Pointless philosophical debates

[halfeye]

If a debate is pointless it isn't philosophical.

Also, if a debate is philosophical, it isn't pointless.

Compare philosophy to logic.

[golentan]

I'm sorry. Is that p-zombie in the same way therianthropes use shift and P-shift?

A p-zombie is short for philosophical zombie. It's an object indistinguishable from a human being, with all the appropriate responses to external stimuli, but no internal consciousness.

[halfeye]

A p-zombie is short for philosophical zombie. It's an object indistinguishable from a human being, with all the appropriate responses to external stimuli, but no internal consciousness.

How did anyone expect to discriminate one of those from a human?

[golentan]

How did anyone expect to discriminate one of those from a human?

They didn't. That's the point. If something has neither soul or mind, or any other way you want to phrase it, but acts exactly like it does, how is it ever going to be possible to tell and what are the ethical implications of such a being? That's the central question of a philosophical zombie. Also the question is raised: how do you know the people around you are people? How do you know you're a person rather than just repeating "I think therefore I am?" What is the nature of thought?

[halfeye]

They didn't. That's the point. If something has neither soul or mind, or any other way you want to phrase it, but acts exactly like it does, how is it ever going to be possible to tell and what are the ethical implications of such a being? That's the central question of a philosophical zombie. Also the question is raised: how do you know the people around you are people? How do you know you're a person rather than just repeating "I think therefore I am?" What is the nature of thought?

If you're not religious, that just sounds like a person.

Which may be the point, but if you think that p-zombies don't have rights, then I have a Reich I want to sell you shares in.

[SiuiS]

A p-zombie is short for philosophical zombie. It's an object indistinguishable from a human being, with all the appropriate responses to external stimuli, but no internal consciousness.

That's sort of ridiculous.

How did anyone expect to discriminate one of those from a human?

You've answered yourself.

If you're not religious, that just sounds like a person.

Incorrect. All forms of philosophy and logic acknowledge the idea of consciousness. Only the term "soul" could be considered religious.

Which may be the point, but if you think that p-zombies exist, then I have a Reich I want to sell you shares in.

Fixed for ya

[halfeye]

Fixed for ya

So you did.

[golentan]

I think it's an interesting concept. Of course, if someone tells me they're a person I'm going to believe them, but a P-zombie is interesting, especially as pertains to computer science.

[halfeye]

I think it's an interesting concept. Of course, if someone tells me they're a person I'm going to believe them, but a P-zombie is interesting, especially as pertains to computer science.

Nah, it's just another word for person. If you want to treat p-zombies as different from people, they've conned you. The point is, you can't tell unless you can see the soul. Which is to say, unless you are Ghod, or have his blessing.

[golentan]

But see, where it gets interesting to me is the question of when we map the brain sufficiently, or design a computer that passes the turing test and then some. You know the physical processes and lines of code that give rise to the perceived consciousness at that point. Does that make it any less real? I'd say no, a person's a person's a person, full stop, but if someone breaks out the philosophical zombie argument because the consciousness is a machine that can be predicted by tracing lines of code, we're going to have to have it out, and ultimately are they right in some way? Because I don't care if I or the people I care about are p-zombies, I still care, but does that make my position logically correct or just axiomatically stubborn?

[SiuiS]

It's not that p zombies are people too, it's that people are all p zombies and there is no relevant distinction. It's basically " so what if solipsism was valid sorta?"

[halfeye]

It's not that p zombies are people too, it's that people are all p zombies and there is no relevant distinction. It's basically " so what if solipsism was valid sorta?"

Yeah.

I think you just said what I was thinking. Or maybe not. I suspect that there is a level of thought below/beyond language, but so far as thought can be languaged, yeah..

[Jeff the Green]

See what I was saying? You can have reasonable discussions about them; they're just utterly pointless because according to our current understanding of cognition they're not possible.

[veti]

It's not that p zombies are people too, it's that people are all p zombies and there is no relevant distinction. It's basically " so what if solipsism was valid sorta?"

Well, no. I know I'm not a p-zombie - my evidence for having internal feelings is a lot better than my evidence for any of you existing at all. I can't share it with you, but that's not my problem, I still know it.

Therefore it makes very little sense to assume that the other people I perceive are internally any different from me. Occam's razor and all that - a universe in which two different types of"people" exist is significantly harder to explain than one where all "people" work on the same lines.

What if you could 'save' the p-zombie's state, like saving a video game, then easily reload the mind into an identical body? Then killing the pz is easily reversible - is it still just as bad as killing a regular person?
.

[golentan]

So... Say you're straddling the international dateline, and it's new year's eve. Which midnight do you toast at?

[Bhu]

What is fun?

Pointless, indiscriminate use of fire, high explosives, lasers, or electricity.

[SiuiS]

So... Say you're straddling the international dateline, and it's new year's eve. Which midnight do you toast at?

Yes.

Pointless, indiscriminate use of fire, high explosives, lasers, or electricity.

Hehehehehe.

[Jeff the Green]

Pointless, indiscriminate use of fire, high explosives, lasers, or electricity.

