Got a Real-World Weapon, Armor or Tactics Question? Mk. XXIII

[Storm Bringer]

I know that the Royal Marines Commando were going to be deployed to Norway in a hot war (hence the artic warfare training), but weren't kept there permanently, as the northern parts are not the sort of place you want to stay if you can avoid it.

[Khedrac]

I know that the Royal Marines Commando were going to be deployed to Norway in a hot war (hence the artic warfare training), but weren't kept there permanently, as the northern parts are not the sort of place you want to stay if you can avoid it.

Interestingly I just spoke to a colleague who is ex-UK army (though not old enough to have been serving in the 70s) and he reckons that there would have been Royal Marines up at the north end of Norway "most of the time". What that actually means is more debatable, unfortunately I no longer work with colleagues who would have been serving then (or close to then).

[Storm Bringer]

Interestingly I just spoke to a colleague who is ex-UK army (though not old enough to have been serving in the 70s) and he reckons that there would have been Royal Marines up at the north end of Norway "most of the time". What that actually means is more debatable, unfortunately I no longer work with colleagues who would have been serving then (or close to then).

yes, their would have been some, but "some" in this case would be a company or two that were either on a arctic warfare exercise, doing initial training for arctic warfare, or supporting other such exercises, etc. there would be a small permeant support contingent that looked after equipment and other such admin tasks, but it would not be a thousands strong standing army like BAOR* was.

the skills involved in artic warfare are like any skillset, you need to be taught them, and to keep practicing them to stay good at them, so troops would be constantly cycled though the north, both freshen their skills and to familiarise them with their intended areas of operations if the war went Hot.



*BAOR= British Army On the Rhine. later renamed to British Forces Germany.

[Mike_G]

The US Marines trained in the northern part of Norway as well. In the 1980s, anyway. I don't think we have any permanently stationed up there, but it's a good place to train for arctic warfare and test equipment in the cold.

If a shooting war with the USSR had started, Norway would have been a theater of war, and I expect troops would have been deployed. marines make the most sense, since they can be rapidly deployed from the sea, so maybe that's why the UK and US Marines trained up there.

[Vinyadan]

About US deployment (and general NATO) troops:

The US had troops and a-bombs in many countries in Western Europe; they actually still do.
There were two kinds of troops: the occupation troops for the defeated Axis powers and the protection troops graciously deployed in allied countries. With time, they ended up merging in function: having strategic lookouts and forward bases, while containing Moscow, protecting allies and keeping an eye on them.
However, the numbers in ex Axis countries were always much greater. There are various reasons for this, of which position (W Germany near the Iron Curtain, Italy strategically located in the Mediterranean and near the Balkans) is very important, but past history also gave a lot more leeway for troop deployment over local governments.

Today, Germany still houses a foreign international force. It gets smaller over the years, but there still are Danes, Britons, French, Americans, Canadians, Belgians, and possibly many more.

Italy only houses Americans (AFAIK). The largest bases are the Aviano USAF base in the North, an aeronaval base and a large radar installation in Sicily, and a now inactive submarine base in Sardinia. Right now there's probably more US military personnel in Italy than in Afghanistan.

Atomic bombs are still given by the US to allied nations as a way to give them deterrence without having them developing a nuclear program. They also are a security concern, since they need to be stored and protected adequately, and a few countries may not be doing that. The US bombs abroad are: about 20 in Belgium, about 20 in the Netherlands, max. 90 in Turkey, and about the same in Italy. They once were many more (around 7000 in total) and deployed in more countries, among which GB and South Korea.

There are right now 330 US marines stationed in Norway, and it's the first time since WWII that foreign troops have been posted on Norwegian soil. They got there two months ago. So, no stantial foreign NATO troops in Norway during the Cold War.

[Lemmy]

Would it be feasible to make a saber (or another curved blade) with reach similar to that of a rapier?

[Gnoman]

The zhanmadao saw service in 9th-century China, while the nagamaki was used in 10th-16th century Japan. These have a blade length similar to a rapier, and have a curve to the blade.

