Got a Real-World Weapon, Armor or Tactics Question? Mk. XXV

[gkathellar]

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Deer horn handle:


Bone handle:

It's worth noting that antlers are not horns in the technical sense - they're not keratin, and are actually a seasonal growth rather than a permanent one. Unlike horn, which is just protein and forms the exterior for a bony protrusion, the surface of the antler is alive during the growth process and emerges from a root on the skull. If you've ever seen a fuzzy-looking antler, you've seen one mid-growth, as the fur is actually a coat of capillaries. When growth is done, the fuzz falls and is scraped off, and the antler itself falls off later in the years.

Deer are weird and horrible and everything you learn about them will make you like them less.

[wolflance]

On a completely unrelated note:

La tene swords. I am in the situation that I should publish one (uncovered during an excavation). It is poorly preserved but is sort of the same typoe as the linholmgård sword:



So I have plenty of sources to their appearance in Scandinavia (and know La Tene itself etc). But is there anyone who have discussed how it was actually used? That is any scientific papers etc.

It seem to be as close as one can get to a no-thrusting sword, which is interesting in that it is sort of from the same period as the gladius (current example is 1st centry BC/ early AD).

The celtic shields are very much like the roman shields (rectangular or oval in shape, relatively heavy, centre grip etc). So why the completely different swords (gladius fucessed on stabbing/thrusting).

Are the flat swords indication that they might have been horsemans weapons?

Hmm, maybe because the Romans made terrible swords (despite their low opinion on Celtic sword), or couldn't make enough long sword? This is just my my hunch feeling, but given that a Roman formation still had something like 3ft spacing between legionnaires, there's no reason to not use a longer sword if they could help it - and especially since the Romans were known to use gladius as chopping weapon as well as thrusting - longer sword helps in both uses.

Late Roman troops also switched to longer spatha, and I don't think it affected their infantry formation in significant way.

[Vinyadan]

Is it just me or does it sound a bit like "bröst borg" i.e. "cheast castle".



Undoubtedly the root of the Swedish word for armour, "pansar", imported via German I guess (with the "a" at the end it sounds more 'Italian' than German).

Bröst is sure that. But Old Norse words with a -jö- generally come from -e- . So in German you have a comparable verb bergen, which means "to save", and Dutch has halsberg, "throath saver", and Italian usbergo (a kind of armour), all from a German root.

The a in pansar might be less important than it looks like: German has had -er pronounced a(r) for a while, although I am not sure that that was already the case in this time. It could also have just been an adaptation of a foreign word to the declension (I haven't checked). Panzer itself does come from a neolatin language, like French "panciere", something you wear on your belly (pancia still means belly in Italian).

[John Campbell]

Thick gambesons are also to hot to be comfortable to fight in, run in etc, in Northern Europe, even by winter. Unless you are talking about arctic circle area etc.

So I've actually in real life for many years been fighting in, running in, etc., mail over a quilted gambeson, in a climate much warmer than Viking Age Northern Europe. It's really not that bad. You get used to it; your body adapts. Getting your helm off when you have the chance helps a lot - you radiate a lot of heat through your scalp.

I've found the mail over quilted gambeson to be a lot more comfortable in the summer than my old plate kit was. The mail and gambeson breathe much better than the plate did. (This is assuming the gambeson is made from natural fibers, which mine is and any period gambeson naturally would have been. There've been a couple times where for one reason or another I've borrowed the gambeson from the loaner bin, which was made from a polyester moving blanket, and holy gods is that thing awful.)

And in the winter, having that thick layer of insulation between your skin and the huge-ass heat sink you're wearing is really, really nice.

[Tobtor]

Hmm, maybe because the Romans made terrible swords (despite their low opinion on Celtic sword), or couldn't make enough long sword?

Well terrible is a strong word. Especieally since they already had imported celtic smiths pretty early. But I am not just talking about length. the SPatha is also pretty long, but is still a very good thrusting sword. Also some la Tene swords have a point, but then there is this group completely without points

This is just my my hunch feeling, but given that a Roman formation still had something like 3ft spacing between legionnaires, there's no reason to not use a longer sword if they could help it - and especially since the Romans were known to use gladius as chopping weapon as well as thrusting - longer sword helps in both uses.

I agree, but fighting with a big shield, then thrusting is typical seen as important. The la tene sword I have, as well a several others like the one shown in the picture, have a completely flat tip. The question is why?

[Xuc Xac]

The la tene sword I have, as well a several others like the one shown in the picture, have a completely flat tip. The question is why?

