been about 80 of these strange murders caused by these things. The parasite then asks "Aren't humans really the monsters? How many millions of things do you kill each year and eat?" Its this statement that prompted this post.

Picture a world where these ravenous creatures existed that enslaved and consumed the other, less intelligent creatures of that world. So great was their hunger that entire species went extinct in an attempt to satiate them. They forced the ones that didn't die out to mate in order to produce more food. They ate creatures of every gender and age, young, old, the strong, the weak and even the unborn.

Now realize that thats humans. Is there any horror story that can compare to what humans do on a daily basis? Don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating a vegan lifestyle, meat tastes too good. Its just that this parasite thing kind of had a point, we justify doing what we do to animals because we're at the top of the food chain. If we found out there was something else above us, can we really complain if they do the same to us?

Hmmmm...

No.

The central flaw the parasite exposes here is the assumption that eating something that your species is designed to eat makes you evil. The parasites are the antagonists because we're human, and we can empathize with a human's struggle far more than the parasite trying to kill us. I haven't read the series, so I can't make accurate comments on it, but from your description I get the impression that the parasites are considered 'evil' because they terrorize humans, not because they eat them.

Also, boiling down all extinction events to 'humans were hungry' is extremely inaccurate. Off the top of my head, the buffalo went near-extinct in America because of the transportation industry. Cows, chickens and other domesticated animals aren't going extinct and we constantly eat them.

[veti]

Also, boiling down all extinction events to 'humans were hungry' is extremely inaccurate. Off the top of my head, the buffalo went near-extinct in America because of the transportation industry. Cows, chickens and other domesticated animals aren't going extinct and we constantly eat them.

The OP didn't say that was the only reason for extinctions, just that it has happened, and I think that's undeniable. The dodo is the most famous example, but others would include the moa, stellar sea cow, Pyrenean ibex, and very probably the woolly mammoth. See also 'overfishing'.

Another way of driving animals to extinction is to clear the land on which they live, in order to cultivate something that we do eat. That's accounted for several more species.

Personally I think there's a lot of agonising about nothing in this thread. They're eating people, therefore they're the enemy. Good or bad... seriously, who cares? Just kill them already.

[SiuiS]

The OP didn't say that was the only reason for extinctions, just that it has happened, and I think that's undeniable. The dodo is the most famous example, but others would include the moa, stellar sea cow, Pyrenean ibex, and very probably the woolly mammoth. See also 'overfishing'.

Another way of driving animals to extinction is to clear the land on which they live, in order to cultivate something that we do eat. That's accounted for several more species.

Personally I think there's a lot of agonising about nothing in this thread. They're eating people, therefore they're the enemy. Good or bad... seriously, who cares? Just kill them already.

Yeah. That's pretty straightforward. It's never been about whether or not to kill them, though. It's about how bad you should feel about it afterwards, and if that feel bad is enough to maybe stop you.

[TuggyNE]

Well, a poster mentioned that rational agents can act to the detriment of themselves in things like Prisoner's Dilemma. I answered that it is not so, as rational agents do not act in a way that is to their own detriment. The distinction matters. I'm not sure what you are trying to say, however.

You're assuming that "acting against one's values" and "acting to one's detriment" are formally equivalent. Why?

Note that a number of value systems make a point of mentioning situations in which the right thing to do (according to them) is one that will harm the actor, which to most people would be considered "detrimental". You could, I suppose, claim that these are fundamentally irrational systems, but such a claim requires very strong proof indeed, and tossing that sort of thing off as an implication of an unstated assumption simply isn't cricket.

I suppose you could be trying to say that rational agents never act according to their ultimate, end-of-the road detriment, but that seems to miss the mark of the discussion, since e.g. Prisoner's Dilemma is predicated, not on some sort of lifetime reward or net effect, but the isolated consideration of what falls out at the end of the Dilemma. And honestly, even this much weaker claim seems like it's entirely too strong to leave assumed, and still worse, unstated.

[Murska]

You're assuming that "acting against one's values" and "acting to one's detriment" are formally equivalent. Why?