[MrZJunior]

I would bet that US Navy anti sub patrols out of Iceland stopped in Norway occasionally.

[Lemmy]

The zhanmadao saw service in 9th-century China, while the nagamaki was used in 10th-16th century Japan. These have a blade length similar to a rapier, and have a curve to the blade.

Were these blades used one-handed? Also... If they have the same blade length as a rapier, but are curved, wouldn't they have lower reach?

[Raunchel]

Dutch marines also trained in Norway, and if war would have broken out, they, together with West German, British, and American marines would have fought there.

[Carl]

This kind of reasoning is actually also what led to the total war policies of WW II to some extent. Dan Carlin makes this point in his excellent "logical insanity" podcast, which has to do with Air War in the 20th Century. The idea was increasing the brutality would help prevent the kind of bloody stalemate they saw in WW I, i.e. it would be a crueler but much shorter war. But of course, they didn't realize that the war could just go on with the increased brutality on all sides.

There was a lot more going on there than pure terror tactics though. Harris's specific reason for choosing the area bombing strategy used was the harsh limitations on maximum accuracy imposed by several factors, (notably the relatively poor target marking capabilities available at the time), which meant trying to level an entire city was the only way of reliably also taking out any industrial targets at all. Ultimately pioneering work done by amongst others 617 squadron eventually morphed with further technological advances into true precision bombing. But there was a lot more behind the city leveling raids than pure terror for the sake of terror.

[Mr Beer]

There was a lot more going on there than pure terror tactics though. Harris's specific reason for choosing the area bombing strategy used was the harsh limitations on maximum accuracy imposed by several factors, (notably the relatively poor target marking capabilities available at the time), which meant trying to level an entire city was the only way of reliably also taking out any industrial targets at all. Ultimately pioneering work done by amongst others 617 squadron eventually morphed with further technological advances into true precision bombing. But there was a lot more behind the city leveling raids than pure terror for the sake of terror.

There's also the fact that for a long time, Britain had about zero ways to really bring the fight to Germany, other than bombing. Churchill was not exactly in a position to run Operation Overload solo.

Of course the effectiveness of the campaign can be argued and from what I've read, it didn't really start to bite into the war economy until late in the war anyway. Hindsight is 20/20...I don't really subscribe to the whole 'Bomber Harris was a war criminal' way of thinking.

[Storm Bringer]

There's also the fact that for a long time, Britain had about zero ways to really bring the fight to Germany, other than bombing. Churchill was not exactly in a position to run Operation Overload solo.

Of course the effectiveness of the campaign can be argued and from what I've read, it didn't really start to bite into the war economy until late in the war anyway. Hindsight is 20/20...I don't really subscribe to the whole 'Bomber Harris was a war criminal' way of thinking.

one of the reasons the bombing took so long to bite is not only the limits of early war bombing technology, but the degree of "reserve" capability in German industrial system, as they were working on relatively under-utilized basis until Albert Speer was allowed to rationalise the whole set up.

[Deadmeat.GW]

Actually...some of the bombing runs were acts of terror and atrocity.

Firebombing with as intention to cause a blaze which would wipe civilians was done and purposely so.

'Bomber' Harris has been quoted several times in regards to his intention to pursue a full out war against all of Germany.

Another quote ...

But in November 1941 the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command said he had been intentionally bombing civilians for a year. “I mention this because, for a long time, the Government, for excellent reasons, has preferred the world to think that we still held some scruples and attacked only what the humanitarians are pleased to call Military Targets. I can assure you, gentlemen, that we tolerate no scruples.”

And the net result of it all...

Bombing German cities clearly did have an impact on the war. The question, though, is how much. The post-war US Bombing Survey estimated that the effect of all allied city bombing probably depleted the German economy by no more than 2.7 per cent.

2.7%...it is substantial and the specifics of which part of the economy was affected had a bigger impact (e.g. ball bearing manufacture, oil production and storage, ...)