This is completely wild conjecture. The swords of the Romans were intended to be used by thrusting between your shield and the shield of the soldier next to you. You make a wall with your mates and thrust through the gaps.

Maybe the flat tipped La Tène swords were meant for a more one-on-one fight where you would be fighting around your opponent's shield. You either reach around and flick your blade to slice with the tip or you get inside his guard (twisting his shield aside with the edge of your own) and have to slice with the edge in extreme close quarters.

[Kiero]

On a completely unrelated note:

La tene swords. I am in the situation that I should publish one (uncovered during an excavation). It is poorly preserved but is sort of the same typoe as the linholmgård sword:



So I have plenty of sources to their appearance in Scandinavia (and know La Tene itself etc). But is there anyone who have discussed how it was actually used? That is any scientific papers etc.

It seem to be as close as one can get to a no-thrusting sword, which is interesting in that it is sort of from the same period as the gladius (current example is 1st centry BC/ early AD).

The celtic shields are very much like the roman shields (rectangular or oval in shape, relatively heavy, centre grip etc). So why the completely different swords (gladius fucessed on stabbing/thrusting).

Are the flat swords indication that they might have been horsemans weapons?

I'm no Celtic expert, though I do know one and have talked about them a fair bit (and I'll try to get his input as well). The primary Celtic weapon was actually the spear, however their nobility aspired towards being horsemen. The wearing of trousers and use of swords was something done to ape the cavalryman, and on horseback a longer sword was obviously better than a shorter one.

That's the primary difference in approach between the Romans and Celts, the gladius was a perfect and versatile infantry weapon, good for cutting and thrusting, but too short to be as handy on horseback. Later Roman legionaries were drawn from "barbarian" peoples who again aspired to being cavalry and thus the longer spatha was a more natural weapon for them. It would not have been as good in a close infantry press as the gladius, but I don't think the later legionaries used the same formations.

Note Celtic shields are not like the later scuta, which are curved so that it wraps around the body.

[Brother Oni]

And in the winter, having that thick layer of insulation between your skin and the huge-ass heat sink you're wearing is really, really nice.

The huge-arse heat sink can also work the other way in sunny climates, which is why the crusaders took to wearing tabards, both to stop being baked and for friend-or-foe identification.

[Kiero]

In hot and dry place where sweat evaporates quickly (i.e. desert), wearing very thick gambeson or metal armor may still be bearable.

For an infantryman? How is he carrying enough water to stay hydrated under those conditions?

[Mike_G]

For an infantryman? How is he carrying enough water to stay hydrated under those conditions?

OK, "been there, done that" alert.

Having been in the infantry, wearing waaaay too much crap in hot places, (not gambeson and mail, but try to wear full battle rattle and pack and ammo and so on in temps over 100 F) you don't individually carry enough water. You can't. There is some form of supply whether it's wagons or pack animals back in the day, or trucks full of the stuff now. You carry some water, and you refill when you can.

It sucks, and heat casualties are a concern, but armies have fought in deserts and jungles and terrible weather since the dawn of history. Gear has always been hot and heavy. But if it keeps you alive, it's worth it.

I'm sure ancient armies planned marches based on water sources, and men didn't march in full armor, and mules or camels bearing huge water skins were part of the army.

[wolflance]

Well terrible is a strong word. Especieally since they already had imported celtic smiths pretty early. But I am not just talking about length. the SPatha is also pretty long, but is still a very good thrusting sword. Also some la Tene swords have a point, but then there is this group completely without points

Sorry, I should have chose my word carefully.

My overall impression of Roman gladius quality is influenced by the metallurgical study on several gladii, pictured below. I am no metallurgy expert so the image doesn't make any sense to me, although someone I trusted told me that these samples suck in quality as far as sword goes, with overly hard/brittle blade and improper/inconsistent heat-treatment.

I agree, but fighting with a big shield, then thrusting is typical seen as important. The la tene sword I have, as well a several others like the one shown in the picture, have a completely flat tip. The question is why?

I think others have answered this before me, i.e. either it's a cavalry sword, or Celts relied more on spear than sword.

Note Celtic shields are not like the later scuta, which are curved so that it wraps around the body.

I wonder why Roman scuta is curved around the body - I can understand that it protects more, but isn't this curved design less conductive to formation fighting? Isn't it easier to form shield wall or testudo with flat shield?

[Potato_Priest]

I wonder why Roman scuta is curved around the body - I can understand that it protects more, but isn't this curved design less conductive to formation fighting? Isn't it easier to form shield wall or testudo with flat shield?

