A Philosophical Conundrum Involving 'Spock's Brain'

[Giggling Ghast]

"Brain and brain? What is brain?!"
-Kara, from that one episode of Star Trek that was nearly as bad as the one with the space hippies and the tiresome Garden of Eden metaphor

OK, have you ever watched the Star Trek: TOS episode "Spock's Brain?" Here's the short rundown: Spock's brain gets removed by stupid alien babes who need it to run their implausible civilization. Spock's body temporarily gets a mechanical replacement. (He can't talk or nothin', though.) Eventually, McCoy uses a make-you-super-smart machine and sticks Spock's brain back into Spock's body so that he can finish out the rest of TOS' mediocre third season.

But let's say, for the sake of argument, that Spock's brain couldn't be put back, as it was literally impossible to reconnect all the ... brain-thingies. Shut up. Not wishing to lose his first officer, Kirk orders that they use the technology of the stupid alien babes to implant an upgraded mechanical brain in Spock's body that will be able to perfectly mimic Spock's personality.

However, shepherding a civilization of hot morons when you don't have a physical body presents all sorts of difficulties, so Spock's original brain constructs a robot body that is identical to his old body.

So now we have two Spocks: one with the original body with a mechanical brain, and one with the original brain and a mechanical body. Both have the original personality of Mr. Spock.

The question is: which is the true "Spock"? Who do you make First Officer of the Starship Enterprise? And is a two-fisted hammer punch really that effective in hand-to-hand combat?

[Grinner]

Give the meatbrain one the uniform and throw the metalbrain one into the nearest sun. Yeah, they might be equivalent as far as proficiency goes, but you sidestep a lot of existential questions that way.

[golentan]

Assuming you actually copied the memories and personality? They're both spock, though the meat mind has continuity and so may as well be called Spock A, vs. uploaded mind as Spock B.

If Spock B doesn't have cloned memories, and is merely emulating Spock A, he's still Spock but he's not the original Spock, he's basically a super in-character cosplayer, but he's probably got the delusion he's original spock and it's as mean to try and break that delusion as to have created it unless you can do it non-traumatically.

Give the meatbrain one the uniform and throw the metalbrain one into the nearest sun. Yeah, they might be equivalent as far as proficiency goes, but you sidestep a lot of existential questions that way.

That's murder...

[SiuiS]

They are both Spock. The only valid difference is when their narrative bifurcates.

Yes, that's murder, but it does make the problem go away. I won't say "solves", but.

[Giggling Ghast]

They are both Spock. The only valid difference is when their narrative bifurcates.

But who do you make First Officer? As I see it, they both have a claim to the position.

[Grinner]

That's murder...

So are teleporters.


On a more serious note, you all might be interested in a variant of the Ship of Theseus problem. If you take a ship and replace every piece, is it still the same ship? What if you build another ship from the disassembled parts of the original?

Edit:

But who do you make First Officer? As I see it, they both have a claim to the position.

I'd say Meatbrain has the greater claim, being the original chronologically speaking.

[Giggling Ghast]

On a more serious note, you all might be interested in a variant of the Ship of Theseus problem. If you take a ship and replace every piece, is it still the same ship? What if you build another ship from the disassembled parts of the original?

That's actually what inspired the question.

[SiuiS]

But who do you make First Officer? As I see it, they both have a claim to the position.

Who wants to be first officer? You have two highly intelligent and rational people with identical desires who can work out a system of benefit to all parties, I doubt this is an actual issue.

On a more serious note, you all might be interested in a variant of the Ship of Theseus problem. If you take a ship and replace every piece, is it still the same ship? What if you build another ship from the disassembled parts of the original?

This is easier, because "ship" insofar as it pertains to the concept of the vessel bearing the name and history isn't really tied to the physical ship. If you replace is systematically, you're left with the ship with new pieces. The old pieces do not have claim to the concept of being a certain ship except where they shaped that concept. Just like disassembling a legion piece by piece and later taking all those men into a new legion doesn't have this problem.