In the end Harris embraced the limitations it seems because it allowed him to get away with doing what he wanted to do in the first place and that was total bombing warfare against any and all targets and in that aspect Dresden with its 25000 to 35000 victims, 25000 from the city itself (there is some indirect evidence that the refugees that were in the city were not counted and this may have added as many as another 10000 victims but there is no direct evidence sadly enough as these people were not from the region and nobody was really keeping track of them at this point in the war) was a war crime under any of the terms the US and the UK were applying at this point.

And it was not the only place that this was starting to get done sadly enough.

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war...of-wwii-2.html

If you check the top ten of worst bombings you do have London in it but...then you check the dates and the numbers for the other 9...

[Mr Beer]

one of the reasons the bombing took so long to bite is not only the limits of early war bombing technology, but the degree of "reserve" capability in German industrial system, as they were working on relatively under-utilized basis until Albert Speer was allowed to rationalise the whole set up.

Yeah, Speer is an interesting figure, he's one of those guys you don't know whether it would have better if he wasn't around or not. His control of the war industry was masterful and likely kept Germany fighting longer than otherwise, on the other hand he avoided destroying a lot of infrastructure during Hitler's final paroxysms of rage.

[pendell]

Yeah, Speer is an interesting figure, he's one of those guys you don't know whether it would have better if he wasn't around or not. His control of the war industry was masterful and likely kept Germany fighting longer than otherwise, on the other hand he avoided destroying a lot of infrastructure during Hitler's final paroxysms of rage.

He also planned To assassinate Hitler with gas. This was foiled by the installation of an anti-gas chimney on the bunker. He was also implicated in the 20 July plot, but not arrested , evidently because he still had Hitler's trust.

The second is a matter of public record; the first is only from his own testimony, which might well be a lie.

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Vinyadan]

I personally see the bombings of WWII as a prosecution of a process which was already happening during WWI. You have the trenches, you have important enemy hubs beyond them, and so you devise ways to hit them. In WWI, it was Zeppelins over london and German artillery bombing Paris - if you ever visit the church of the Madeleine, you may still notice a St. Luke whose head was exploded by a grenade. (23 years earlier, another unrelated bomb had exploded inside the church, killing the anarchist carrying it.)
In WWII you have the Channel and the Atlantic Wall as trenches, and better developed aviation and rockets as ways to strike beyond it. It probably also is worth saying that the Germans started the practice of terror bombing during the war, and that a right of retaliation is generally recognized. If that's right or wrong, well, that's another story. I however don't fully accept the targeting difficulty theory: Cologne was reduced to a mass of ruins, but the Ford industries, which were helping the German war effort, suffered little damage. Other allied air attacks in Italy had the purpose of destroying everyday life, like randomly killing horses on country roads.

[Carl]

Actually...some of the bombing runs were acts of terror and atrocity.

Firebombing with as intention to cause a blaze which would wipe civilians was done and purposely so.

'Bomber' Harris has been quoted several times in regards to his intention to pursue a full out war against all of Germany.

Another quote ...

But in November 1941 the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command said he had been intentionally bombing civilians for a year. “I mention this because, for a long time, the Government, for excellent reasons, has preferred the world to think that we still held some scruples and attacked only what the humanitarians are pleased to call Military Targets. I can assure you, gentlemen, that we tolerate no scruples.”

And the net result of it all...

Bombing German cities clearly did have an impact on the war. The question, though, is how much. The post-war US Bombing Survey estimated that the effect of all allied city bombing probably depleted the German economy by no more than 2.7 per cent.

2.7%...it is substantial and the specifics of which part of the economy was affected had a bigger impact (e.g. ball bearing manufacture, oil production and storage, ...)

In the end Harris embraced the limitations it seems because it allowed him to get away with doing what he wanted to do in the first place and that was total bombing warfare against any and all targets and in that aspect Dresden with its 25000 to 35000 victims, 25000 from the city itself (there is some indirect evidence that the refugees that were in the city were not counted and this may have added as many as another 10000 victims but there is no direct evidence sadly enough as these people were not from the region and nobody was really keeping track of them at this point in the war) was a war crime under any of the terms the US and the UK were applying at this point.