As I'm coming to understand in the Swords as Primary Weapons and the Roman Legion thread, the Roman shield and sword phalanx was designed to be more flexible than its competitors since it needed to be for the irregular terrain of Italy. Thus, the roman shields were probably designed for a balance between individual and formation fighting, since tight formations could not be relied upon in all of the Roman's engagements.

[Kiero]

As I'm coming to understand in the Swords as Primary Weapons and the Roman Legion thread, the Roman shield and sword phalanx was designed to be more flexible than its competitors since it needed to be for the irregular terrain of Italy. Thus, the roman shields were probably designed for a balance between individual and formation fighting, since tight formations could not be relied upon in all of the Roman's engagements.

Actually, it wasn't the terrain of Italy that stimulated the change, the Romans fought in the regular hoplite phalanx for a long time. It was fast-moving, loose-formation Celts and Samnites, who could consistently out-maneuver the hoplite phalanx that spurred it.

[gkathellar]

Actually, it wasn't the terrain of Italy that stimulated the change, the Romans fought in the regular hoplite phalanx for a long time. It was fast-moving, loose-formation Celts and Samnites, who could consistently out-maneuver the hoplite phalanx that spurred it.

This follows. While the hoplite phalanx is perfectly serviceable, even during its heyday in antiquity it saw defeats at the hands of skirmishers and other formations that could outmaneuver it - IIRC there were scattered successful experiments with using more flexible infantry to defeat the hoplite phalanx during the Peloponnesian Wars. There's some reason to believe the formation's persistence was due as much to social factors as its effectiveness - for the Greeks and their imitators, the hoplite phalanx was an important symbol of citizenship, masculinity, and individual courage.

[Clistenes]

This follows. While the hoplite phalanx is perfectly serviceable, even during its heyday in antiquity it saw defeats at the hands of skirmishers and other formations that could outmaneuver it - IIRC there were scattered successful experiments with using more flexible infantry to defeat the hoplite phalanx during the Peloponnesian Wars. There's some reason to believe the formation's persistence was due as much to social factors as its effectiveness - for the Greeks and their imitators, the hoplite phalanx was an important symbol of citizenship, masculinity, and individual courage.

The Greek/Hellenistic developed ways to reduce the flaws of the phalanx: Larger armies became a combination of macedonian-like hoplites with longer sarissas, classical greek heavy hoplites, lighter iphicratid hoplites and peltast skirmishers, the lighter and more agile troops working as "hinges" for the army.

It worked quite well, and the Romans lost many battles against such armies. However, the Marian legions turned to be more versatile, simpler to manage and less dependant on having a great tactician in charge.

On the other hand, the Roman system required to have many, many troops with an aggresive mindset and good morale willing to close with the enemy.

[Kiero]

The Greek/Hellenistic developed ways to reduce the flaws of the phalanx: Larger armies became a combination of macedonian-like hoplites with longer sarissas, classical greek heavy hoplites, lighter iphicratid hoplites and peltast skirmishers, the lighter and more agile troops working as "hinges" for the army.

It worked quite well, and the Romans lost many battles against such armies. However, the Marian legions turned to be more versatile, simplest to manage and less dependant on having a great tactician in charge.

On the other hand, the Roman system required to have many, many troops with an aggresive mindset and good morale willing to close with the enemy.

Your middle point is essentially why the Roman system proved superior. As long as the general wasn't a complete incompetent, it was an army that largely fought itself. Most of the tactical decisions were made on the ground by the centurions responding to local conditions without orders from the top.

[Tobtor]

My overall impression of Roman gladius quality is influenced by the metallurgical study on several gladii, pictured below. I am no metallurgy expert so the image doesn't make any sense to me, although someone I trusted told me that these samples suck in quality as far as sword goes, with overly hard/brittle blade and improper/inconsistent heat-treatment.

Indeed. The weapons was by n means good "steel" swords, however you get the same results for any ancient European sword of the period (and all the way to the medieval period, and even well into it, though around 900AD you begin to see proper steel swords, though as a rarity). There is within each group a large variation. That said, as is obvious some of the gladii are early stages of pattern-welded, as several kinds of "poor" steel are forged together. The idea is to have (too) soft iron and (too) brittle steel to combine into a useable sword, the iron preventing the sword to snap, the steel to keep a point/edge and to prevent the sword to bend. This method was widely used (roughly 8/10 or 8/10 of roman gladii and spathaes have it).

[rrgg]

http://mikeprendergast.ie/monte/

I've recently been reading through this translation of a series of works by Pietro Monte, an italian soldier who lived at the end of the middle ages, and so far it's been really informative. He talks quite a bit about the advantages of various weapons, the differences between fighting one on one vs battles, and the differences between fighting in heavy armor vs light.

