Got a Real-World Weapon, Armor or Tactics Question? Mk. XVII

[GraaEminense]

Only in a world where nobody poops. Saltpetre is a natural byproduct of decaying dung (which is why bat guano is a material component of Fireball). Indeed, all three of the ingredients for black powder are extremely easy to get.

It still took a lot of time for black powder to be discovered, and more for it to be widespread. Having the recipe be a jealously guarded secret of a small alchemical guild would make captured guns of limited use and captured black powder a prized resource.

I really like the demon guns, though. Or add some fantasy ingredient to the powder -dragon guano or bound fire elementals or something.

[Honest Tiefling]

I do too, and it works since the idea is that guns are magically bound so only demons, their followers, or people with demonic blood can use them to prevent the majority of their enemies from trying to use them. Some might might even magically explode if used by the wrong people. They still want to keep black powder a secret, because well, the stuff is useful and dangerous. So yes, guns would be made by a few craftsmen as opposed to being made in a factory.

Odd question I thought I'd never type, exactly how would one stumble upon the process of extracting potassium nitrate from poop?

[Gnoman]

It still took a lot of time for black powder to be discovered, and more for it to be widespread. Having the recipe be a jealously guarded secret of a small alchemical guild would make captured guns of limited use and captured black powder a prized resource.

For one thing, that's a different concept than the material scarcity that was suggested.

For another, stealing or reverse-engineering the formula didn't actually take that long. Europeans first encountered it in 1241 (possibly earlier, there's a lot of confusion between gunpowder and older incendiary agents in the earliest period), it became common in the Arabic world by 1280, and there is conclusive European recipes from 1300, meaning that at the absolute longest it took Europe a mere 59 years (considering the travel times of the era, this is pretty short) from the first encounter with gunpowder to making it themselves.

Gunpowder not being discovered at all is reasonable, keeping the formula secret once you start using it is not. It's a very simple formula made from very simple ingredients, and it retains enough properties of sulfur and charcoal that saltpetre is the only ingredient that it is possible to keep secret, and it would inevitably get out that you were collecting it on a large scale. The exact proportions would require experimentation, but the proportions needed are so basic that this wouldn't take too long or kill too many alchemists to do so.

[Galloglaich]

For one thing, that's a different concept than the material scarcity that was suggested.

For another, stealing or reverse-engineering the formula didn't actually take that long. Europeans first encountered it in 1241 (possibly earlier, there's a lot of confusion between gunpowder and older incendiary agents in the earliest period), it became common in the Arabic world by 1280, and there is conclusive European recipes from 1300, meaning that at the absolute longest it took Europe a mere 59 years (considering the travel times of the era, this is pretty short) from the first encounter with gunpowder to making it themselves.

Well, a bit earlier than that I think. The 1300 date is for the Liber Ignium, which has the first 'modern' (ish) gunpowder formula, but earlier versions were published by Roger Bacon in 1267 and Albertus Magnus around 1270. There is also records of gunpowder weapons being used in Spain in 1248 (I think by the Moors)

One of the tricky parts of making gunpowder (which Fusilier and Incannur and I debated in an earlier incarnation of this thread) that was really useful though was in getting the salt of St. Peter processed properly, that is to say as mostly Potassium Nitrate instead of Calcium Nitrate. The latter will burn but is much more vulnerable to being rendered inert by moisture. Liber Ignium contains a recipe for processing the 'nitre' which was the base ingredient. So that could be another way to limit the spread of gunpowder in a fantasy world (at least for a while); keep the secret of the Salt of St. Peter.

Another major technological improvement in black powder or gunpowder was when they figured out how to process it with alcohol (and other fluids) to make so-called corned powder around 1450. Before that black powder had to be mixed in the field because it would separate into it's component materials when shaken. Corned powder was also much more powerful.


The original discovery of the pyrotechnic qualities of the Potassium Nitrate came about some time around the 8th or 9th Century apparently as a result of Chinese Alchemical experiments which were seeking potions of eternal life.

G

[goto124]

How well did armor protect the neck? Feel free to define time period and country.

[Gnoman]

Well, a bit earlier than that I think. The 1300 date is for the Liber Ignium, which has the first 'modern' (ish) gunpowder formula, but earlier versions were published by Roger Bacon in 1267 and Albertus Magnus around 1270. There is also records of gunpowder weapons being used in Spain in 1248 (I think by the Moors)

1300's the earliest European example I could find on a quick search that indisputably concerned black powder. A lot of the early Arab sources are somewhat inconclusive because they used the same word for gunpowder as they did for naphtha, and 1300 was early enough to support my point about it being very easy to duplicate the mixture once you heard about it, so I didn't feel the need to look for even earlier examples.