Don't forget the EtOH! Though that usually comes before the fire, high explosives, lasers, or electricity.

[Jay R]

To examine these philosophical questions requires precision of language, so let's clear up a couple of side issues.

They didn't. That's the point. If something has neither soul or mind, or any other way you want to phrase it, but acts exactly like it does, how is it ever going to be possible to tell and what are the ethical implications of such a being? That's the central question of a philosophical zombie.

Oh, why stop there? I don't even know that you rise to the level of a philosophical zombie. The people around me do, but I have no evidence that you are anything but a Turing program. After all, you don't do anything except make words appear on my screen.

But the underlying answer is this: Mind and awareness (other than my own) are inferred from people's actions. There is no other hypothesis that, in Plato's phrase, "preserves the appearances," that is, explains the actual phenomena I observe each day.

In its most basic form, it's inductive logic. When I drop a hammer on my toe, I yell because I can feel pain. When others drop hammers on their toes, I observe that they yell, so I infer that they can feel pain. From this I deduce awareness.

It might of course be possible to construct a philosophical zombie that feels no pain but nonetheless yells when a hammer is dropped on its foot. It might be possible to create a zombie that eats without feeling hunger, converses without understanding words, and otherwise simulates all thoughts and feelings without processing them. But the appearance that must be preserved is this: there are seven billion creatures who simulate the same feelings and thoughts that I think and feel via the same actions I use.

The hypothesis that they are nonetheless completely alien from me, and behave the same way I do for totally different reasons than I do is far less likely than the hypothesis that they are like me in all ways that they appear to be.

Also the question is raised: how do you know the people around you are people?

This is a semantic question, not a philosophical one. I know that they are persons because that's how the word "person" was defined. The philosophical question is this - how do I know that any persons (other than myself) possess personal awareness and consciousness?

How do you know you're a person rather than just repeating "I think therefore I am?"

Repeating it to whom? That's how I know I exist as a self-aware person. That was the point of Pascal's long discussion that is summed up inadequately as "I think therefore I am."

What is the nature of thought?

The nature of thought is already presupposed by the asking of the question - indeed, by asking any question at all.

[Anarion]

All of the "what if reality were different in a way I'm incapable of perceiving" questions beg for the hypothetical to be rejected. They're upsetting because we think there's something special about a person and therefore some robotic program would be distinguishable. Another one is like asking if there's a difference between having a good friend and having a person who's a perfect actor that's secretly paid to act like your friend, but you never find out before you die. If you'd prefer the former, it's because you're emotionally rejecting the hypothetical and don't really believe a person could perfectly act out friendship.

So... Say you're straddling the international dateline, and it's new year's eve. Which midnight do you toast at?

You take 100% of the excuses to drink champaign, silly.

[Grinner]

The hypothesis that they are nonetheless completely alien from me, and behave the same way I do for totally different reasons than I do is far less likely than the hypothesis that they are like me in all ways that they appear to be.

Early in the history of AI research, there was a certain program developed, called ELIZA. ELIZA was really just a complicated text parser, and it was the first example of what would later become known as "chatterbots". Using rules from a script, ELIZA would formulate a response to questions or statements presented to it. One script, called DOCTOR, was remarkably successful, even with people who knew it was just a program.

The tendency for people to give the program the benefit of the doubt was dubbed the "ELIZA effect".

The story doesn't end there, though. I remember reading an article in a book called Metamagical Themas where the author recounts a story of participating in a Turing Test of sorts. I don't have the book at hand, so forgive me if I make a few errors in relating it.

He was given the opportunity to determine if a new military AI was, in fact, intelligent. The proctors sat him at a computer, and he proceeded to converse with the program. After trying to trap it for some time, sometimes getting close but never close enough, he gave up. Then, the proctors led him to meet the AI in person.

There was never any AI. He had been conversing at random with three different people a few rooms over.

The point here is that you never really know if others are what they present themselves to be. Moreover, you have an inherent tendency to give them the benefit of the doubt. Even when you think you've got it all figured out, it's far from impossible for someone to pull a fast one on you.

This is a semantic question, not a philosophical one. I know that they are persons because that's how the word "person" was defined. The philosophical question is this - how do I know that any persons (other than myself) possess personal awareness and consciousness?

If an illusion is so perfect as to be indistinguishable from the real, then what differentiates it from the real?

I think what the real question here is "What is real?". Is there some quintessential element of realness? Problematically, such broad questions are frequently resistant to conclusive investigation precisely because they are so broad.

All of the "what if reality were different in a way I'm incapable of perceiving" questions beg for the hypothetical to be rejected.

However, the question in and of itself is hypothetical. If you reject the hypothetical option out of hand in favor of what might be called the reasonable option, you may as well not even bother wasting time to consider the question. It makes the whole enterprise kinda pointless, fittingly.

[Jay R]

The point here is that you never really know if others are what they present themselves to be. Moreover, you have an inherent tendency to give them the benefit of the doubt. Even when you think you've got it all figured out, it's far from impossible for someone to pull a fast one on you.

