Got a Real-World Weapon, Armor or Tactics Question? Mk. XXIV

[snowblizz]

I'm not 100% certain that the French could simply occupy Spain hands-down. After all, the Spanish do have a history of bogging down specifically French invasions, and a Soviet Wellington being sent over with a small force to occupy the French army could easily drag out that war for a long time. This would especially be true given that there would be an immense population of trained militia or guerillas being present as a result of the Civil War (which I'm assuming the Republic won). Italy might be easier, but again has plenty of defensive points to hold of an invasion with relatively few troops--the Nazis did it pretty well IRL. So while the French would have an important role to play, it's very easy to see them getting bogged down in these side campaigns while Britain and Germany take the lead against the Soviets and Scandinavia fights a Continuation War on steroids.

I agree with the general principle (occupying Spain would consume most of what France could muster at the time I suspect), though I think the point made was that France could neutralise Spain, ie defend against whatever a weak post-civil war Spain could pose in the way of threat. Similary Spain, no matter which side won would be internally weak economically and politically. I would assume France and Portugal would have a fair share of various "nationalist" flavour emigrees sitting close to the borders causing problems too.
What has not been answered, is whether Spain is Republican or Communist in this scenario. While the latter were some of the stronger elements the majority of Spain formed a much more moderate left-leaning faction, most of them not necessarily that Soviet friendly when it comes down to it. And end up with something much more Yugoslav like as a state, communist-lite. Or even somewhat democratic. Either way in Alt-WW2 I don't see Spain being much of a player coming out if it's civil war.

As an interresting aside, I think France would be better equipped for a slower campaign (infantry + artillery) against Spain or Italy than they were for the fast armoured warfare that IRL developed.

France, Spain and Italy all face similar geographical issues (stoopid mountains) trying to attack each other though, advantage going to the defender. Easily sustaining an armed status quo. Neither of these three are industrially or politically strong enough to really go to war "for reals".

What I think is actually the strategic wildcard is probably what Turkey and Iran do. The Turks can in theory shut down the ability of the Soviets to supply the Mediterranean, and have plenty of reason to hate the Soviets, but also plenty of reason to fear them. If they openly side with the Allies to the point of risking war, Spain and especially Italy become much easier for the Allies to attack as the Soviets cannot resupply them. Iran, on the other hand, might declare war on Britain or the USSR in an effort to take back its regional standing and control its oil--Reza Shah especially could be plenty belligerent at times, and might well set up a point where his slightly-less-belligerent heir Mohammed Reza Shah would have no real choice but to follow his policy. If Iran sided with the CCCP, it could easily invade the British and French "mandates" in the Middle East, eliminating their oil supply. On the other hand, war with the Soviets would open up a front on their exposed "underbelly" in Central Asia, limiting the degree to which the Soviets could give ground, threatening their oil in the Caucasus, and forcing them to split their forces. Thus, the decisions of these middling powers could prove major in the war's ultimate outcome.

Definitely. Both Turkey and Iran was courted by WW2-Germany IRL, somewhat successfully too. Though Turkey remained neutral and Iran was essentially occupied by Britain and the Soviet union (for their own good, much thanks to the inroads the Germans made) to ensure communications between the British empire and the Soviet union, a lot of supplies flowed in this way through the Caucasus.
I think it's more likely that Iran would become a frontline between the Soviets and Allies than it being a successful partner of the Soviets on it's own. It's another country with potentially fatal internal weaknessess (the Britts and Soviets IRL took it over one day just like that). The British without losing an army in Europe could use the troops from the Empire, if they are not threatened from Japan e.g. With a better plan and commanders than in WW1 it's not going to be such a weak spot I'd think.

Ancillary question about this war. I like France, and I imagine that, with the Germans between them and the Russians, the French can handle a Spain immediately out of a civil war and not prepared for an international one (I think what Franco always knew when Hitler tried to get him involved holds true in my world, too: Spain didn't have the industry or the stability), and do their part in subduing Italy, then join the fight in Eastern Europe. I certainly don't intend to play with that stupid Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey stereotype,

However, France entered WW2 with some serious problems. I've leard their Air Force was substandard, and their armor not properly concentrated. I've also heard their median age for soldiers was middle aged and they lacked the young manpower of Britain or Germany, but I don't know how true that actually is (it sounded pretty suspect to me). That apart, are there any other key problems with the French military of 1940 that would be have to be addressed if they took part in a prolonged conflict? I'm wondering about things like leadership culture, technology, doctrine, and industry. Also, the warming of relations with Germany happened in the mid-30s, so the French still largely focused on the Maginot Line and another war with Germany up until very recently, meaning the French military largely looks as it did IRL (essentially, Italy went Communist and the Soviet backed side won in Spain, Britain and France got SUPER worried about commies, and democracy won out in Germany through ample fiery anti-Communism, and then the Germans flat out told the British and French that they were abandoning the terms of Versaille so they could address the Communist threat, and Britain and France could work with that and stand together with Germany, or they could stand apart. The Commies were a whole lot scarier than the Germans, and I imagine the German position sounded eminently reasonable.)