[golentan]

Is it, though? It is Spock's body, but strictly speaking, it isn't the original Spock, merely a simulacrum that acts like the original Spock.

And that makes it not a person? If it's bright enough to legitimately emulate a living mind, that seems pretty person to me. I mean, you wouldn't gun down a guy in a mental hospital who declares "Je Suis Napoleon!" just because' he's not the original Napoleon, but rather acting as a simulacrum of the man to the best of his ability, would you?

And like I said, if you've actually copy pasted spock's memories and emotions about them (yeah vulcans have emotions, it's not my fault Roddenberry never adequately learned his psychology), that is absolutely Spock.

Think of it this way, Spock died in the movies, neh? Dead, gone, doornailed, definitely dead. And he came back to life afterwards. Despite the gap in continuity, what makes spock spock isn't the body, it isn't the continuity, what makes him spock is when they give him his mind/katra back.

If you've got an indistinguishable mind/katra, because you duplicated the original, that's spock, and it's at least as much spock as post resurrection and continuity gap spock. You can't tell the difference from any test that relies on the content of that mind, until such time as the two branches of spock have grown into different people from experiencing new, unshared memories, and if the new spock was a second meat brain instead of a metal one, there would be 0 tests you could perform without "marking the cards" so to speak before the test to tell the original from duplicate. The material that mind is encased in doesn't matter to it.

In the paraphrased words of Dr. King, I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their brain, but by the content of their character.

[LaZodiac]

Seeing as how the brain is the seat of thought, it would therefor be the original Spock and thus have ownership of everything that is his, including his job and stuff. Just because you get an artificial leg doesn't mean you're no longer you, this is just a highly extended metaphor for that.

The mechanical duplicate brain, though perfectly Spock in every way, is still a mechanical device and thus would be considered, for lack of a better term, the lesser of the two.

[golentan]

So are teleporters.


On a more serious note, you all might be interested in a variant of the Ship of Theseus problem. If you take a ship and replace every piece, is it still the same ship? What if you build another ship from the disassembled parts of the original?

Teleporters aren't murder in the same way, though, because despite the potential continuity gap you've still got the person you sent through it. Throwing someone into a sun, you don't get them back, and if you had two simultaneous spocks that does mean you've got two different spocks (they'll start differentiating straight away), even if they're both spocks, and if you later find yourself permanently down to one spock after that, it means spock has died... Continuity gaps are way easier ethically than duplication in my mind, but the ethics of duplicates are pretty clearly that the duplicate is still a person...

As SiuiS says with the ship of theseus problem. Though if you really want to take it beyond that, it always seemed to me that continuity makes it the same ship, and in this case "cloning" also makes it the same ship, and so you're gonna have to differentiate between the ships by name but you can't claim one is more the original than the other...

I'd say Meatbrain has the greater claim, being the original chronologically speaking.

Probably? But that's a different question... Does it really matter? They'll have the same opinion of the job and the same competency if B is a true duplicate. Either way you need to find Spock a new job, and Spock keeps his job, honestly I'd probably flip a coin just to be fair.

[Grinner]

This is easier, because "ship" insofar as it pertains to the concept of the vessel bearing the name and history isn't really tied to the physical ship. If you replace is systematically, you're left with the ship with new pieces. The old pieces do not have claim to the concept of being a certain ship except where they shaped that concept. Just like disassembling a legion piece by piece and later taking all those men into a new legion doesn't have this problem.

It's a metaphor.

[golentan]

It's a metaphor.

Eh, you contain very few of your original atoms, are you still your mom's child?

It's a bad metaphor...