[Incanur]

As others have noted, gunpowder manufacturing isn't completely trivial and shortages of gunpowder and of saltpeter and/or sulfur happened from time to time well after the widespread use of firearms. Lack of gunpowder and difficulty producing it was an issue in various wars in North America in the 18th century, for example, though that was also in the context of high demand. Anyway, depending on the economics on the populations in question, it's not unreasonable for gunpowder manufacturing to be a problem.

Armor protected the neck rather well in 15th- and 16th-century Western Europe. The gorget was a key piece of defensive equipment. Some 16th-century infantry gorgets weighed as much as a breastplate - 6lbs in Sweden in 1572. Such gorgets were likely fairly thick.

[goto124]

'Look behind you!'
'How?!'
'Just do it!'
'Fine! *cracks neck*

[Mr. Mask]

G: Hmm, that situation sounds remarkably similar to what I was thinking. They even have a nearby Mongol horde to think about.

Okay, an odd question. For a campaign, I was thinking of a world where guns are present, but not mass produced. There's a brutal war going on, and one side has them, one does not. The reason they are not mass produced is that they don't want the secrets getting out via factory workers. (Both sides love to steal people from the other side). I know this is a complicated question, but how do I make this believable without making it seem like kooky fantasy gun control?

Well, depends on the quality of the guns, and the technology of the factions. For example, Native Americans liked guns, but they never really manufactured them in significant numbers (there was a Native American force with their own guns and artillery in the US Civil war).

The other example, is that for a long time crossbows were the equal if not the superior of guns. Most notably, they could be used while it was raining, and they were quiet weapons.

Something similar to what you're suggesting existed for a different reason. There were Gatling guns, repeating rifles, and various other innovations in history that took a while before they were adopted. This was because of expense, and no one was paying for mass manufacture. The Tommy Gun became associated with crime, because only gangsters had the money and reason to buy the things.

[Knaight]

Only in a world where nobody poops. Saltpetre is a natural byproduct of decaying dung (which is why bat guano is a material component of Fireball). Indeed, all three of the ingredients for black powder are extremely easy to get. If you want to make a firearm component difficult to get, the best thing to do is advance to flintlock technology and make flints hard to get (historically, this was one of the biggest supply problems for rebel troops, along with bayonets), or even come up with a magical equivalent of the percussion-cap that is difficult to duplicate. In either case, while it would be possible to bypass the lack, the advantages of the more modern lock are so great as to be decisive.

This is overstating it a bit. There was a lot of guano harvesting behind munitions in various periods, to the point where it was the central industry of Peru for a while. Shortages still happened. Having absolutely no gunpowder is unlikely, but having access to enough raw materials can be questionable, particularly once artillery starts getting used really heavily. If it weren't for the development of the Haber Process, we'd probably still be seeing major shortages every so often.

[Gnoman]

The Tommy Gun became associated with crime, because only gangsters had the money and reason to buy the things.

Not true. In actuality, criminal use of the Thompson Submachine Gun was quite rare. It was used at least ten times as often by the FBI, sold moderately well on the civilian market, and all other users were dwarfed by the United States Army, which bought hundreds of thousands of the things. Gatling Guns and repeating rifles were adopted pretty much as soon as they were made practical and reliable. Gatling's early prototypes from the very end of the American Civil War weren't purchased at the time because they were not yet fit for battle due to reliability concerns (orders picked up considerably once those problems were solved), and Spencer carbines were adopted by Union cavalry by the battle of Gettysburg (and are often credited with winning that battle for the Union by allowing Buford's cavalrymen to hold off the Confederate army long enough for Union infantry to arrive on the field). To my knowledge, there has never been a firearms development that languished for more than a few years unless there were genuine practical problems.

The Amerindians provide the clearest possible reason why the proposed scenario is stretching the limits of plausibility, as a genuine Stone Age society was able to keep themselves supplied with firearms when fighting someone else that had them, even during times when they couldn't buy them from anyone and nobody was giving them away.



Edit:

This is overstating it a bit. There was a lot of guano harvesting behind munitions in various periods, to the point where it was the central industry of Peru for a while. Shortages still happened. Having absolutely no gunpowder is unlikely, but having access to enough raw materials can be questionable, particularly once artillery starts getting used really heavily. If it weren't for the development of the Haber Process, we'd probably still be seeing major shortages every so often.