If they built the Maginot line the 2 main weaknesses is 1) the economic and military drain it represents. Almost everything else had to take back seat to that, and it will have been a massive waste in this scenrio. Not that it was of much use IRL either. 2) tied to nr1 the psychological trauma of WW1 in France cannot be underestimated, it drove the idea of the Maginot line, but France was essentially not only forced to use old equipment their entire military thinking was reliving WW1. What independent tank formations existed were positioned to plug the gaps in the Maginot line while infantry piled on. There were no plans or strategies for when they were all strategically outflanked. France at this point is also internally weak, the governments had limited popular support which makes it difficult to properly organise anything. Ordering men up for conscription, organising reserves, production capacity for the industry etc etc etc. IIRC most governments rules for short periods of time ending in disagreements, just about the only thing they could agree on was to fund the Maginot line. The one thing they really shouldn't have been doing, especially since it drained funds that could been used to improve the nation. I don't like the steroetypical surrendermonkey idea but as a nation it can't be denied the French did really really not want to fight another war (and it should be noted it was British waffling that decided it for the French the few times sparks were igniting in 30s Europe, it's not they weren't brave, but they did question the need of a war rather hard). It wouldn't surprise me if this in part influenced why French soldiers were older, they simply had immense trouble with the idea of sacrificing another generation of youth. The fear of the Next Big One drove a lot of French military planning, spending etc as well as societal thinking. It might be a bit hyperbolic but essentially France started WW2 already defeated. They gambled everything on the Maginot line and could not recover from the shock of that not working. (I know I've blamed the Maginot line for almost everything, there's a lot of stuff playing in but it's hard to sidestep how symbolic it is for France's issues post-WW1, well unless youa re the Wermacht, thne you can sidestep it easily.)

[Vinyadan]

The Maginot line had a German counterpart, though - the Westwall, aka Siegfried Line. And there also was the Alpine Wall. Everyone was preparing for a possible new WWI-style conflict, with huge static defense. The big difference was that the Germans were also preparing for a new kind of war, in which they would have the initiative (and overrun Belgium, again, which actually is a WWI thing France did not prepare for).

Anyway, Italy surely wouldn't have defeated France on its own. The attempts at an attack across the Alps while Germany was invading ended with very little achievement and iirc about ten times more losses for Italy than for France. France could have occupied Piedmont, as usual (I mean, if they had fought a war against Italy without German involvement).

As for the surrender monkey myth, that's a weird myth for a country that lost more men in four years than the US in their whole history. It staying mainstream is probably the weirdest heritage of the Iraq war.

[Galloglaich]

I remember watching this documentary that talked about Teutones and Cimbri raiding Roman settlements as they migrate south into Italy.

This documentary portrayed the raid in a fashion that seemed outright goofy to me. At first, there was a perfectly normal, humdrum market town with butchers and blacksmiths working out in the open and people browsing the stalls on the streets. All of a sudden, a pack of bloodthirsty barbarian warriors, wearing furs and wielding a motley collection of swords and axes enter the shot by rounding a corner, and they're upon the town instantly, slaughtering everyone, grabbing random baskets and pots and chickens, and kicking over everything they did not take.

So this seems silly for a few reasons:

First, I'm finding it kind of hard to believe that the town wouldn't know about the raiders until those raiders were literally upon them. Wouldn't it make more sense for someone, anyone, to have seen the raiders and informed the town? In order to have a town in the first place, shouldn't there be people who live close to, but not in the town itself?

Second, I don't know that the way the raiders behave makes much sense either. Why would raiders be trying to loot things as they come into the town? It strikes me that response times for local defenses would probably not be so quick that the raiders need to actually smash, grab, and get out.

So my question is, what do we know of how raids were performed from antiquity to medieval times? Were there any accounts from survivors or raiders that have some good historical value? Did anyone write anything like a guide to raiding or a guide to fighting back against raids?

You are correct, I think, to be skeptical of the scene you described, which is kind of the standard Hollywood depiction of a raid. Down to the shirtless blacksmiths and astounded townsfolk who have no idea they could be raided.

Yes there is a ton of stuff, not all of it that accessible. But there are actually reams of reports, first hand accounts, military manuals giving advice, and so on. It's a very popular subject in the military literature since raiding was arguably the main form of warfare.

As usual with these things, it helps to narrow down the region and the time period.

There are a lot of Classic Sources, too many to list out, (Thucididyes, Xenophon, Herodotus and Tacitus are good places to start) but though I don't for a primer I'd recommend John Gibson Wary's Warfarein the Classical World. I don't usually recommend secondary sources but for Classical warfare I think it helps a lot to get oriented so that you can handle and make better use of the many excellent primary sources.