In particular, in the final section where he talks about military tactics and strategy he offers a really interesting take on the question of heavy sword&shield men vs swiss/german style pikemen which frequently shows up in early modern military treatises. Unlike Machiavelli however, Monte did have quite a bit of real-world military experience and presumably had a better idea of what he was talking about.

I'm still not entirely certain about the translation or the descripition (is he talking about pikemen literally crossing pikes with their neighbor to create a row of X's?), but he seems to be claiming that the Swiss/German pike squares had two different methods of fighting, one of which was vulnerable against heavily armored footmen with large shields while the other was vulnerable against other pikemen with longer pikes. His suggestion for defeating this new order then was to combine heavily armored shieldmen and pikemen together in the same formation, forcing the enemy to defend against just one or the other:

"

XIV. ON THE ORDER TO COUNTER THE ORDER WHICH THE GERMANS USUALLY KEEP.

For the sake of setting out some way for universally withstanding many peoples, we shall here place an example against the order and formation of Germans in conflict, for here the German order in our times appears almost untouchable. Even though they may be few and must pass from place to place and have no offensive arms except for lances, riding crossbowmen and soldiers with heavy armour can be very strong against Germans. Indeed when Germans wholly keep their order, they bring all sorts of weapons along with them; they especially have very many kinds of cannons on all sides. Therefore they can very easily go against riding crossbowmen and against weapon-bearers with heavy armour, which in the vernacular are called men at arms. When the Germans want to charge or clash with them, they bring all lances into contact in strength, somewhat like the cross of St Andrew, and in this way horses can pass without great detriment through the middle of the German footsoldiers, and those who remain far away are often constrained by these footsoldiers. And when the whole array or unit begins to retreat, it can be said to be devastated, and therefore, against Swiss or German footsoldiers, another, stronger, order must be assumed. And here it can be said that it will be useful to have some armed carriages against the enemies, since the people can move the carriages all the way to the middle of the enemies and walk safely. But this will take place only on plains, and once in many years. Therefore it is appropriate to devise another formation which is easier and more common, where one must pay special attention in every way to an order which is stronger than the German custom. This can be done, having considered the Germans’ strength, and it is to be done in such a way at first: the units are to be ordered in accordance with the German custom, with lances and halberds, and along the sides one should attach handguns or springalds, and crossbows, and all these things of the side are machines for striking or killing at a long distance. But beyond the German order, a unit of heavily armoured cavalry is to be placed behind, and on the face or the front part, very strong and excellently armoured men, and all first men, for seven or eight ranks, should have very big shields, and at least in the middle some very strong lames of steel, and at the back and in the middle of those who carry the shields, one should insert other men, strong and armed, with longer lances than those the Germans bear. And here the Germans will be forced to choose one of two: either throwing with their lances in a loose or unrestricted way against the shield-bearers, or putting their lances in a cross, to keep the enemies from concentrating in their middle. Against the first choice, as long as the Germans strike loose blows with their lances, the shieldbearers can enter in the middle of the Germans, and there, when all are armed with swords and other short weapons, they can quickly and easily devastate the Germans’ entire formation, and beyond this order, the Germans are less strong; and if they put their lances like the cross of St Andrew, those who have longer lances coming between the shieldbearers, without difficulty, give enormous trouble against the Germans, and in this way they can easily enter in their middle, and when they are divided or rolled back, the heavily armoured cavalry should run against the enemies with maximum force, and men who are fast and sufficiently strong in similar things are sought. For all Germans are by nature slow and so, when they are rolled back together with enemies and are found out of order, they suffer much adversity with little effort because of their slowness or inagility; and this order which we have set out will always oppose the order of the Germans, since it goes against their temperament, and just as we have said about them, one should, against other nations, investigate methods contrary to their own.

"

[rrgg]

Here's something interesting from page 185 where he talks a bit about how quality armor is made:

"

If someone wants to handle light and safe arms, he should altogether take up iron or steel. In Spruco, a city in Germany, the best iron and steel is found. Therefore the masters there put arms to the test with crossbows, and commonly it is said that such tempering is caused because of one body of water which passes through those places. But in fact they temper with any cold water, and some who had seen the excellence of this iron wanted to experiment to make a corslet resistant to sclopetis, which is a small kind of cannon, and in fact achieved this. Nevertheless, one should wear a silk quilt and a well-sewn cloth over the corslet. And when it becomes wet it is rendered stronger, though such armour is heavy according to the Germans, but not according to the Italians or French, and this armour should be strong through all parts. Now though there are arms made in Italy which are nearly as good as those from Spruco. Although the art recently originated from Germany, and afterwards hands are of good nature and well-equipped, the secret consists in beating the arms a lot when they are already cold, and they should produce strong tempering, though they should not be broken but remain like any iron of an arrow, weapon, or things like these, which are neither broken nor folded.