And it was not the only place that this was starting to get done sadly enough.

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war...of-wwii-2.html

If you check the top ten of worst bombings you do have London in it but...then you check the dates and the numbers for the other 9...

Be careful how you interpret statements like that. My own information on the matter comes from a book i own on the history of 617, (it's now somwhere in storage sadly), which is built from a variety of sources and Harris made it clear to Barnes Wallis that he would happily have chosen an alternative if a viable one had existed. Since he could within the technological limitations not do otherwise however he saw it as an awful necessity to pursue a strategy of totally demolishing enemy cities and everything therein. There was absolutely a deliberate element of targeting civilians. But that was an inevitable, logical, and required result of the policy of indiscriminate bombing forced on them by the technological limitations. Not a case of everyone going "lets bomb civilians because where mustache twirling villains, muahahahaha". And thats an important distinction that needs to be remembered.

The munich raid especially puts lie to the claim that harris bombed civilians for the hell of it. He came to 617 with the idea of them marking for one of his big 1,000 bomber raids on the rail yards there. It wasn't repeated. But between all the other targets he needed them to go after with actual bombs and the practical limits of operational tempo the squadron could maintain, (and the difficulties in training anyone else to do the same job), it wasn't practical to repeat it. A man however who was interested only in bombing civilians for the hell of it would never have considered such a raid that offered, (and in practise did), eliminate collateral damage to the area surrounding the rail yards, (one apartment building was hit, it was an SS barracks though so it worked out). It was however hugely effective and paved the way for eventual future developments in technology that made it more practical to achieve on a widespread basis.

There's a big difference between bombing the hell out of civilians and going out of your way to wipe them out in the hopes of breaking the enemy's will to fight because it's your only effective large scale means of harming the enemy's ability to persecute the war and going out of your way to bomb civilians because you just want to kill civilians in job lots for the hell of it.

[Pauly]

For bombing designed to terrorize and kill civilians you really have to go to the Luftwaffe. It started with the bombing of Frampol in Poland.

[Deadmeat.GW]

I never said he was doing it for the hell of it, he did it as part of a deliberate and planned strategy based on the available resources and on his personal understanding of the way this would work.

There was no 'lulz, lets bomb Dresden or Hamburg in a specific manner to create a fire storm to cause as much damage as possible'.

It was premeditated after they managed to do it once accidentally, flattening everything and killing or injuring as many people as possible by purposely creating a firestorm definitely was the target of these raids later in the war.

That is quite premeditated, if it was in a murder case for a single victim it would have been quite clearly been pointed out that it was all planned and prepared on purpose.

Whether or not that was solely due to the limitations of the technology is still up for debate.

Harris was a cold and calculating man when it came to doing his job.
There is a reason a lot of RAF men called him Butcher Harris instead of Bomber Harris.

He clearly subscribed to the maxim the ends justify the means and he was willing to push hard on his men to do the job.

Harris did not bomb the Germans for amusement but because he believed utterly that it was the best way to destroy the German will to fight and their industry.
And by attacking the populations he could strike at both his targets instead of just at the military targets.

After all, whether they broke from the bombing or died and therefore could not work or fight in both cases he got the result he was aiming for.

More enemies destroyed, less resources for the enemies and reducing their capacity to produce.

[dramatic flare]

For bombing designed to terrorize and kill civilians you really have to go to the Luftwaffe. It started with the bombing of Frampol in Poland.

You could also look at the IJA, who bombed Shanghai during both the first and second battle of that city for the expressed purpose of both wiping out enemy soldiers and breaking the enemy will to fight.

[Pauly]

I

Harris was a cold and calculating man when it came to doing his job.
There is a reason a lot of RAF men called him Butcher Harris instead of Bomber Harris.