For the migration era you have many, mostly Roman sources, I think the best of which is Justinians War histories by Procopius, which is an excellent source describing various wars with different types of enemies (Goths, Franks, Vandals, Sassanids etc.) in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and so on. The only issue with these is that there are so many of them it's a lot to wade through.

In the early Crusades (you can get some very good depictions from the fantastic autobiography or monograph of Usamah Ibn Munqidh which I highly recommend to anyone interested in medieval warfare. You also have Ana Comnena and various Byzantine sources, and De Joineville etc.

In the late medieval world where I'm a little more familiar, you break it down by region.

Froissart among many others talked a great deal about raiding in the 100 years War in northern France, Brittany and Burgundy.

In that region, the 'raid' was often called the Chevauchee. If you use that search term there are reams written about it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevauch%C3%A9e

There is also a lot written about raids in the Italian Wars, in Spain, in Ireland and Scotland, raids in Germany, and raids in the Baltic among many other zones.

In the Baltic raids were known as 'Reysa', and were done on an annual basis by all sides in the wars. Typically the Teutonic Knights would conduct 3 raids every year, one in the summer to make castles, and two in the Winter. The Lithuanians would do 1 raid every year in the fall when the Teutonic Knights went to their annual meeting (leaving defenses lightly manned) and often 1 or 2 other ones opportunistically.

There are several accounts of these raids including a first-hand account of a 14th Century raid by Crusaders into Lithuania by an Austrian poet named Peter Suchenwirt which I have somewhere. Here is an excerpt:

“Women and children were taken captive,
What a jolly medly could be seen,
Many a woman could be seen,
Two children tied to her body,
One behind and one in front. On a horse without spurs,
Barefoot they had ridden here,
The heathen were made to suffer,
Many were captured and in every case,
Were there hands tied together,
They were led off, all tied up,
Just like hunting dogs.’

Many foreign potentates and famous knights went on Crusader raids in the Baltic, including Boucicault and the man who would later become King Henry IV of England. You can read a bit about one of two raids he participated in here. If you read medieval Latin you can read a long detailed account of both raids, including the siege of Vilnius and his getting mugged by Robber Knights in Mecklenburg on the way to the Crusade. Sadly I can't or I'd publish a translation and be famous.

There are also the Chronicles of Henry of Livonia which happily has been given a very good translation into English and covers the raiding by all sides in the earlier Northern Crusades. There are a variety of Teutonic Knights sources from this era which you can read if you read German.

The Mongols had two different types of raids, sefers which were the big raids organized by the Khan (and could be forestalled by treaty), and çapuls, which were smaller raids organized by Mongol nobles which went on all the time regardless.

The goal of Mongols raids was 90% in taking slaves, which they called 'harvesting the Steppe'. Other raids may be to steal cattle or horses, or to burn crops and devastate the land, or to kill and destroy. The Mongols used to also do things like poison or fill in wells, destroy bridges and even agricultural terracing and so on, in a conscious effort to break down the economic system.

There was also regional vs. local raiding. Local raiding between neighbors tended to be much more about stealing a few cattle or horses and less brutal, regional raiding especially across language and religious barriers could be really nasty. The French and Spanish were nasty as hell in Italy (and then paid the price). The Mongols were nasty everywhere they went, pretty much, at least until you submitted to their rule, the Cossacks and Poles various mercenaries who raided into Mongol territory were none to gentle to them either.



Generally, towns and even villages were either fortified or had a fortified citadel of some kind (for villages this might be something simple like a stone granary or a Church) or both, more typically. As I've mentioned before, in medieval times larger towns were usually (not always - there were important exceptions) very well fortified. Villages less so but the villagers had other options like hiding places they habitually fled to, and yes they did keep lookouts posted to warn them of raiders, and used things like signalling beacons and so forth to help stay ready.

Military manuals of the era also do talk about how to conduct raids, too many of these to list though in this already long post.

G

[gkathellar]

The goal of Mongols raids was 90% in taking slaves, which they called 'harvesting the Steppe'. Other raids may be to steal cattle or horses, or to burn crops and devastate the land, or to kill and destroy. The Mongols used to also do things like poison or fill in wells, destroy bridges and even agricultural terracing and so on, in a conscious effort to break down the economic system.

All of which makes a lot of practical sense when you consider that a raid's goals were often military aggression and/or extortion of a foreign state. In a modern context, you could liken it to one criminal organization performing a smash-and-grab on another's turf: aside from the immediate financial benefits, the action and the reaction will both have political ramifications that are probably part of the decision to attack in the first place.

[wolflance]

The goal of Mongols raids was 90% in taking slaves, which they called 'harvesting the Steppe'. Other raids may be to steal cattle or horses, or to burn crops and devastate the land, or to kill and destroy. The Mongols used to also do things like poison or fill in wells, destroy bridges and even agricultural terracing and so on, in a conscious effort to break down the economic system.
G

Actually, given the way of life of the steppe, aren't the slaves just add extra burden (more mouths to feed) to the Mongols while add nothing of value? The knowledgables, craftsmen, artisans and women might be of some use, but what are they gonna do with a bunch of lowly peasants that worth jack? The cost of keeping these slaves alive far outweigh the price these slaves can be sold (and besides, who are their customers to sell these slaves?).