THIS is the point I'm trying to make. I'm not arguing that it should be available in limitless quantities, but there will never be a point where mere scarcity prevents you from having gunpowder altogether, and the formula's so simple that not figuring it out once you get your hands on a little of the powder (unless you're very outclassed technologically) borders on the impossible.

[Knaight]

THIS is the point I'm trying to make. I'm not arguing that it should be available in limitless quantities, but there will never be a point where mere scarcity prevents you from having gunpowder altogether, and the formula's so simple that not figuring it out once you get your hands on a little of the powder (unless you're very outclassed technologically) borders on the impossible.

With that said, it's very possible that there won't be very much of it.

[Mr. Mask]

Gnoman: Referring to the gun's early history. Later, cheaper models became available, and it was a popular gun for WW2.

If I recall, many of the carbines were purchased by the soldiers themselves, not by military issue.

Several Gatling guns were put to use during the Civil War, out of a specific general's own pocket, and they worked quite well.

You can see examples of superior gear languishing due to cost. Cases like the Tiger and King Tiger tanks compared to Shermans are the first that come to mind, but just looking at some of the ships and planes which could be developed but aren't due to expense also serves (what was that stealth jet that had like 20 made, then two were lost?). You can make one super awesome tank, ship or aeroplane, it is possible--but if the enemy can make a hundred that are half as good, they'll win.

[Carl]

(what was that stealth jet that had like 20 made, then two were lost?).

B2 and that was only so expensive because they only made 20. For modern system the cost of the first order, (i.e. the guaranteed order), is the cost to produce + development costs/number of units. Since only 20 where built and they costed 10's of billions to develop they ended up costs 2 billion apace. But if they'd been produced in the numbers originally intended they'd have been a fraction of that price.

[Thiel]

Gnoman: Referring to the gun's early history. Later, cheaper models became available, and it was a popular gun for WW2.

Before WWII the FBI was by far the biggest customer. Despite its reputation it wasn't actually particularly widespread among criminals.

[Mr. Mask]

B2 and that was only so expensive because they only made 20. For modern system the cost of the first order, (i.e. the guaranteed order), is the cost to produce + development costs/number of units. Since only 20 where built and they costed 10's of billions to develop they ended up costs 2 billion apace. But if they'd been produced in the numbers originally intended they'd have been a fraction of that price.

Do you think Germany could have produced as many Tiger tanks as Panzers, by the same method?

Before WWII the FBI was by far the biggest customer. Despite its reputation it wasn't actually particularly widespread among criminals.

The FBI were better armed, yeah. Know when they started buying the guns exactly? From what I know of the history, sales were very low for the first while, for long enough to practically bankrupt Thompson.

[Brother Oni]

You can see examples of superior gear languishing due to cost. Cases like the Tiger and King Tiger tanks compared to Shermans are the first that come to mind, but just looking at some of the ships and planes which could be developed but aren't due to expense also serves (what was that stealth jet that had like 20 made, then two were lost?). You can make one super awesome tank, ship or aeroplane, it is possible--but if the enemy can make a hundred that are half as good, they'll win.

The Tiger/Sherman comparison isn't a particularly good one though.

Cost, while an issue, was secondary to the major mechanical reliability problems the Tiger and its derivatives suffered from compared to the Sherman - if I recall correctly, this was due to the tighter tolerances of the German hardware, which was exacerbated by their use of conscripted labor (the laborers were secretly sabotaging what they were making).

The advantages of the Tiger was also limited by the complete air superiority - there's not much a Tiger can do against rocket attacks from a P47 Thunderbolt.

A better one would be the Me262 - it outflew everything the Allies had (the Gloucester Meteor was dedicated to V1 defence) to the extent that the recommended way to destroy them, was while they were parked up at their airfields. The fact the Germany was on the back foot by the time it was introduced, limiting its numbers (and the meddling in its operational role by AH), pretty much relegated the Me262's impact on the war as a footnote.

The Allied jet, the Gloucester Meteor, in addition to being stuck on V1 defence, had issues in that its short endurance (wiki reports that the engines were so fuel hungry, it could only stay in the air for only an hour) prohibited it from other offensive actions.

[Mr. Mask]

That may well be a better example.

[Galloglaich]

G: Hmm, that situation sounds remarkably similar to what I was thinking. They even have a nearby Mongol horde to think about.

Here is an excerpt from that paper I linked, which I think sounds like an ideal setup for an RPG campaign.