[Lord Raziere]

put the two Spocks in a room and let them figure this out themselves. they're the super-rationalist logician people. they should be able to come up with a better solution than I ever could, and they probably need to hash out the whole philosophical existence thing themselves.

but if I was perfectly rational/logical/whatever, I'd say "well you may be me or at a least a perfect duplicate, no reason to let you go to waste. since your presence on this ship should would undoubtedly cause confusion and emotional turmoil among the crew, perhaps it would be best that you find some other career or occupation to best be useful to other people in the best manner possible."
"I concur. Your are the one with the organic brain and therefore the Spock the rest of the crew would psychologically consider the real one, and therefore it is in our best interests for you to continue your voyage with them. I will find something else to do, Live long and prosper."

[golentan]

put the two Spocks in a room and let them figure this out themselves. they're the super-rationalist logician people. they should be able to come up with a better solution than I ever could, and they probably need to hash out the whole philosophical existence thing themselves.

but if I was perfectly rational/logical/whatever, I'd say "well you may be me or at a least a perfect duplicate, no reason to let you go to waste. since your presence on this should would undoubtedly cause confusion and emotional turmoil among the crew, perhaps it would be best that you find some other career or occupation to best be useful to other people in the best manner possible."
"I concur. Your are the one with the organic brain and therefore the Spock the rest of the crew would psychologically consider the real one, and therefore it is in our best interests for you to continue your voyage with them. I will find something else to do, Live long and prosper."

A good solution! And no murdering! Have your 564th internet.

[Grinner]

Eh, you contain very few of your original atoms, are you still your mom's child?

Fortunately, biology provides an answer. I recall reading somewhere that at a certain point, the brain, the modern seat of the soul, ceases to develop. While the rest of your body may continue to seethe with new cells, the brain just succumbs to the pull of time.

I think the question is perfectly fine as is. What I find interesting is the way it provokes people to scramble for answers and what they come up with.

[golentan]

Fortunately, biology provides an answer. I recall reading somewhere that at a certain point, the brain, the modern seat of the soul, ceases to develop. While the rest of your body may continue to seethe with new cells, the brain just succumbs to the pull of time.

I think the question is perfectly fine as is. What I find interesting is the way it provokes people to scramble for answers and what they come up with.

Didn't say cells, said atoms. Your brain cells may stop multiplying, but they still exchange fluids and nutrients and gases which are excreted into the wider world and replaced by you eating and drinking new ones. Let's face it, your fundamental parts have been swapped out. So, the question stands. Are you your mother's child?

Because if you think that the neurons and not the atoms are what matter for this question, we have to admit that there's a level of component that is negligible to the continuity question. And really, your neurons still are dying and forming new connections constantly, they're just not replicating. And if your neurons were all intact, but you forever lost all memories and emotions and even the subconscious elements of learning from everything that came before that moment, would you consider the person who emerged from the rubble to be you? If not, isn't it the memories and thoughts contained within that matters to you? And if that's true, why is a true duplicate of your mind any less you? If you found out tomorrow that you were a computer program emulating the life of the "original" would you be any more willing to die?

[Grinner]

Didn't say cells, said atoms. Your brain cells may stop multiplying, but they still exchange fluids and nutrients and gases which are excreted into the wider world and replaced by you eating and drinking new ones. Let's face it, your fundamental parts have been swapped out. So, the question stands. Are you your mother's child?

Because if you think that the neurons and not the atoms are what matter for this question, we have to admit that there's a level of component that is negligible to the continuity question. And really, your neurons still are dying and forming new connections constantly, they're just not replicating. And if your neurons were all intact, but you forever lost all memories and emotions and even the subconscious elements of learning from everything that came before that moment, would you consider the person who emerged from the rubble to be you? If not, isn't it the memories and thoughts contained within that matters to you? And if that's true, why is a true duplicate of your mind any less you? If you found out tomorrow that you were a computer program emulating the life of the "original" would you be any more willing to die?

Might I point out that fluids and nutrients and gases do not make a cell just as fuel does not make a car?

A technicality, yes.

Frankly, I would love to consider your stance on this and its implications, but it's getting late. Also, we're cutting into my TV time. I'll see you in the morning.