RAF, and RAAF and RCAF and RNZAF aircrew calling him butcher had nothing to do with the attacks on civilians. They called him butcher because he ordered the bombing campaign to continue despite horrific casualty rates amongst air crew.

[Martin Greywolf]

Were these blades used one-handed? Also... If they have the same blade length as a rapier, but are curved, wouldn't they have lower reach?

The ones mentioned weren't used one handed if you could avoid it, and just FYI, I'd take anything about them being used against cavalry with a massive grain of salt.

There was a bastard saber used in Hungary circa 1300-1500 and beyond, though. The idea was to apply the same principle to a sabre as to a bastard sword, and it seems to have worked decently well. Illuminations from Chronica Picta show them being used one handed by horsemen, but having recently recieved a replica of one, I wouldn't really want to use it one handed while on foot. They seem to have been favored by people who didn't carry a shield (definitely horse archers, and probably well armored nobles) for that reason.

As for reach and trusting capability, you, as most people, severely overestimate the curve 99% of sabers have. Here's an example of one survival, currently IIRC in National museum in Budapest. Note how the tip is slanted to bring it in line with the hilt for better thrusts. Here is a selection of typical sabers for Hungary from 900-1300, some of these are Magyar (crossguard slanted a little forwards, with spheres at the end), most are a fusion of Magyar with western type of arming sword (crossguard without the spheres). No blades deviate from the line of the hilt more than about 5 cm at the tip.

There are generally two types of sabre, one with widened tip, and one without. The widened tip ones do sacrifice nimbleness of the point in exchange for increased cutting capacity, the ones without it are either wide along the entire length and behave like falchions, or are narrow(er) and are functionally almost identical to arming swords (they slice sliiiightly better). Lumping all sabers into one category is about as correct as lumping every arming sword together - early almost viking types are very different in their characteristics from the later, anti-mail designs.

[pendell]

WRT bombing, I point you to the US Strategic Bombing Survey . There's a tolerably good summary at Wikipedia .

High points ,as I see them. some from here and some from other sources:

1) The US attempted precision daylight bombing using the Norden Bombsight, specifically to hit military targets and avoid civilian casualties.

2) The British conducted night-time area raids with the ostensible objective of "de-housing" the German industrial sector, at least in part because their own precision attacks were faring poorly. In other words, the civilian population was not 'collateral damage' ; the civilian population was the intended target.


3) Strategic raids on factories and tank works proved ineffective. Reason: While the bombs knocked down buildings and caused a lot of superficial damage, it turns out that machine tools are actually pretty tough. It was possible to get the lines operational again in short order.

4) Similar problems occurred when attacking ball-bearing or aircraft factory plants. Again, while damage to the buildings was fairly easy, doing lasting damage to the underlying equipment and putting a factory out of business permanently proved to be a much more daunting task. No indispensable industry was permanently crippled by bombing during the course of the war.

5) What was effective was attacks on transportation systems ; preventing trains and trucks from delivering fuel, ammunition, oil, or other supplies to combat troops. This had the effect of isolating the enemy in place , such that armored formations were rendered little more than steel pillboxes. Their mobility -- the primary asset of modern armor -- was neutralized.

Oh, and the Norden Bombsight? Turns out it's a lot more useful in always-sunny New Mexico than over Europe. Evidently the designers had never anticipated the weather phenomenon known as "clouds". That's without the additional strain of combat. Getting a bomb within a mile of the primary target was sometimes a difficult achievement.

These issues are why the US resorted to fire-bombing Japan later in the war; in addition to all these troubles over Germany, Japan was a much longer range and high winds were even more of a problem as discussed .

Given the choice between ineffective high-precision attacks and effective firebombing, the US chose the second. Cue Grave of the Fireflies . It's why the Germans were never brought to war crimes charges for the early bombing or their submarine campaign; because everything they did , we were forced to do as well. Such is modern war.




Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Max_Killjoy]

What's the old quip... "The Americans area-bombed precision targets, and the British precision-bombed area targets"... or something like that.