"By the1450s large parts of northern Hungary were thus in the hands of vagi – variously adventurers, deserters and decommissioned mercenaries who plundered the country-side and established their own ‘brotherhoods’ under elected captains. At this time the number of these bratříci (i.e. ‘brothers’) was put at 20,000 men, operating from 36 field camps and castles."

and

"To these may be added the revenues of justice which fell to Jiskra through his control of the administration of thecounties of which he was ispán. Significantly also, Jiskra drew to the side of thequeen and of Ladislas V the principal mining towns and commercial centres of the region. These included the minting and mining chambers of Košice (Kassa)and Kremnica (Körmöcbánya), as well as rights to an extensive range of revenues, including taxes, tolls and market dues. It was not, however, the case that the towns and mining communities of Slovakia were forced into supporting Jiskra. The merchant patricians of Košice in particular were anxious at this time to free them-selves from the economic ascendancy of Cracow and they resented recent Polish intrusion into Spiš (the Szepesség).

They thus shared with Jiskra an interest in advancing the cause of Ladislas V against the Polish party of King Wladislas. The extent to which the city and citizens of Košice effectively ‘bankrolled’ Jiskra is demonstrated not only by the large sums lent to him by the city council – almost 27,000 florins between 1440 and 1445 – but also the loans of individual citizens, most notably of the city magistrate, John Moderer, who in the 1440s lent Jiskra well over 30,000 florins. Although by the 1450s, Jiskra had lost the automatic support of Moderer and of the urban communities of the north, until this time it is possible to conceive him as being as much the agent of merchant capital asof Elizabeth, the Habsburg faction and Ladislas V. Nor, we should add, did Jiskra’s power weigh heavily on the communities over which he ruled. Indeed, despite the condition of endemic civil war, investment and extraction rose significantly in Kremnica’s mining industry during the 1440s."

So you can see here an example of the real-world circumstances in which towns can become 'bandit' or up to this point, more accurately 'privateer-bandit' havens, supporting an array of causes (a royal succession) and self-interests (furthering the agenda of autonomy, and competing with regional commercial rivals, i.e. Krakow). This Condotierre Jan Jiskra was one of the few who had the respect of the mercenaries in question, the so called Brethren, and he gained a lot of military benefits from them (they were among the only troops who could consistently defeat the Ottomans at this time, for example during campaigns in 1443) but he also suffered politically from the misdeeds of these troops, particularly the heretics among them who tended to like to loot monasteries and hang Catholic priests. These groups they formed the so called "“bratrík" started to cause a lot of real concern among the Princes of Europe.

The Kings, princes and generals of Hungary decided Jiskra had to be driven away, and after various political and legal moves against him he left for a while to fight in the 13 Years War as a mercenary commander for the Teutonic Knights (he also attempted to negotiate a truce between the Teutonic Order and the Poles, unsuccessfully). Once he left, the Hungarians and Austrians thought they could liquidate the bandit-mercenaries from their strongholds in Slovakia, but they were unable to do so. So they asked for Jiskra to return in the hope that he could get control over the situation.

As this other article notes:

http://www.aepress.sk/hum/full/hum196c.pdf

"The King returned to Jiskra, the administration of the Spiš, Šariš and the mining
towns, only so that Jiskra would stop the rise of the “bratrík” groups. The beginnings
of such groups are most frequently placed in the fourth decade of the 15th
century, when not only in Slovakia, but also in Poland and Austria, the situation
arose after the defeat of the Hussite armies at Lipany in 1434, that many soldiers,
accustomed to an exclusively military way of life, could not find employment in
mercenary armies. They could not live in a different way, and so they formed field
camps for their own protection, and began to call themselves “bratríci”. They
evoked concern in the highest circles of Central Europe, where fear was again
growing of Ottoman aggression, after the fall of Constantinople, the last bastion of
resistance and power of the Byzantine Emperors, on 29th May 1453 when it was
captured and occupied by the armies of Sultan Mehmed II, son of Murad II."