True. But those were isolated situations. In the case being presented, the question is whether it is reasonable to believe that the world has successfully produced seven billion things so alien in essence from me via the same process that produced me, and then attempt to reason from that premise...

.. or to conclude that the premise is incorrect and believe that they are like me.

If an illusion is so perfect as to be indistinguishable from the real, then what differentiates it from the real?

And the scientific approach compels one, after considering that question earnestly, to conclude, via observation and experimentation, that nothing separates them from the "real", and therefore to conclude that they are in fact real.

I think what the real question here is "What is real?". Is there some quintessential element of realness? Problematically, such broad questions are frequently resistant to conclusive investigation precisely because they are so broad.

Perhaps. Or perhaps they are resistant to logical analysis because the premise is not logical.

However, the question in and of itself is hypothetical. If you reject the hypothetical option out of hand in favor of what might be called the reasonable option, you may as well not even bother wasting time to consider the question. It makes the whole enterprise kinda pointless, fittingly.

Yes, but nobody here has rejected the hypothetical option out of hand. If, instead, we carefully consider the hypothetical option and conclude that it is impossible, then we undertook the enterprise and concluded that it is based on a false hypothetical premise.

Similarly, if you hypothesize that a kitten was born to a pair of dogs. and ask us to speculate on the effect on our knowledge of DNA, a good faith consideration of the DNA issue leads to the conclusion that it is impossible, and the hypothesis is in fact false.

[golentan]

There's no such thing as an illogical premise. There are mutually incompatible premises which you cannot include together in the same formal logic structure, but a premise is the building block of logic from which other things are built, and any premise which does not somehow contradict itself can be used to build a logical argument from deductive reasoning, and regardless of whether that argument matches reality if it is internally self consistent it is logically sound and hypothetically possible, if not in this universe in some universe. Deductive reasoning answers "why," but offers little guarantee of relevance to the world around you.

Inductive reasoning is fuzzier because it must be logically consistent with the observed universe, but you can never get down to absolute certainties because it can only provide extremely high likelihoods for its inducted premises to be true. Inductive logic is wonderful, but it can't answer why, only hypothesize as to "what," and "how."

Also, I don't accept that a human being who can't think is a person any more than I accept that anything else that can is not a person, so it's not a semantic question for me. I think if you give the illusion of thought, though, you're a thinking being. A turing machine is a person!

[Jay R]

There's no such thing as an illogical premise.

Sigh. Red herring duly noted. I should have called it a false premise. And any conclusion you draw from a false premise is useless - the proof tells you nothing about its truth value.from falsity, you can prove anything logically.

Also, I don't accept that a human being who can't think is a person any more than I accept that anything else that can is not a person, so it's not a semantic question for me. I think if you give the illusion of thought, though, you're a thinking being. A turing machine is a person!

Giggle. You just made it a semantic question, by defining it in terms of a definition of as person that others don't accept.

[Grinner]

True. But those were isolated situations. In the case being presented, the question is whether it is reasonable to believe that the world has successfully produced seven billion things so alien in essence from me via the same process that produced me, and then attempt to reason from that premise...

.. or to conclude that the premise is incorrect and believe that they are like me.

Well, you've got 50/50 odds on being correct, and it can't really be proven either way.

Mind you, not necessarily the same process that produced all these supposed automatons produced you. It depends entirely on the particular scenario you have in mind.

Perhaps. Or perhaps they are resistant to logical analysis because the premise is not logical.

How so?

The reason I say they are resistant to analysis is simply because they represent such broad ranges of possibility. What compels you to think that they are inherently illogical?

[Jeff the Green]

Well, you've got 50/50 odds on being correct, and it can't really be proven either way.

Mind you, not necessarily the same process that produced all these supposed automatons produced you. It depends entirely on the particular scenario you have in mind.

That is not how statistics works.

[TuggyNE]

Well, you've got 50/50 odds on being correct, and it can't really be proven either way.

Did... did you just use the Principle of Indifference on solipsism?

[Grinner]

That is not how statistics works.

And how would you go about assigning probabilities?

Edit:

Did... did you just use the Principle of Indifference...

There's a word for it? Cool!

[Jeff the Green]

And how would you go about assigning probabilities?

First, if you're starting with an entirely naive prior, every alternative hypothesis has to have equal probabilities. However, the probabilities are not p(p-zombies) and p(¬p-zombies), they're p(p-zombies) and every other explanation you can think of.

More importantly, though, the prior for p(p-zombies) pretty much has to be greater than p(¬p-zombies) because the former postulates the existence of two kinds of humans and the latter postulates the existence of one.

[BannedInSchool]

There was a story in Analog in which they identified a pattern in the brain that was consciousness and some people didn't have it. I'm a little hazy how they identified it, possibly by suppressing it and people reporting the experience of being a zombie. Anywho, supposedly proved that some people weren't really people. And again I'm vaguely remembering society reacted badly, and the twist ending was the protagonist had falsified the results for his wife. Happy New Year!