[golentan]

We're talking about structural and active mechanical components, not just fuel (cells are so complex that only rarely does a nutrient only fuel something without also playing some actively mechanical role), and I'd argue that an automobile which has no fuel and no intent to be refueled isn't an automobile so much as a very strange sculpture, lacking as it does the defining characteristic that gives automobiles their name (self moving).

[factotum]

Didn't they handle this exact dilemma in a TNG episode where they find that Riker accidentally got a transporter duplicate of himself stranded on a hostile planet years before, so they had two of him aboard? I can't actually remember how they resolved it in the end, though...I know that the Riker clone ended up as a member of the Maquis, though, because he appeared again in a Deep Space 9 episode.

My answer to the posted conundrum would be: the brain in the machine body is the rightful Spock, because he existed as a sentient entity before the mechanical mind in the Spock body did.

(And shouldn't this whole thread be in Media Discussions?).

[Grinner]

Didn't say cells, said atoms. Your brain cells may stop multiplying, but they still exchange fluids and nutrients and gases which are excreted into the wider world and replaced by you eating and drinking new ones. Let's face it, your fundamental parts have been swapped out. So, the question stands. Are you your mother's child?

Because if you think that the neurons and not the atoms are what matter for this question, we have to admit that there's a level of component that is negligible to the continuity question. And really, your neurons still are dying and forming new connections constantly, they're just not replicating. And if your neurons were all intact, but you forever lost all memories and emotions and even the subconscious elements of learning from everything that came before that moment, would you consider the person who emerged from the rubble to be you? If not, isn't it the memories and thoughts contained within that matters to you? And if that's true, why is a true duplicate of your mind any less you? If you found out tomorrow that you were a computer program emulating the life of the "original" would you be any more willing to die?

To address your first point, I think the best answer is "Cogito ergo sum". However, I enjoy a relatively uncomplicated existence. I've never met a doppelganger of myself nor have my memories ever been edited by an external actor, to my knowledge at least.

To address your second point, shortly after I signed off, I watched some anime and went to bed. As I slept, I dreamed what I thought was one of the most bizarre things I ever encountered. I wanted to remember this dream when I woke up, but that turned out not to be the case. So I sit here with the memory of a memory. Certainly that's not so hard to imagine, but why does such a useless thing exist? I might propose that those little cognitive oddities are what make us us.

That's what the whole question is about: identity.

Others have proposed different answers. Some are characterized as speculation, some as theology, and still others as pseudoscience.

Personally, if I were to experience some revelation that I'm not existentially who I think I am, I think my first response would be one of denial. After all, it's simply not within my background to think otherwise. If I were convinced, that certainly would not strip me of my "entity-hood", and I certainly wouldn't be more willing to die. In fact, I might be less willing to die, for the existing bodies of philosophy and scripture do not address the transmigration of the RAM.

[golentan]

To address your first point, I think the best answer is "Cogito ergo sum".

Personally, if I were to experience some revelation that I'm not existentially who I think I am, I think my first response would be one of denial. After all, it's simply not within my background to think otherwise. If I were convinced, that certainly would not strip me of my "entity-hood", and I certainly wouldn't be more willing to die. In fact, I might be less willing to die, for the existing bodies of philosophy and scripture do not address the transmigration of the RAM.

And there we have it.

[Jay R]

Consider an 18th century philosopher asking, "If it were possible to build a machine that would perfect mimic everything I say when I say it, and another that would do the same for you. We each take the other's machine. While 500 miles apart, I talk to your machine and you talk to mine. Which one is the real conversation?"

We. living when we do, answer, "The machine is called a telephone, and there's only one conversation. Your lack of technological understanding has made you believe there was a philosophical question when there wasn't." The 18th century philosopher doesn't realize technology has erased the idea that my 'real' voice can only exist in one place.

[...an upgraded mechanical brain in Spock's body that will be able to perfectly mimic Spock's personality.

If this is possible, then the notion that there is only one Spock is technologically backwards. Only backward 21st century savages (us) could believe that the question has meaning because we don't realize that this technology erased the idea of unique individuality forever.