After he was allowed back, Jiskra was put under pressure to reign-in these rogue mercenary groups, but political and practical expediency got in the way

"After Jiskra’s return, the “bratrík” groups mostly made
up of his former soldiers, went over to him, but were successful only against
smaller and more demoralized groups of “bratríci”. The situation in which Jiskra
found himself and with which he agreed, could not be unmarked by the recent painful
disappointment, which he had experienced. He must have known that he was
more or less only used, but he clearly had no other starting point and he did not
seek one. Apart from this, the struggle for supreme power in the country was not
interrupted after the election of Ladislas Posthumus. In the uncertain situation, the
“bratríci” were able to reach their zenith in 1458, when their number reached
20, 000 men, and they had about 36 field camps and castles, of which only an insignificant
proportion lay outside the territory of Slovakia. They rarely built new
castles, but mostly reconstructed fortified places including monasteries. At most
they built strongholds such as on the Zadná Hura Hill at Chme¾ov.
Jiskra wanted to make agreements with people he formerly, or not so long ago
commanded. However the agreements did not last very long. At first he declared
the most feared “bratrík” commander, Axamit, to be an enemy of the country, a ravisher,
but he preferred to agree with him."

In the long run Jiskra made Slovakia his power center once more and more or less retained order. The most dangerous bratrík bands were eventually defeated, but the heretics remained and the region continued to be largely autonomous. The towns formed the league called the "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentapolitana]Pentapolitana which further enabled the enforcement of peace, and this mountainous area was able to successfully resist external enemies including the Mongols, the Ottomans and various European powers that sought to control and subdue them until the 30 Years War in the 17th Century, (when Austria took over after the Battle of White Mountain) and the region eventually became Slovakia instead of Northern Hungary (in spite of also being the seat of the Hungarian State during the long Ottoman occupation of what we call Hungary today). The Slovakians kind of consider Jan Jiskra to be their "George Washington".

G

[Incanur]

The Amerindians provide the clearest possible reason why the proposed scenario is stretching the limits of plausibility, as a genuine Stone Age society was able to keep themselves supplied with firearms when fighting someone else that had them, even during times when they couldn't buy them from anyone and nobody was giving them away.

Amerindians varied a great deal in this regard depending on the era. As a general rule, Amerindian groups acquired firearms through trade and capture. Most didn't produce their own gunpowder, though the Cherokee definitely had some gunpowder production in the 19th century if not earlier. Certain Amerindian groups at certain times lacked guns entirely or experienced severe shortages of guns and powder. The presence of competing European colonial powers as well as the difficulty of enforcing trade restrictions went a long way toward supplying many Amerindian groups with guns.

The one-side-has-guns-and-the-other-doesn't scenario becomes vaguely plausible if it's a single powerful state that possess firearms technology. But such a state would need impressive social controls to prevent folks from selling guns to the other side for a fat profit.

[Galloglaich]

Amerindians varied a great deal in this regard depending on the era. As a general rule, Amerindian groups acquired firearms through trade and capture. Most didn't produce their own gunpowder, though the Cherokee definitely had some gunpowder production in the 19th century if not earlier. Certain Amerindian groups at certain times lacked guns entirely or experienced severe shortages of guns and powder. The presence of competing European colonial powers as well as the difficulty of enforcing trade restrictions went a long way toward supplying many Amerindian groups with guns.

The one-side-has-guns-and-the-other-doesn't scenario becomes vaguely plausible if it's a single powerful state that possess firearms technology. But such a state would need impressive social controls to prevent folks from selling guns to the other side for a fat profit.

I think it took a little while for the Native Americans to completely figure out firearms. By the time you have Lakota warriors running around with repeating rifles on horseback they had been exposed to firearms for centuries. During the initial invasions in Mexico and I think also Peru (though I could be wrong on that, I haven't read up on Peru) the Native Americans really had no idea what they were dealing with, not just the firearms but the horses, dogs, metal armor, steel swords, crossbows and so on. They were back on their heels for a while before they started to realize how to use these things to their own advantage.

Further North some of the initial contacts such as with French fur traders was more collaborative and friendly allowing adoption of various technologies (and vices like whiskey and rum) to spread before the total shock of war hit too hard. As Colonialism hit it's stride certain Native groups like the powerful Iroquois confederation were initially armed and trained with firearms because they were integrated as political and military allies with certain European Colonial powers as the latter fought with one another for control.

G

[Storm Bringer]

So two quick questions and a mini-rant:

And the rant. Is anyone else annoyed as much as I am in fantasy (or any other genre, really) when a group displays exceedingly, staggeringly bad tactics--which are then praised as excellent? I was recently reading a short story about a group of soldiers who fought in pairs--each pair armed differently--that made no effort to keep any kind of formation. They would deliberately break their formations upon contact. Which is okay, because their enemies apparently weren't any brighter and did the same. The whole time they were displaying the amazing fighting skills of this group, I could only think just how completely a disciplined, properly supported body of pikemen would massacre these people. And that's not even considering cavalry--if they were charged (which they were), they would have to reform mid-combat, and then they didn't even have polearms (or at least a significant number of them) with which to repel cavalry. And they're supposed to be elite soldiers.

this is basically a manifestation of the fact that most authors are, well Authors, and not experts in ww1 small unit tactics/12th century politics/Roman courtship customs/Large scale networking/ any of a hundred other things. Their is a limit on how much research a author can do for a book, given deadlines and such.