There's no cities to be built and no galleys to row, either.

[fusilier]

Anyway, Italy surely wouldn't have defeated France on its own. The attempts at an attack across the Alps while Germany was invading ended with very little achievement and iirc about ten times more losses for Italy than for France. France could have occupied Piedmont, as usual (I mean, if they had fought a war against Italy without German involvement).

It should be kept in mind that Mussolini ordered forces that were arrayed in defensive positions, and had made no preparations for an offensive, to attack immediately. That said, the French border with Italy, was generally recognized to be more heavily defended and stronger than even the pre-WW1 border with Austria. Italy's plans for war with France when they were part of the Central Powers, involved simply tying down French troops on the border, and sending as many troops as possible to fight alongside the Germans on the western front. Although an amphibious assault was also contemplated.

[Galloglaich]

All of which makes a lot of practical sense when you consider that a raid's goals were often military aggression and/or extortion of a foreign state. In a modern context, you could liken it to one criminal organization performing a smash-and-grab on another's turf: aside from the immediate financial benefits, the action and the reaction will both have political ramifications that are probably part of the decision to attack in the first place.

yes, the other factor is raids are what they could do. The primacy of defense in the medieval era, and even pretty far into the Early Modern, meant that it was hard to capture well defended strong points. This meant there was a long lasting emphasis on soft(er) targets.

I think people tend to imagine, and in the case of Hollywood, portray raids as being more brutal than they often were. Often the goal was just to provision your army (soldiers need to eat, and horse fodder in particular was a major problem for cavalry forces) and maybe to drive off the 'enemy' population, which you can do just by stealing cattle - since without their cattle they have a hard time living.

But while we all know many stories of atrocities in pre-industrial warfare and especially raids, from reading the records I am often struck by how mild they are. Raids which were full-on massacres seem to stand out and cause surprise and consternation. More often they only steal some of the cattle and grain and leave the rest, precisely because they don't want the peasants driven off. In Central Europe and Italy when fighting neighbors they often seemed to almost play by certain rules, the rules of what the Germans called "Fehde" or private war. For example capturing and then paroling enemy soldiers and ransoming back captive civilians at relatively low rates.

I think because today's enemy or victim might be tomorrows victor, and turn about is fair play. Or today's enemy might be tomorrows ally when a much more dangerous enemy arrives from another region (the French army or the Mongol hordes for example)

G

[Galloglaich]

Actually, given the way of life of the steppe, aren't the slaves just add extra burden (more mouths to feed) to the Mongols while add nothing of value? The knowledgables, craftsmen, artisans and women might be of some use, but what are they gonna do with a bunch of lowly peasants that worth jack? The cost of keeping these slaves alive far outweigh the price these slaves can be sold (and besides, who are their customers to sell these slaves?).

There's no cities to be built and no galleys to row, either.

They did capture skilled laborers and craftsmen, especially useful for when they had to do siege warfare of any kind, since they didn't seem to have the cultural context for that really, but mostly seemed to use them for sex - women and children specifically. Slaves were currency much like cattle. many were sold to the Mongols or to other settled people in Central Asia, mainly through major centers like the Crimean towns such as Caffa (controlled by the Italians) or the larger Mongol quasi-urban centers like the Sarai. The Ottomans in particular had an insatiable demand for slaves for which they would pay with gold, spices, and other valuables, but the Mongols clearly used a lot of them as well.

I think a lot of the slaves had a relatively short life span. Certainly the descriptions i have read of how they were brought to market indicate a low level of regard for their survival let alone comfort, not unlike the horror-stories you read about the Middle Passage in the infamous transatlantic slave trade.

They estimate about 2 million slaves were taken from Poland, Ukraine and Russia alone by the Mongols over the course of several centuries. But quite a few Germans, Hungarians, Moldovans, Romanians, Bulgarians, and so on were also taken. Estimates are at about ~20,000 people per year were "harvested" by the Crimean Horde alone.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimea...te#Slave_trade

G

[PersonMan]

I agree with the general principle (occupying Spain would consume most of what France could muster at the time I suspect), though I think the point made was that France could neutralise Spain, ie defend against whatever a weak post-civil war Spain could pose in the way of threat. Similary Spain, no matter which side won would be internally weak economically and politically. I would assume France and Portugal would have a fair share of various "nationalist" flavour emigrees sitting close to the borders causing problems too.

Depending on the state of north Africa and Britain (for Gibraltar), it's possibly that the French could set up a solid defensive line and let a blockade do its work. I'm not sure how much food could be imported via the Mediterranean, but neither Spain nor Italy could produce enough to feed their populations.