"

[snowblizz]

Regarding the cross thing.

I think what may be meant is that that you brace (in the ground) the pike slanted forwards. As opposed to holding it out horisontally for the "loose stabbing".

If the author was modern he would have said "they should put the like back-slashes"

At least that's what I'd say makes sense, as the 2 main methods of holding your pike in combat would be covered.

That would also mean the author is talking about stuff that was used, like the Rondoleros.

[Vinyadan]

This follows. While the hoplite phalanx is perfectly serviceable, even during its heyday in antiquity it saw defeats at the hands of skirmishers and other formations that could outmaneuver it - IIRC there were scattered successful experiments with using more flexible infantry to defeat the hoplite phalanx during the Peloponnesian Wars. There's some reason to believe the formation's persistence was due as much to social factors as its effectiveness - for the Greeks and their imitators, the hoplite phalanx was an important symbol of citizenship, masculinity, and individual courage.

Greece is as uneven as central and southern Italy, if not worse. This is why there have been a million battles at Mantineia, it was one of the few flat places where two large phalanxes could fight each other. Social factors definitely were a thing. There also was the idea that most fights should be fought with the home city in sight, which maybe made the phalanx somewhat more viable. But I remember seeing the hoplitical revolution in Greece described as an oddity. A rocky land filled with mountains and hills, and chronically poor on natural resources, somehow not only adopted, but actually invented a kind of formation that needed lots of metal and flat terrain. And it was adopted because it still was effective (the Spartans defeated by the Argives at the Battle of Hysiae (669 BC)).

I personally wonder whether the Samnites completely ignored the hoplitical revolution, or simply chose to adapt themselves to the terrain they were living in. In a way, they were what the Greeks could have been. I thought I saw an hoplite in this image from a Samnite tomb, but I guess that it could be a spear-thrower armed with a shield.

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I don't think that the rounded scutum made fighting in formation more difficult than flat ones. Actually, I think it was better. And the hoplon itself was rounded. I think that the scutum allowed you to carry the weight of the shield closer to your body, and that it was better at deflecting hits. Keeping the shields in line probably wasn't any more difficult than it would have been with flat shields.

About Roman generals, keep in mind that one of the strong points of Rome was superior know-how and elite formation for its leaders. With this I don't deny the centurion's role, nor do I mean that they were all Scipions. But, after the second Punic war, I doubt that Roman generals could easily meet their equals abroad, the Parthians being the exception.

Actually, it wasn't the terrain of Italy that stimulated the change, the Romans fought in the regular hoplite phalanx for a long time. It was fast-moving, loose-formation Celts and Samnites, who could consistently out-maneuver the hoplite phalanx that spurred it.

According to Mommsen, the ancient tradition was that the rounded scutum was a weapon of the Samnites that was adopted by the Romans (he didn't agree, on etymological reasons that are now outdated). The tradition was that the Romans started out with a quadrangular flat shield, then got the round clipeus from the Etruscans, and finally the curved scutum from the Samnites.

[Kiero]

People hugely underestimate the social conventions involved in hoplite warfare - and the fact that many of the norms were designed to ensure only a specific and restricted class were involved in war at all. One of the early parts of any campaign in Greece involved road-building by both sides to reach the pre-defined battle sites. Or more accurately, road maintenance, since previous campaigns would have done the same thing in clearing and repairing the roads on the way to the fight.

I think the Samnites simply weren't interested in adopting these conventions, and preferred a simpler way of fighting, involving a lot of raiding and plundering rather than the formal affair of a clash of phalanxes.

[The Jack]

But I remember seeing the hoplitical revolution in Greece described as an oddity. A rocky land filled with mountains and hills, and chronically poor on natural resources, somehow not only adopted, but actually invented a kind of formation that needed lots of metal and flat terrain. And it was adopted because it still was effective (the Spartans defeated by the Argives at the Battle of Hysiae (669 BC)).

.

I dunno, it's not really an area I'm big on, but hoplites in general seem to make more sense in the mountains and hills. In a shallow and not really complete overview, many cultures famed for their heavy infantry do seem to be from lands of hills,mountains,lakes and which are often islands/peninsulas. Legions, Vikings, Britons.. In comparison, when one thinks of flatlanders, it seems less likely that heavy infantry will get the cake, and if they do it's likely neigbour influence. In contrast, these lands are hardly famed for horsemanship unless it's famous for being awful.