[Elemental]

But who do you make First Officer? As I see it, they both have a claim to the position.

You send them both on vacation and book them regular sessions with therapists. Vulcans are still people with much of what that entails, I wouldn't put them back into a stressful position after such an unusual event until they both get it sorted out.


Anyways... That aside, I prefer the chronological approach. The biological Spock came first so the other must therefore be a copy barring time travel shenanigans (which we cannot discount as this is Star Trek we're talking about).
Therefore, despite how perfect the copy is, it isn't the true Spock as it was produced afterwards. Just as a forger can produce a duplicate of a famous painting, they can't paint the original, again barring time travel shenanigans. Should we throw the duplicate away? No, that's wasteful.
Of course, a painting is a poor analogy for a brain given that brains do things and paintings usually don't, but it was the first thing that came to mind.

[GolemsVoice]

My first idea would be to let the Spocks discuss it, it IS their life, after all. Being rational, and willing to make personal sacrifice, I think they could come to some satisfying conclusion. What Lord Raziere said sounds like something they would come up with.

However, if for some reason I had to make a decision, I'd take the meat-brain Spock, for the same reasons others have given, namely that the brain is the seat of the mind, and that brain is the older of the two Spock-brains.

As for the ship of Theseus problem: the ship of Theseus is whatever ship Theseus happens to have sailed on, it's not neccessarily bound to individual physical components. Such, each new part Theseus replaces becomes part of his ship, while each old part he throws away does not stop to be part of Theseus' ship. Just not a part of the ship as it currently is.

[Gavran]

Consider an 18th century philosopher asking, "If it were possible to build a machine that would perfect mimic everything I say when I say it, and another that would do the same for you. We each take the other's machine. While 500 miles apart, I talk to your machine and you talk to mine. Which one is the real conversation?"

We. living when we do, answer, "The machine is called a telephone, and there's only one conversation. Your lack of technological understanding has made you believe there was a philosophical question when there wasn't." The 18th century philosopher doesn't realize technology has erased the idea that my 'real' voice can only exist in one place.

If this is possible, then the notion that there is only one Spock is technologically backwards. Only backward 21st century savages (us) could believe that the question has meaning because we don't realize that this technology erased the idea of unique individuality forever.

Genuinely excellent post. Kudos if its original thought, and thanks for sharing if it isn't.

[Grinner]

And there we have it.

I'm not sure what we have, but okay.

*snip*

So if you ever get bored of doing math for a living, I think you have a promising career in science fiction awaiting.

[SiuiS]

It's a metaphor.

It's an extended koan. It just happens to actually have direct parallels that provide context for an answer. I believe that makes it a bad koan – you should think about it, not answer it – but then, that's context. A metaphor used as an example of a principle is perforce going to be stripped of details and have the principle attended to. I just used words that also matched the metaphor.

Consider an 18th century philosopher asking, "If it were possible to build a machine that would perfect mimic everything I say when I say it, and another that would do the same for you. We each take the other's machine. While 500 miles apart, I talk to your machine and you talk to mine. Which one is the real conversation?"

We. living when we do, answer, "The machine is called a telephone, and there's only one conversation. Your lack of technological understanding has made you believe there was a philosophical question when there wasn't." The 18th century philosopher doesn't realize technology has erased the idea that my 'real' voice can only exist in one place.



If this is possible, then the notion that there is only one Spock is technologically backwards. Only backward 21st century savages (us) could believe that the question has meaning because we don't realize that this technology erased the idea of unique individuality forever.

This is a neat hook for a Mage game, thanks. I like that I got the answer pretty immediately myself. I could use a bit of smugness before bed. :)

Seems about the same as the boat; the concept isn't objective and is based on POV, strictly, so assign how you like but don't assume universal validity.

[Mx.Silver]

The question is: which is the true "Spock"?