As such, they often come up with ideas or concepts (like elite troops) that they don't have the ability to describe in detail, without making errors.

that said, yes, it is annoying.

[Thiel]

A better one would be the Me262 - it outflew everything the Allies had (the Gloucester Meteor was dedicated to V1 defence) to the extent that the recommended way to destroy them, was while they were parked up at their airfields.

That has always been and still is the recommended to deal with any aircraft, so it's hardly unusual.

The fact the Germany was on the back foot by the time it was introduced, limiting its numbers (and the meddling in its operational role by AH), pretty much relegated the Me262's impact on the war as a footnote.

Engine-wise the real killer was the lack of nickel, cobalt and molybdenum to make heat resistant steel for the compressor blades. They managed to redesign the engine to do without, but this resulted in an engine life of just a few hours so they had to change the engines every other sortie.

The Allied jet, the Gloucester Meteor, in addition to being stuck on V1 defence, had issues in that its short endurance (wiki reports that the engines were so fuel hungry, it could only stay in the air for only an hour) prohibited it from other offensive actions.

This was an issue for all first generation jet engines. The Me262 had a similar endurance of just over an hour.

this is basically a manifestation of the fact that most authors are, well Authors, and not experts in ww1 small unit tactics/12th century politics/Roman courtship customs/Large scale networking/ any of a hundred other things. Their is a limit on how much research a author can do for a book, given deadlines and such.

As such, they often come up with ideas or concepts (like elite troops) that they don't have the ability to describe in detail, without making errors.

that said, yes, it is annoying.

And the more you know the worse it gets. I'm a professional sailor and I've sailed both traditional sailing ships as well as modern tankers with the result that most maritime themed films become unwatchable.
Similarly I've done a lot of reading on artillery from the Napoleonic Wars to WWI which has turned the already questionable Danish series 1864 into a chore.

[Gnoman]

The Me-262 wasn't really a superfighter. It was a bit faster than most Allied fighter planes (but nowhere near as much as you might think, around 10-15%), but maneuverability was rather poor and the armament wasn't that great for the assigned role of interceptor (it was nearly impossible for it to bring a B-17 down on one pass because the guns didn't fire fast enough in the short engagement window), and piston-engined fighters did quite well against them. It was one of the few German "wonder weapons" that was actually worth having (the other two being the V1 and V2 missiles), but considering that the compeition was the garbage Tiger, the rather bad Panther, mediocre Tiger II, and the absolutely ludicrous super tanks, that isn't saying much.

[Galloglaich]

B2 and that was only so expensive because they only made 20. For modern system the cost of the first order, (i.e. the guaranteed order), is the cost to produce + development costs/number of units. Since only 20 where built and they costed 10's of billions to develop they ended up costs 2 billion apace. But if they'd been produced in the numbers originally intended they'd have been a fraction of that price.

That is debatable... it gets brought up a lot with very expensive programs like that which get cut down or canceled, but part of the reason they only made 21 of those B2's is that they were so expensive and there were so many cost-overruns. It's also somewhat questionable what exact role a subsonic strategic nuclear bomber even has today anyway.

US has always had problems with major cost overruns and corruption in our military procurement, going back to the Civil War. It's bad in other countries too but the US is just about the worst. Strategic bombers are especially embarrassing on this level, the predecessor of the B-2, the B-1 was famous for the $1000 toilet seats and so on, and the predecessor to that, the B-70 Valkyrie, was one of the poster children for procurement disasters (unit cost 750 million in 1969!).


As for the whole Tiger vs. Panther vs. Sherman vs. T-34 thing.. it's such a huge can of worms. Quality, cost, quantity, simplicity of use and reliability are all factors that have to be balanced along a fine-line to make a successful weapon (and all four of those tanks were successful). The Tiger I wasn't as unreliable as some people say, and it was intended to be made in small numbers, as a special 'heavy tank'. They built a lot of Panthers, which were very effective tanks when they were working (and in most circumstances). Good enough that they were sought after by various nations after the war (the French used thousands of them, and continued to use the gun from the Panther in tanks they were building in the 60's). The Panther did initially have a lot of serious reliability problems but some of that was due to sabotage because they were using slave labor (of people being worked to death) who did what they could to cause problems. Shermans were actually better tanks than the original T-34 in most respects, incidentally (the Russians thought so of the thousands of Shermans they had, which they put into elite Guards units) the only caveat being Shermans had a hard time traversing soft ground due to their thin tracks so they could only be used certain times of year in most of Russia (which was a major limitation of course).