If they built the Maginot line the 2 main weaknesses is 1) the economic and military drain it represents. Almost everything else had to take back seat to that, and it will have been a massive waste in this scenrio. Not that it was of much use IRL either.

It was useful, but primarily in a strategic sense - it meant that Germany couldn't attack directly into France, and would ideally be bogged down in Belgium fighting combined French/Belgian forces.

2) tied to nr1 the psychological trauma of WW1 in France cannot be underestimated, it drove the idea of the Maginot line, but France was essentially not only forced to use old equipment their entire military thinking was reliving WW1.

I wouldn't pin it all on the Maginot/old trauma. France decreased military spending, shortened the period they had to train men during their compulsory service and as a result couldn't modernize or implement new doctrines requiring a well-trained force. Pétain threatened to resign at least once over reductions in professional officers and budget cuts during the interwar period. But, looking back to just after WWI, under Poincaré, they had the largest army in Europe and allies surrounding Germany.

A lot of France's weaknesses came from an inability of the military to change in the way it needed to, due to a lack of proper resources, stemming from issues France had as well as the weakness of a democratic state when it comes to performing the "actually I'd like to just crank up the military and we can ignore the debt because we'll just invade the people we owe money to" strategy.

[Storm Bringer]

If they built the Maginot line the 2 main weaknesses is 1) the economic and military drain it represents. Almost everything else had to take back seat to that, and it will have been a massive waste in this scenrio. Not that it was of much use IRL either. 2) tied to nr1 the psychological trauma of WW1 in France cannot be underestimated, it drove the idea of the Maginot line, but France was essentially not only forced to use old equipment their entire military thinking was reliving WW1. What independent tank formations existed were positioned to plug the gaps in the Maginot line while infantry piled on. There were no plans or strategies for when they were all strategically outflanked. France at this point is also internally weak, the governments had limited popular support which makes it difficult to properly organise anything. Ordering men up for conscription, organising reserves, production capacity for the industry etc etc etc. IIRC most governments rules for short periods of time ending in disagreements, just about the only thing they could agree on was to fund the Maginot line. The one thing they really shouldn't have been doing, especially since it drained funds that could been used to improve the nation. I don't like the steroetypical surrendermonkey idea but as a nation it can't be denied the French did really really not want to fight another war (and it should be noted it was British waffling that decided it for the French the few times sparks were igniting in 30s Europe, it's not they weren't brave, but they did question the need of a war rather hard). It wouldn't surprise me if this in part influenced why French soldiers were older, they simply had immense trouble with the idea of sacrificing another generation of youth. The fear of the Next Big One drove a lot of French military planning, spending etc as well as societal thinking. It might be a bit hyperbolic but essentially France started WW2 already defeated. They gambled everything on the Maginot line and could not recover from the shock of that not working. (I know I've blamed the Maginot line for almost everything, there's a lot of stuff playing in but it's hard to sidestep how symbolic it is for France's issues post-WW1, well unless youa re the Wermacht, thne you can sidestep it easily.)

in defence of the maginot line, it did a lot of what was actually expected it to do.


The French knew that the Germans could flank north of the Line, but they couldn't fortify the border with Belgium as that was politically unacceptable (Belgium refused to formally join an alliance against Germany, fearing that such at alliance would make it a target while not being able to protect it. considering the course of events, its hard to argue they were wrong), so they fortified the France - Germany border, which closed the "direct" route off. the "plan", such as it was, was to wait for the Germans to violate Belgian Neutrality by invading it, then make a "dash" to a defensible river frontier inside Belgium and then fight off the German attack.

the basic idea was more or less ok, but political pressures kept pushing the river line to be held further and further into Belgium (and thus lengthening and lengthening the line to be held). The Belgians had fortified the Belgium/German border, which was expected to hold the Germans up for some time. However, fort Eben-Emael, the largest single fort in the world at the time, was taken by a combination of surprise, a "no one could pull that off" approach route via gilders and an honest to god secret weapon in the form of shaped charge warheads.

Also, the Germans made their primary push not through the easy-to-invade over Belgian plains (like they did in 1914), but though the horrible to invade though Ardennes, a region of poor roads, steep hills and thick forests, which caused so many logistical problems that the Germans would have been screwed if the allies knew what they were doing. However, the allies, convinced that the germans weren't so stupid to try something like that (and helped along by a captured copy of the original german invasion plan that went via the low countries), didn't understand what was going on until It was too late.



in short, the French didn't expect the Line to stop the germans on its own, and by forcing the germans to go around it, the Line did its part in the plan, it was just let down by the rest of the elements.

[Haighus]

yes, the other factor is raids are what they could do. The primacy of defense in the medieval era, and even pretty far into the Early Modern, meant that it was hard to capture well defended strong points. This meant there was a long lasting emphasis on soft(er) targets.

I think people tend to imagine, and in the case of Hollywood, portray raids as being more brutal than they often were. Often the goal was just to provision your army (soldiers need to eat, and horse fodder in particular was a major problem for cavalry forces) and maybe to drive off the 'enemy' population, which you can do just by stealing cattle - since without their cattle they have a hard time living.