The limits of technology. Getting worked up over supposed "war crimes" by the Allies in WW2 is an exercise in myopic hindsight.

[Lemmy]

The ones mentioned weren't used one handed if you could avoid it, and just FYI, I'd take anything about them being used against cavalry with a massive grain of salt.

There was a bastard saber used in Hungary circa 1300-1500 and beyond, though. The idea was to apply the same principle to a sabre as to a bastard sword, and it seems to have worked decently well. Illuminations from Chronica Picta show them being used one handed by horsemen, but having recently recieved a replica of one, I wouldn't really want to use it one handed while on foot. They seem to have been favored by people who didn't carry a shield (definitely horse archers, and probably well armored nobles) for that reason.

As for reach and trusting capability, you, as most people, severely overestimate the curve 99% of sabers have. Here's an example of one survival, currently IIRC in National museum in Budapest. Note how the tip is slanted to bring it in line with the hilt for better thrusts. Here is a selection of typical sabers for Hungary from 900-1300, some of these are Magyar (crossguard slanted a little forwards, with spheres at the end), most are a fusion of Magyar with western type of arming sword (crossguard without the spheres). No blades deviate from the line of the hilt more than about 5 cm at the tip.

There are generally two types of sabre, one with widened tip, and one without. The widened tip ones do sacrifice nimbleness of the point in exchange for increased cutting capacity, the ones without it are either wide along the entire length and behave like falchions, or are narrow(er) and are functionally almost identical to arming swords (they slice sliiiightly better). Lumping all sabers into one category is about as correct as lumping every arming sword together - early almost viking types are very different in their characteristics from the later, anti-mail designs.

I see. Thank you both for your answers.

[Carl]

What's the old quip... "The Americans area-bombed precision targets, and the British precision-bombed area targets"... or something like that.

The limits of technology. Getting worked up over supposed "war crimes" by the Allies in WW2 is an exercise in myopic hindsight.

Basically my point all along.

I never said he was doing it for the hell of it, he did it as part of a deliberate and planned strategy based on the available resources and on his personal understanding of the way this would work.

There was no 'lulz, lets bomb Dresden or Hamburg in a specific manner to create a fire storm to cause as much damage as possible'.

It was premeditated after they managed to do it once accidentally, flattening everything and killing or injuring as many people as possible by purposely creating a firestorm definitely was the target of these raids later in the war.

That is quite premeditated, if it was in a murder case for a single victim it would have been quite clearly been pointed out that it was all planned and prepared on purpose.

Whether or not that was solely due to the limitations of the technology is still up for debate.

Harris was a cold and calculating man when it came to doing his job.
There is a reason a lot of RAF men called him Butcher Harris instead of Bomber Harris.

He clearly subscribed to the maxim the ends justify the means and he was willing to push hard on his men to do the job.

Harris did not bomb the Germans for amusement but because he believed utterly that it was the best way to destroy the German will to fight and their industry.
And by attacking the populations he could strike at both his targets instead of just at the military targets.

After all, whether they broke from the bombing or died and therefore could not work or fight in both cases he got the result he was aiming for.

More enemies destroyed, less resources for the enemies and reducing their capacity to produce.

Sorry if i came off bad then, i see a lot of people assume that people like harris bombed the hell out of civilians because they liked killing the enemy and where bloodthirsty bastards, rather than the real reason they chose that strategy.

WRT bombing, I point you to the US Strategic Bombing Survey . There's a tolerably good summary at Wikipedia .

High points ,as I see them. some from here and some from other sources:

1) The US attempted precision daylight bombing using the Norden Bombsight, specifically to hit military targets and avoid civilian casualties.

2) The British conducted night-time area raids with the ostensible objective of "de-housing" the German industrial sector, at least in part because their own precision attacks were faring poorly. In other words, the civilian population was not 'collateral damage' ; the civilian population was the intended target.


3) Strategic raids on factories and tank works proved ineffective. Reason: While the bombs knocked down buildings and caused a lot of superficial damage, it turns out that machine tools are actually pretty tough. It was possible to get the lines operational again in short order.