The T-34 proved a huge benefit to the Soviets when it first appeared but it wasn't facing Tigers. It was facing Pz III's armed with 37mm guns, mainly, and the T-34 pretty much owned them (the KV definitely did). So when the T-34 first came out, it wasn't small cheap Soviet tanks dominating big bad German tanks, the T-34's were actually bigger than the Pz III's I think and definitely had bigger guns (76mm).


If it was just a matter of small and cheap beating out big and expensive, the Soviets would have won the war in the early days with their thousands of cheap BT-7 tanks, which theoretically had big enough guns (45mm high velocity) to kill the best German tanks, as well as good performance, high speed and so on. But they were wiped out in catastrophic, apocalyptic numbers by only slightly superior German tanks. It was really relatively subtle factors like a 3 man turret, good radios, better made (as opposed to necessarily thicker) armor, better optics, more and better machineguns, more ammunition, and most of all, better training and unit cohesion which made the difference. Unit cohesion and leadership had been badly damaged for the Soviets by Stalin's pre-war purges.

When the T-34 came out it was a major shock for the Germans but they adjusted within a few months and by the time the Pz IV F2 and it's evil friends like the Marder II and the StuGG IIIf made it to the field (starting around May 1941 through late 1942), it was the Soviets who were back on their heels again trying to figure something out (which they did of course, with weapons like the Su-152 and Su-122.. later the T-34/85, JS 2 etc. and the qualitative edge with armor went back and forth). We all know the Soviets gradually seized the strategic momentum and never let it go, but when used properly, especially on defense, a couple of dozen Tiger I's could and did hold up a major Soviet advance. The solution to dealing with them largely depended on heavy artillery, rockets, and aircraft like the Il2.

Tiger II was never really ready for the real world but by that time Germany had so many problems (fuel, morale, strategic metals, trained crews) that it was kind of a moot point anyway. Regardless, Tigers of both kinds could and did make a big difference on the battlefield and we shouldn't forget about that one.



Generally we have to be careful about reducing things to one dimensional sound bytes to help people understand. If people want to understand history they have to be able to accept nuance.

G

[Kiero]

this is basically a manifestation of the fact that most authors are, well Authors, and not experts in ww1 small unit tactics/12th century politics/Roman courtship customs/Large scale networking/ any of a hundred other things. Their is a limit on how much research a author can do for a book, given deadlines and such.

As such, they often come up with ideas or concepts (like elite troops) that they don't have the ability to describe in detail, without making errors.

that said, yes, it is annoying.

Worse still when they fail to grasp the basics of the central theme of their work. John Stack managed to write an entire trilogy of books, purportedly about the Roman navy in the First Punic War, while failing to understand the oaring arrangements of galleys of the day, the nature of oarsmen and that the construction of the vessels meant they had to be pulled out of the water when not in use. That's without getting into his poor grasp of the equipment of legionaries in that era and of Roman politics and offices. I'm left wondering exactly what research he did do.

[Carl]

For anyone interested in the tank side of things look up Jingles's war thunder vids on specific tank's, he goes into all this in them. TBH there more history lessons with cool gameplay as background footage.

@Gallioach: Sort of. My understanding is they cut the order because with the end of the cold war the cost of replacing the B52 fleet vs the increase in capability was not considered cost effective. It's a rare case of one faction ending up with no equivalent tech enemies after their sole competitor imploded. It's certainly true that it's an example of cost being a procurement factor, but it's also beget by very specific circumstances. Had the cold war still been going strong it's unlikely the order would have been cut because against a fully modern foe of sufficient size they actually do represent a major upgrade in capability, it's just that in the new environment there aren't any truly large threats wit the necessary level of capabilities.

That said in war it's rarely cost that limits employment of a weapon system, it's production capacity limitations. Certainly more complicated to produce items are more expensive in general, but that's more of an incidental relationship, it's not the cost itself that limits the numbers. That's also why the ease of production for things like the Sherman, t-34, or the famous liberty ships was such a huge thing. Anyway like i said Jingles covers a lot of this stuff in a lot more detail quite nicely.