And if you can excuse that over generalization, there's many a reason to make it.
-Less space means the quality of individual troops gains more importance compared to tactics/numbers, In comparison to open terrain.
-Bad terrain means there's a lesser advantage in more mobile troops.
-More Defensive geography (chokepoints, advantageous ground) means you need to worry less about the maneuverability of your own troops/formations.
-Hills- make for strong legs, allow you to destroy the moral of stick-legged flatlanders with your well routed laughter.

[Kiero]

I dunno, it's not really an area I'm big on, but hoplites in general seem to make more sense in the mountains and hills. In a shallow and not really complete overview, many cultures famed for their heavy infantry do seem to be from lands of hills,mountains,lakes and which are often islands/peninsulas. Legions, Vikings, Britons.. In comparison, when one thinks of flatlanders, it seems less likely that heavy infantry will get the cake, and if they do it's likely neigbour influence. In contrast, these lands are hardly famed for horsemanship unless it's famous for being awful.

And if you can excuse that over generalization, there's many a reason to make it.
-Less space means the quality of individual troops gains more importance compared to tactics/numbers, In comparison to open terrain.
-Bad terrain means there's a lesser advantage in more mobile troops.
-More Defensive geography (chokepoints, advantageous ground) means you need to worry less about the maneuverability of your own troops/formations.
-Hills- make for strong legs.

Hoplites didn't fight in the mountains or hills, by convention they fought on the plains. Most of the battles of the Peloponnesian War that happened in Greece took place on the same spots again and again. Once more, societal pressures are more important here than tactical considerations.

I'd highly recommend Hoplites: the Classical Greek Battle Experience by Victor Hansen, a collection of essays on the hoplite from many aspects, which details just how formalised that style of warfare was. It's more comparable to a duel than all-out total war.

The early Roman experience against the Samnites is more equivalent to that of Greek mercenaries fighting people who didn't do the hoplite thing.

[Vinyadan]

There's also the fact that Western Europe and Anatolia are somewhat odd, in that there aren't massive open spaces. One of the reasons why the Romans kept being beaten by the Parthians until the Imperial age was that their troops were built for a different terrain on a strategic level. So they could handle fighting on a plain, but, if the whole campaign was set in an endless plain, then they were outmatched by specialised troops, like cavalry.

So, in a way, it made sense for the Greeks to have soldiers with heavy armour, because, on a strategic level, they weren't risking constant harassment by cavalry.

However, this heavy infantry was meant to fight in formation in a plain. This meant that they needed to find a suitable place to fight. I think that Herodotus expresses the surprise of the foreigners when they see that the Greeks don't fight by ambush, and, instead, look for the most suitable place to have the armies meet.

But, if the terrain is mostly mountains, one would expect light infantry to have a much larger role. One would expect armies built around smaller squads of throwers and skirmishers, and that don't need to fight in formation, and thus can fight on most of the territory.

I don't think that the habit of fighting on the plains was a result of the hoplitical revolution. I think that it was the opposite: the hoplitical revolution was a thing because the Greeks were already fighting on open plains before they developed the equipment of the hoplite. And they developed this equipment because it was the best available for this kind of fighting.

I have three theories about why the Greeks were already used to fighting in the open plains.

One is that war chariots were used by kings and aristocrats until shortly before 710-650 BC. If these people were the ones to lead armies, they would lead them where they could use their chariots: on the plains.

The second one is that plains were the richest territories, and the cities fought to control them. So we have the Lelantine war, which was about control of the Lelas Plain. The easiest way to control the plain is occupying it, which leads to fighting on the plain.

The third one is that large cities were placed on plains, Athens being the most important example (in the case of Athens, the oldest part of the city was located on a steep hill, but the city expanded into the plain below); cities built upon a hill and surrounded by fertile plains are fairly common. Since the most important objective was defending the home city, you needed soldiers capable of fighting on the plains. If you wanted to attack a city, you still needed to be able to be able to fight in the plain in which it was located.

The plains would have, in theory, allowed the use of heavy cavalry, but the general look of the territory meant that there weren't enough resources to have large stables. Cavalry also doesn't fare well against tightly packed heavy infantry formations, which are bound to outnumber cavalry simply because of lower price.