4) Similar problems occurred when attacking ball-bearing or aircraft factory plants. Again, while damage to the buildings was fairly easy, doing lasting damage to the underlying equipment and putting a factory out of business permanently proved to be a much more daunting task. No indispensable industry was permanently crippled by bombing during the course of the war.

5) What was effective was attacks on transportation systems ; preventing trains and trucks from delivering fuel, ammunition, oil, or other supplies to combat troops. This had the effect of isolating the enemy in place , such that armored formations were rendered little more than steel pillboxes. Their mobility -- the primary asset of modern armor -- was neutralized.

Oh, and the Norden Bombsight? Turns out it's a lot more useful in always-sunny New Mexico than over Europe. Evidently the designers had never anticipated the weather phenomenon known as "clouds". That's without the additional strain of combat. Getting a bomb within a mile of the primary target was sometimes a difficult achievement.

These issues are why the US resorted to fire-bombing Japan later in the war; in addition to all these troubles over Germany, Japan was a much longer range and high winds were even more of a problem as discussed .

Given the choice between ineffective high-precision attacks and effective firebombing, the US chose the second. Cue Grave of the Fireflies . It's why the Germans were never brought to war crimes charges for the early bombing or their submarine campaign; because everything they did , we were forced to do as well. Such is modern war.




Respectfully,

Brian P.

I'd add a couple of addendums to that. Bombing was perfectly capable of wreaking a factory. The problem was each bomb has a limited destructive radius as you noted and the limitations made completely plastering the factory in bombs was mostly a no go. During the war the estimate was that just 4% of all bombs fell within a 1 mile radius of the target. Between navigation issues for the bombers and limitations of target marking accuracy the bombs would generally be dropped very higgledy piggledy.

You're not wrong about the difficulties of finding targets from high altitude. Precision bombing required precise target marking and the pathfinders where not very precise. It was so bad that when 617 switched to precision bombing they rapidly took over target marking duties for their targets themselves. using diving attacks first with Lancaster's, then later with a Mosquito, and eventually switching to a P-51 Mustang. At Munich Harris basically had 617 take over from the pathfinders. They flew to the target, the mosquito dropped white flares, and then the squadron's lancasters dropped 22 bombers worth of green flares on those, then the mosquito raced around overhead directing the bomber streams in and onto the target fr as long as the fuel lasted. The result was few bombers got lost and all aimed their bombs at the right spot with corrspondingly good effects. A dozen prior raids had only lightly damage the yards, that raid put them out of action till after the war.

[Deadmeat.GW]

RAF, and RAAF and RCAF and RNZAF aircrew calling him butcher had nothing to do with the attacks on civilians. They called him butcher because he ordered the bombing campaign to continue despite horrific casualty rates amongst air crew.

Indirectly it did, he was willing to take high casualties to get the job done, in that aspect he was a cold and calculating man.

It was not that he did it for amusement but because in his understanding this was the best way to use bombers with the technology and equipment available to them.

[AslanCross]

Were these blades used one-handed? Also... If they have the same blade length as a rapier, but are curved, wouldn't they have lower reach?

The zhanmadao and nagamaki were two-handed. I think the closest thing to a curved, single-edged, one-handed sword to what you are looking for is the langes messer.

[VoxRationis]

So this is going to be a rough question to answer: does anyone have a good comparison of what production costs were for different armor types in the same economy? I ask this because I'm trying to do a rewrite of the d20 system and I'm on armor right now. I understand that plate armor is expensive (partially because it's custom-made, partly because of the large amount of metal required, partly because of the quality associated with the work), but it's my understanding that mail is in fact much harder to produce on account of the immense amount of effort it takes to make that much metal wire, form the rings out of the wire, and then individually attach them. The PHB model of having all the different armor types on different racks in the same store is unrealistic, since different cultures usually make different armor types according to technological and economic factors, but what if you could go into a store and buy all these armors? How would lamellar, scale, mail, and plate compare?