Note that a number of value systems make a point of mentioning situations in which the right thing to do (according to them) is one that will harm the actor, which to most people would be considered "detrimental". You could, I suppose, claim that these are fundamentally irrational systems, but such a claim requires very strong proof indeed, and tossing that sort of thing off as an implication of an unstated assumption simply isn't cricket.

I suppose you could be trying to say that rational agents never act according to their ultimate, end-of-the road detriment, but that seems to miss the mark of the discussion, since e.g. Prisoner's Dilemma is predicated, not on some sort of lifetime reward or net effect, but the isolated consideration of what falls out at the end of the Dilemma. And honestly, even this much weaker claim seems like it's entirely too strong to leave assumed, and still worse, unstated.

I just used 'detriment' as defined to mean something that goes against one's values. Thus, 'rational agents don't act to their own detriment' simply means 'rational agents do not act against their own values' where rationality is defined as acting towards your own values. I hope the confusion is now dissolved as I don't think there's any point in debating a tautology any further.

In Prisoner's Dilemma, the rational decision is to cooperate. If we assume that two cooperations give out 3 utilons to both participants, two defects pay out 1 utilon to each and one defect and one cooperate gives 0 to the cooperative and 6 to the defector, for instance, then what happens if two identical agents meet, they act in the same way every time as their reasoning processes are mirrored, so they can either precommit to cooperate and get 3 utilons or precommit to defect and get 1. The rational choice is the former.

[Donnadogsoth]

The OP didn't say that was the only reason for extinctions, just that it has happened, and I think that's undeniable. The dodo is the most famous example, but others would include the moa, stellar sea cow, Pyrenean ibex, and very probably the woolly mammoth. See also 'overfishing'.

Another way of driving animals to extinction is to clear the land on which they live, in order to cultivate something that we do eat. That's accounted for several more species.

Personally I think there's a lot of agonising about nothing in this thread. They're eating people, therefore they're the enemy. Good or bad... seriously, who cares? Just kill them already.

The philosophy comes in when we win the war against them. Should we exterminate them, enslave them, give them a bloody nose and back off, or attempt to come to terms? If they're people, we attempt to come to terms, if possible. If they're not people, we don't and may end up eating them.

Though I should add that I've met enough people online who exhibit no ability or desire to distinguish human from beast, so without a philosophy that grants us humans a special status among animals, I think there would be plenty of people who wouldn't even bother to fight the aliens, out of misguided compassion, inferiority complex, or quietism.

[TuggyNE]

I just used 'detriment' as defined to mean something that goes against one's values.

*insert Princess Bride quote here* "Detriment" is not conventionally defined in terms of "going against values", but in terms of harm (per OED, M-W, etc etc etc). So no, it's not a tautology. It's a novel and unusual definition, upon which your entire argument hangs. Therefore, as previously noted, you can't just brush it under the rug; you must rigorously defend exactly why this definition is correct, or why it is semantically equivalent to the usual, or whatever. Otherwise the argument falls on its face at the starting blocks.

[SiuiS]

Thank you for articulating my vague thoughts, Tuggy.

[Murska]

*insert Princess Bride quote here* "Detriment" is not conventionally defined in terms of "going against values", but in terms of harm (per OED, M-W, etc etc etc). So no, it's not a tautology. It's a novel and unusual definition, upon which your entire argument hangs. Therefore, as previously noted, you can't just brush it under the rug; you must rigorously defend exactly why this definition is correct, or why it is semantically equivalent to the usual, or whatever. Otherwise the argument falls on its face at the starting blocks.

Because I am claiming that is what I intended to say? If my definition was poor, I apologize - I am not a native speaker, and have thus made a mistake in communicating my thoughts. However, I hope I have now made my meaning perfectly clear, and would much rather defend that if anyone finds anything in it to question, rather than discussing words.

EDIT: Ah, yes. In the context of Prisoner's Dilemma specifically, detriment is functionally equivalent to not getting the best possible outcome, as the game is abstracted to only contain the four possible outcomes which are clearly ranked in preference.