But while we all know many stories of atrocities in pre-industrial warfare and especially raids, from reading the records I am often struck by how mild they are. Raids which were full-on massacres seem to stand out and cause surprise and consternation. More often they only steal some of the cattle and grain and leave the rest, precisely because they don't want the peasants driven off. In Central Europe and Italy when fighting neighbors they often seemed to almost play by certain rules, the rules of what the Germans called "Fehde" or private war. For example capturing and then paroling enemy soldiers and ransoming back captive civilians at relatively low rates.

I think because today's enemy or victim might be tomorrows victor, and turn about is fair play. Or today's enemy might be tomorrows ally when a much more dangerous enemy arrives from another region (the French army or the Mongol hordes for example)

G

I think the reforms of Alfred the Great in Anglo-saxon England to deter viking raids is a good example of this- he introduced a series of small fortifications- burgs, which later became known as bury/borough/burgh- in many of the more important villages and towns throughout Wessex, right up to the border with the Danelaw. The majority of placenames in England today ending in bury contained such a fortification (which shows how extensive such networks became). This was likely just an earthwork ring with a palisade in most places.

The system appears to have been a huge success, and allowed raids to be stalled long enough for the local fyrd to be raised to repel them. Maintaining such fortifications was one of the obligations freemen had to uphold in later Anglo-saxon kingdoms.

[Vinyadan]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

[Storm Bringer]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

assuming something similar to the situation in the scots border (which is my reference for these sort of raids), they would normally grab as much of their portable wealth, and then hole up in a defendable strongpoint that would be difficult to attack without going into a full on siege. you see a lot of "tower houses" in the Scots Borders, which were tree or four storys high buildings, with thick walls, a few arrow slits to cover the arcs and a lot of space inside for temporary storage. the idea was basically to wait out the raiders, who didn't have a great deal of time before the cavalry arrived.

[Galloglaich]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

In the South of France, whereas you have fishing villages right on the coast, they would also have fortified villages up in the hills. The fishing village would be abandoned when they spotted the Saracens, or later on the Corsairs.

That is another area, both Italy and France (and Spain ... and even England) which was subject to more or less continuous slave raiding right into the 19th Century. basically ended when France invaded and conquered Morrocco in the 1830's.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbary_slave_trade

[fusilier]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

I think, in some places at least, they would retreat to the watchtowers themselves. The pictures I've seen usually show a fairly substantial tower (at least among those that have survived).

[KarlMarx]

The point of all these towers, burghs, etc. wasn't to actually serve as a defensive position in a major invasion, but as people have said to let the area hold out for a few days. No raiding force could beat heavy cavalry, and most understandably wanted to spend as little time as possible in the area. Essentially, they'd grab anything they could that wasn't nailed down and run away to the ship or across the border, often stealing livestock in the latter case.

Thus, the relative low impact IRL of such raids was a result of a) raiders not having the time to make it worthwhile to destroy everything they couldn't use and b) peasants who survive raids recover and become raid-able again.

[Gideon Falcon]

I've asked this question before, actually, in a previous thread, but misphrased it and ended up getting some fantastic answers for a tangential topic;

See, in a story I'm working on, I have a character who's meant to end up being a formidable strategist, mainly by commanding his armies with tactics far ahead of his time. I've done a bit of research about the basics of Roman and Byzantine formations, especially the infamous phalanx, but those were pitted against bronze-age and iron-age tactics that I presume were not in use in more medieval settings like typical sword-and-sorcery

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?

[Raunchel]

Great tactics and strategies always depend on a lot of things, but especially the surroundings and the kinds of forces. One thing that's really notable, at least, in the ancient world, is that speed really matters. This often has to do with keeping the baggage train small and letting your soldiers carry more of their own stuff. In the Hellenistic period this can be seen very well. Phillip made his infantry carry their own supplies (also to save cost, he wasn't rich) which allowed him to move his army as though it was a smaller one. Later on, this stopped happening because the successor kings had to essentially buy the loyalty of their men, which meant more baggage and slower armies. Of course, on lots of occasions they tried to get rid of at least some of the train, but it hardly ever had any success.

Rome of course did the same with the Marian reforms, but it wasn't the kind of thing that could be done to wealthier soldiers like the earlier legions.

Other than that, there aren't many big tricks that always work (like always putting the bulk of your cavalry on the right, because that's what Alexander tended to do). But in broad terms, deception is important. Let screening forces hide your real disposition so you can suddenly overwhelm the enemy somewhere because the infantry is double as deep there. Or you have a not too obvious weak spot start to appear, luring your enemy to focus there only to have strong forces hidden to intervene.

But what's really important is that information and control are very limited. It's practically impossible to see how deep a line of troops is from the ground, estimates of the strength of the enemy provided by scouts will be off in either direction, even a tiny ridge could hide whole cohorts and your cavalry might just run off to loot the enemy camp or pursue some enemy cavalry leaving you without it.