[Zizka]

To continue a debate from the previous thread:

Nevertheless those armies like all modern armies were designed to fight on the basis of coercion of the rank and file, not inherent motivation and high morale, and I think you are overestimating the power of high morale in the early days of the war in light of years of obvious incompetence by the leadership, ongoing terrible conditions, very high casualty rates both from direct combat and disease etc., and a growing understanding of the shared commonalities between the regular troops on both sides, in comparison with the officer class (which was much more sharply divided during WW I than in later wars very generally speaking) in what were essentially conscript armies for the most part. Obviously fomenting actual revolution was a much more daunting task way beyond the capabilities or agendas of the average soldier which wasn't considered worth the effort since what the troops actually wanted to do was simply survive the war. But "Live and Let Live" systems, local truces, combat refusals, and massive desertion was common in WW I and broke out to epidemic levels on several occasions. Keeping the war going proved to be quite difficult especially toward the end.

I agree on the importance of coercion and the impact of the class divide. However I think you are underestimating the importance of morale and general fighting spirit. Even in 1914, after the initial shock and the fumbling attempts of generals to master the new ways of warfare, the majority of troops did not engage in the Christmas truce.

There was a "Live and Let Live" system but it was very much the exception (especially as the war progressed, with the mechanisation of warfare reducing the opportunities for individual actions). The simple truth is that all the armies fought for four long, hard years in the face of class divides, casualties and conditions. When armies did break in 1917 and 1918 they did so at the same time as their nations, largely as a result of the strategy of attrition (and latterly the Allies development of operational warfare).

I think it is clear from reading primary sources that many soldiers fought for reasons beyond bare survival, although as ever motivations were mixed and varied with the progress of the war.

[Brother Oni]

I'm reading Jack Tar by Roy and Lesley Adkins and I found this interesting little bit regarding sailors having long hair during the late 18th and early 19th Centuries:

I have heard of a sailor whose tail [pig tail] catched in the block [pulley], as the fall [ropes] was going, and had his head pulled out from between his shoulders. So also of a sailor, whose hair was long and loose; it blew in his eyes as he was going up the shrouds [ropes]; he put his hands to his face, to clear it, when he missed his hold, fell into the chains and broke his neck.

He also has something to say about lice:

A sailor who wears his hair tyed appears to me to be a very accommodating man; the queue which falls from his head down his back being well adapted to answer the purpose of a bridge, over which large bodies of lice may decamp from headquarters, when the napper is overstocked, and spread themselves in more commodious pasturage about the jacket, shirt and fork of the trowsers. The tail also well answers the use of a backstay, for it not only assists in keeping the head steady, but it affords the means of giving to every part of the body the same quantity of scrat [scratching], for when the lice are all in the head, the general scrat is there also, but when they crawl down the tail, and disperse themselves, there then exists a general scrat from head to toe

The short version: long hair allows a head lice infestation to become a full body infestation.

[Galloglaich]

To continue a debate from the previous thread:



I agree on the importance of coercion and the impact of the class divide. However I think you are underestimating the importance of morale and general fighting spirit. Even in 1914, after the initial shock and the fumbling attempts of generals to master the new ways of warfare, the majority of troops did not engage in the Christmas truce.

There was a "Live and Let Live" system but it was very much the exception (especially as the war progressed, with the mechanisation of warfare reducing the opportunities for individual actions). The simple truth is that all the armies fought for four long, hard years in the face of class divides, casualties and conditions. When armies did break in 1917 and 1918 they did so at the same time as their nations, largely as a result of the strategy of attrition (and latterly the Allies development of operational warfare).

I think it is clear from reading primary sources that many soldiers fought for reasons beyond bare survival, although as ever motivations were mixed and varied with the progress of the war.

Ok fair enough, maybe I'm too influenced by "Path's of Glory", Jaroslav Hasec, and my own military experiences. The only real history book I've read on WW I (other than those two personal accounts) was Barbara Tuchmans guns of August, and I've also listened to Dan Carlins' excellent lecture series on the war. But it sounds to me like you've studied it a bit more in depth than that, so I'll take your word for it.

One other comment on the class thing, WW I was arguably the last war in 'The West' (as well as the East) in which the 'best and brightest' including large numbers of the young men from the upper classes were sent to fight and die in the ranks, and that is one of the many reasons that the war left such a terrible scar on the psyche of Europe. In some ways even more than WW II.

G