The "less space" part isn't as important as "less population". Greek states were fairly small. So you had fewer soldiers. But the more important part is that many citizens were fairly rich. I think of places like Athens and Argos, where commerce was developed on a Mediterranean level. So a lot of citizens could buy themselves an armour. Athens was odd, in that it had citizens with political rights even though they were too poor to buy armour. But many cities required you to be rich enough to own a hoplitical panoply, if you wanted full rights. So there was a huge incentive towards owing them.

Bad terrain gives an advantage to the troops that are more mobile on bad terrain, like light infantry. A hoplite will have trouble running uphill, while the skirmisher can outrun him while throwing inexpensive javelins. Mountains are bad for horses, but mobility is a relative concept.

The chockepoints were important on occasion. The II Persian War was built around chockepoints. Heavy infantry was a huge advantage then. However, I can't think of a case in which war between Greek states was won or lost thanks to a chockepoint. The main problem with chokepoints are alternate routes. There's always an alternate route. One of Alexander's strokes of strategical genius was building new ones by carving stairs in the mountains.

Physical activity sure was good, no doubt about it. I think that Ariosto sent his mountaineers to the Duke and the Duke was very happy about them.

(Are the Britons famous for being good footmen? Never heard of that).

[The Jack]

(Are the Britons famous for being good footmen? Never heard of that).

I'm probably shaming myself here and shouldn't be posting my dubious theories that aren't well backed, but here's the justification thingy

Not so much famous, but it just popped up as something they seemed to specialize in somewhat. Before the longbow, and I'm unsure what's due to the viking influence, britains were poor horsemen (It's mostly too hilly) and poor at ranged. When you've got **** ranged troops and poor cavalry, you need to be good at at least one thing, right? Well, from limited reading of english battles, and the note that, later, English knights usually dismounted to fight on foot (mostly just using the horses to move to strategic positions quickly.) I've sort of assumed that the english were first infantry and then archer focused, at the eternal expense of cavalry.

I could be entirely wrong somewhere, but theorizing and admiting uncertainty is far more interesting than being right and far less dangerous than acting right...

[Kiero]

No, they fought on plains because that's where the people who dominated the military wanted to fight. The same way they deliberately marginalised the aristocrats who might want to fight on horseback, and the lower orders who might have developed into a more rigorous form of light infantry. The same way all the fighting only took place in the summer, between planting and harvesting, and sieges were avoided for the most part. The same way they didn't do ambushes or look for terrain advantages.

There's been a fair amount of scholarship on the topic, hoplite warfare was a very specialised niche that emerged in a particular time and place because of the power of the hoplite class. Theories based solely on geography or strategy overlook the social reality.

It could function as part of combined arms outside the context in which it was invented (which would be the case in mercenary service), but the form that we saw from the Ionian Revolt until the battle of Chaeronea or thereabouts, didn't require anyone else.

[Galloglaich]

http://mikeprendergast.ie/monte/

I've recently been reading through this translation of a series of works by Pietro Monte, an italian soldier who lived at the end of the middle ages, and so far it's been really informative. He talks quite a bit about the advantages of various weapons, the differences between fighting one on one vs battles, and the differences between fighting in heavy armor vs light.

In particular, in the final section where he talks about military tactics and strategy he offers a really interesting take on the question of heavy sword&shield men vs swiss/german style pikemen which frequently shows up in early modern military treatises. Unlike Machiavelli however, Monte did have quite a bit of real-world military experience and presumably had a better idea of what he was talking about.

I believe Machiavelli did have real-world military experience, he reformed the militia of Florence and led them successfully in battle until they were overwhelmed by the French army.

In this section, by the way

And here it can be said that it will be useful to have some armed carriages against the enemies, since the people can move the carriages all the way to the middle of the enemies and walk safely. But this will take place only on plains, and once in many years. Therefore it is appropriate to devise another formation which is easier and more common,

Monte is referring to war-wagons.





These were very popular and important in Montes day, i.e. the 15th Century.

By very large shields he means pavises, like you see here being used by Bohemian troops in the Landshut war of succession:



Both war-wagons and lines of pavisemen like that seem to have become obsolete some time in the 16th Century, mainly due to the increasing proliferation of more mobile, medium caliber field artillery - such as he mentions the "Germans" carry with them in abundance.

I'm not certain it was so cut and dry though they may have lingered a bit longer in the West than conventional wisdom tells us their gradual disappearance may have had more to do with the Socio-Economic changes I have often referred to which took place in Early Modern Europe. They certainly lingered a bit longer in Central and Eastern Europe than in the Western part.

But I think we can say that they were both largely gone from Latin Europe by the 30 Years War in the 17th Century.