[Kiero]

One of the things often overlooked when considering the Roman success was something more subtle than strategy, tactics or equipment: logistics. The Romans were brilliant at organisation, and that came to the fore when it came to something really basic - making sure all their soldiers were fed. That may not seem like much, but if you can guarantee that on the eve of a battle the soldiers have not only eaten the night before, but on the morning as well, that makes a big difference to their performance and morale. Keeping all your soldiers well-victualled is a big advantage when your enemy isn't anywhere near as prepared.

[snowblizz]

in defence of the maginot line, it did a lot of what was actually expected it to do.

in short, the French didn't expect the Line to stop the germans on its own, and by forcing the germans to go around it, the Line did its part in the plan, it was just let down by the rest of the elements.

This is sort of where I disagree. Hindsight is 20/20 of course. But to me one major element letting down the defense is the line itself, by it's conception, contruction and the thinking it supported. The problem with the line can be best described in the following realisation IMO. A large part of the French army was encircled and pinned against the Maginot line in 1940. Had France tried to fight on they would have had something like 1/3 of the army cut off and strategically unsupported. From an already weaker starting position than the German one. Further it's problematic when we say it forced the Germans to go around, since that's what they planned to do anyway. So in a sense it didn't really force the Germans to do anything. What it however did very effectively was force the French into committing to very static defense. WW2 showed how inadequate fixed forifications were in a modern war usually are. Much of the German Blixtkrieg success came from their opponents insisting on playing ball with them. In the end trying to blixtkrieg they way out every problem turned the war on them.

Which is why I think the Maginot line did exactly the opposite of what it was supposed to do. Wikipedia lists a set of 9 things it was supposed to do, and it more or less completes 4-5 by my count. 2 of those would have happened anyway and none of the reasons were relevant within weeks of the attack of France. Basically the Maginot line is a result of and cause of France's inflexible military thinking, consuming most what little military resources existed in a way that was essentially doomed from the start.

I can't say France would have necessarily been better off without it, but at least not been worse off and may have given a military mindset more appropriate to modern war (e.g. defense in strategic depth).

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

In (pre) ironage Scandinavia "forts" built out of stones piled up on high hills and rocky outcrops existed close to most larger communities where people would flee to wait out hostiles. Presumably the towers themselves or similar fortifications would be built. The mediterranean coast in many places is ideal for it.

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?

I'm not convinced you can really parcel out tactics from weapons, technology and society like that. Basically tactics are how you deploy the weapons and men at your disposal with regards to location, communications and how well trained they are. The last two are going dictate a lot of what you can do. You need well trained men to pull of feigned flights, various maneouvers in the face of the enemy etc. Being able to see and communicate with subordinates places heavy restrictions on what can be accmplished. Much of ancient and medieval tactics flows naturally from this. In a sense what I'm saying is that advanced tactics will have to be implemented when you train you first soldier. The best tacticians had well traine dmen and subordinates who knew what to do as situations unfolded with regards to the overall goal. E.g. Roman centurions .

Great tactics and strategies always depend on a lot of things, but especially the surroundings and the kinds of forces.

But what's really important is that information and control are very limited. It's practically impossible to see how deep a line of troops is from the ground, estimates of the strength of the enemy provided by scouts will be off in either direction, even a tiny ridge could hide whole cohorts and your cavalry might just run off to loot the enemy camp or pursue some enemy cavalry leaving you without it.

Yup this. The limits of line of sight and ability-to-shout-loudly was for the longest time hard limits on tactics.

[Storm Bringer]

I've asked this question before, actually, in a previous thread, but misphrased it and ended up getting some fantastic answers for a tangential topic;

See, in a story I'm working on, I have a character who's meant to end up being a formidable strategist, mainly by commanding his armies with tactics far ahead of his time. I've done a bit of research about the basics of Roman and Byzantine formations, especially the infamous phalanx, but those were pitted against bronze-age and iron-age tactics that I presume were not in use in more medieval settings like typical sword-and-sorcery

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?

One the best hallmarks of excellent strategy is that people look at your battles and go "I don't know what all the fuss is about, anyone could have won that battle!", because you stacked the deck so thoroughly beforehand that the enemy never had a chance.

as kerio mentioned, logistics is a big part of this, and the devil is often in the details, like ensuring that your troops have food (especially hot food), water, somewhere to sleep, haven't marched too far to get to the battle, etc.

I recommend reading the art of war. the actual, original text is only a few thousand words, which is much shorter than most young adult novels, for a frame of reference. anytime you see a copy of the art of war that is larger than your hands, most of what your looking at is commentaries by various authors.

their is also the Thirty Six Stratagems, another historical Chinese work, which are a series of sayings that encapsulate a lot of what Sun Tzu thought about strategy.

the basics of Chinese warfare was, in Sun Tzus words, based on deception. get your enemies to believe what you want to believe, and on using your strengths against their weaknesses.