Well, that answer rather depends on what you mean by 'the true Spock'.
One persistent wrinkle in discussions of personal identity is that,at least in discussion outside of philosophy, humans don't really distinguish between type identity and token identity in the context of what defines a person (likely because, so far, all humans are both type and token unique). Given that personal identity has been a subject of philosophy for centuries, there's been an awful lot of writing about it and how it can be thought of along both those lines (and even if both are relevant to it), but setting that aside for now we'll just see how it applies to this question.
If you define 'the true Spock' as being the Spock that shares token identity with the Spock the rest of the crew have travelled with then, quite obviously, Spock's original brain has the stronger case. After all, barring the grandfather's axe/ship of theseus issue, the same brain (note that it's also technically the older of the two, so in regards to the officer question it can also be argued to have seniority). It should be noted however that this does not necessarily mean Robo-brain Spock loses any personhood status, just that he's a seperate instance rather a continuation of the existing one

However, if we're placing priority on type identity, then the answer rather has to be both of them. While the two are distinct entities, since both have the same personality, memories and thought process as Spock, and therefore are both 'the true Spock', in the same way that two copies of Nueromancer are both the 'true book'.*


You will probably have noticed that this issue is one that also turns-up in the 'teleporter problem'. In fact it's largely the core of that, as well as being one of bigger obstacles to the 'personal immortality through back-up personalities' notion.



*Well, sort of. There is something in your hypothetical scenario that complicates things a bit, but I'll get to that later.

It's a metaphor.

It's an extended koan.

It's a paradox used as a thought experiment. So, you're both wrong

[skipping the analogy because it's not an argument, unless you actually want to argue that a conversation and a person are equivalent]

If this is possible, then the notion that there is only one Spock is technologically backwards. Only backward 21st century savages (us) could believe that the question has meaning because we don't realize that this technology erased the idea of unique individuality forever.

Well, sort of. As mentioned above, it hasn't actually broken the concept of unique individuals (both Spocks in this example are distinct, and will become increasingly less identical on the type front as one has experiences the other doesn't), which is why if you shot one of them into the sun you'd still be committing murder, instead of just making Spock lose a lot of weight. Rather, it's created a scenario whereby type identity no longer has to be concurrent with token identity - which seems to be the case at the moment as far as the real world is concerned.



That passage does however raise another point which might be worth considering, as it does raise a few other questions. Most significantly: is the robot brain capable of functioning as a tabula rasa entity without having a copy of another consciousness implanted in it? Logically, it seems plausible but if the answer is yes, then there does not appear to be much differentiating this process from taking someone and convincing them they're someone else. As in, it would not be akin to growing a clone and implanting that with memories.
Moreover, in that case, what then is it that distinguishes the implanted memories from false memories? Assuming such a distinction would matter in the first place.

[Jay R]

That passage does however raise another point which might be worth considering, as it does raise a few other questions. Most significantly: is the robot brain capable of functioning as a tabula rasa entity without having a copy of another consciousness implanted in it? Logically, it seems plausible but if the answer is yes, then there does not appear to be much differentiating this process from taking someone and convincing them they're someone else. As in, it would not be akin to growing a clone and implanting that with memories.
Moreover, in that case, what then is it that distinguishes the implanted memories from false memories? Assuming such a distinction would matter in the first place.

People seem to want to debate the meaning of a technological achievement that has not been achieved, or shown to be achievable. It has no meaning; it's merely a word game.

If the "soul" exists as a non-physical but real consciousness or mentality, then such technological developments are inherently impossible.

A re-statement is this: if such technological developments are possible, then the "soul" does not exist as a non-physical but real consciousness or mentality.

These statements are logically equivalent, being contrapositives. Either way, it's a logical connection between two unprovable postulates.

We are so used to extrapolating from extensions of known and supportable science ("If a rocket could travel at a continuous acceleration of 1 g, we could reach Alpha Centauri in X years"), that we can easily forget that the second statement above is not extending known science, but speculating on an unsupported fantasy.