Pavises and war-wagons were both part of the Bohemian system, so to speak, and the Bohemians proved capable of defeating German (and Tartar and Ottoman and Hungarian and Polish and Russian etc.) armies repeatedly in the 15th Century. They seem to have lost the knack though by the 17th when they were defeated by the Hapsburgs at the Battle of White Mountain in the early days of the 30 Years War.


G

[Vinyadan]

No, they fought on plains because that's where the people who dominated the military wanted to fight. The same way they deliberately marginalised the aristocrats who might want to fight on horseback, and the lower orders who might have developed into a more rigorous form of light infantry. The same way all the fighting only took place in the summer, between planting and harvesting, and sieges were avoided for the most part. The same way they didn't do ambushes or look for terrain advantages.

There's been a fair amount of scholarship on the topic, hoplite warfare was a very specialised niche that emerged in a particular time and place because of the power of the hoplite class. Theories based solely on geography or strategy overlook the social reality.

It could function as part of combined arms outside the context in which it was invented (which would be the case in mercenary service), but the form that we saw from the Ionian Revolt until the battle of Chaeronea or thereabouts, didn't require anyone else.

This is a rather oblique way of writing, so let me know if I understand correctly with "landed citizens wielded the power in the city and in the army; since they were hoplites, the battlefields that were chosen were plains, which were best for hoplites; since they owned land, they chose to campaign on time spans that were least likely to interfere with agriculture".

This still doesn't answer why the richer citizens chose to equip themselves for fighting in melee formation, instead of e.g. going for composite bows. Which is why I think that there must have been practical reasons why they chose to fight on the plains. Less training time is a good answer, when it comes to "why no bows?". But the light infantry, the one with thrown weapons, would also have needed lots of time to become good at that. But many of these people weren't hunters, and, instead, lived as wage earners, so time was precious for them, too. The smart thing about the Athenian navy was that they took people whose job already was rowing and paid them to do that, as professionals.

In general, I have read the lack of sieges as due to lack of a siege train, which would have been extremely costly, and therefore would only become available later to larger states, like Macedonia. There are a few recorded sieges I can think of, like that of Melos, and, of course, that of Syracuse. Success would simply have been too unlikely or would take up too many troops from small armies to make them worth it. As Thukydides observed, this means that even a country ruled by a king (so someone with different interests from hoplites) needs to leave a small contingent to perform the siege, or face high costs to supply a larger force (which is what happened at Melos, too: a large force landed, and then left a smaller force to handle the siege). Smaller force = results are more unlikely. I remember that the introduction of bronze as a form of money in Rome was explained as due to the siege of Veii: the citizen-soldiers who were left to besiege the city during the agricultural season received ingots from the State to make up for the value lost in produce from their fields at home.

In general, I assume that time spans were the important thing. Short training for melee, and a big smash for a battle that can be done with within a day. Then everyone can go home and think about his business.

However, I don't really get your last observation: hoplites on their own did get defeated during land battles by enemies they couldn't reach, and they also often needed the ability to move on the sea. While they could sail a trieres, they were known to be bad sailors, compared to professionals, and to suffer in combat.

I also wonder if things were very different for e.g. Thessalians, which had larger cavalry, or cities ruled by monarchs or tyrants; tyrants in particular tended to appeal to the lower classes.

[Galloglaich]

http://mikeprendergast.ie/monte/

I've recently been reading through this translation of a series of works by Pietro Monte, an italian soldier who lived at the end of the middle ages, and so far it's been really informative.

"

Three other quick points about Monte,

1. I agree he is a very useful and important source for late medieval warfare in general and the 15th Century in Italy more specifically. He is in the top 5 sources for late medieval warfare on my list. Until recently though I was only able to read his work in fragments.
2. Though he lived his later years and published in Italy (in the service of the Duke of Milan), he was probably of Iberian (Portuguese, Spanish or Catalan) origin, not Italian. Though certainly he was familiar with Italian ways of war - he is kind of a bridge between the fascinating though mostly untranslated Iberian fencing manuals and those of Italy which are better known to the community.
3. There is another major translation out, not sure if you have seen this or not. I have been meaning to buy it though it is expensive. Knowing this guys other work (Forgeng is probably the most important translator of Fechtbucher, he did the major translations for Joachim Meyer, Paulas Kal and the anonymous I.33 manuscript among others) I expect this to be very useful.

Here is a link to the book on Amazon:

https://www.amazon.com/Pietro-Montes...s=pietro+monte

I haven't bought it yet because it's rather expensive, but most of Forgengs other works sold out very quickly and then became rare and much more expensive so you may want to "act soon" as they say if you are interested in this source. May be hard to get in six months...

G