[Haighus]

The point of all these towers, burghs, etc. wasn't to actually serve as a defensive position in a major invasion, but as people have said to let the area hold out for a few days. No raiding force could beat heavy cavalry, and most understandably wanted to spend as little time as possible in the area. Essentially, they'd grab anything they could that wasn't nailed down and run away to the ship or across the border, often stealing livestock in the latter case.

Thus, the relative low impact IRL of such raids was a result of a) raiders not having the time to make it worthwhile to destroy everything they couldn't use and b) peasants who survive raids recover and become raid-able again.

Well, burgh/burg is a very loose term- at least some of them were intended to be very serious fortifications. Some of these burys were pretty important, so would've been reasonably heavily fortified in the Anglo-saxon period, like Shrewsbury. It was a general term for fortified places, and was applied to all manner of defences. Similar to castle really, which is used for tiny wooden motte-and-baileys all the way up to the Malbork monstrosity.

I am under the belief that burg means fortification in german too.

[Vinyadan]

I think it's worth saying that strategy and tactics are two different things, although they necessarily interact with each other.

Tactics are more limited in scope and often have a shorter duration in time. So how you arrange your army before battle is tactics, and ordering your cavalry to charge a suddenly unprotected flank is also tactics. In practice, tactics allow you to improvise with what you have.

Strategy is larger. It can be grand strategy, building the general modus operandi of a state that could go on for centuries. On a smaller, more common level, a strategy is going to deal with the war as a whole. See "Germany first", where the strategy was to first concentrate on a German surrender, and Japan was deliberately left for later.

So tactics tend to be at battle level, and strategies at war level. And it's not necessarily true that being good at one means being good at both, although experience at the tactical level will almost surely create a better strategist, at least because of better understanding of how battles work and what soldiers need.

As for what made the Romans that good: I'll say that one contributing factor must have been fortified encampments, and the ability to build them under attack. Then there is the use of complex siege machines, and the habit to avoid long lasting sieges: they rather stormed the walls after having surrounded them, or built a rampart, or rammed the walls down, or built a cave beneath them. This meant that you wouldn't have an army swamped for months around a target, and you could use it for something else.
In general, they put enormous care in giving the best preparation to their elite, and, since Rome gave military command to civilian magistrates (unlike e.g. Athens, where the separation was very clear), it meant that a well prepared landowner could be a well prepared general.
They also were strict and generous, with a harsh care for discipline, but paying the citizen professional soldiers very well. To make an example, during the first hundred years of Roman rule, Gallia paid Rome less taxes than what Rome paid its soldiers stationed in Gaul, which essentially turned Roman occupation into a century long economic stimulus package.

[Galloglaich]

I've asked this question before, actually, in a previous thread, but misphrased it and ended up getting some fantastic answers for a tangential topic;

See, in a story I'm working on, I have a character who's meant to end up being a formidable strategist, mainly by commanding his armies with tactics far ahead of his time. I've done a bit of research about the basics of Roman and Byzantine formations, especially the infamous phalanx, but those were pitted against bronze-age and iron-age tactics that I presume were not in use in more medieval settings like typical sword-and-sorcery

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?

Aside from the examples in the Classical World which have already been mentioned (Philip of Macedon and Marius / Marian reform being two excellent though large scale examples) there are also a lot of real-life examples of this from the Middle Ages, where a leader (or group of leaders) recognizes the elements missing from war as conventionally practiced in their part of the world, and then institute some major organizational reforms which make a big difference on the battlefield, they usually involve the following elements:

1) Recognize the limitations of the current ways of warfare as done by allies
2) Recognize the advantages and disadvantages of the current ways of warfare as done by enemies / rivals
3) Figure out how to improve these elements within your own forces, while exploiting weaknesses in the potential enemies
4) Whip your armies into shape and develop the new elements as needed, while remaining agile and responsive enough to adapt to changing realities on the battlefield.

Sometimes these events, which occurred both on the very large scale (i.e. nations or Empires) and on smaller scales (individual campaigns or smaller regions) involved major new technological and organizational innovations - filling gaps in an over-specialized type of army to make it more of a 'combined arms' force for example, whereas sometimes they involved more incremental 'tightening and fine tuning' done over many iterations.

Some examples:

William the Conquerer, 11th century - integrated heavy cavalry into his army effectively (arguably for the first time on such a large scale) and improved logistics sufficiently to move an army with horses and supplies across the Channel in a very short amount of time.

Richard Lionheart, 12th Century - filled gaps in the Crusader armies and created a combined arms military force by adding elements of effective light cavalry, improving missile warfare and enhancing C3I and scouting capability. William saw that the Arabs and Turks had adapted to Latinized heavy cavalry by adopting a hit and run strategy, relying on their mounted archers and superior mobility and logistics to sew confusion among the Crusaders and attack when conditions were ideal. By recruiting turcopoles (mixed ethnicity light cavalry), and making extensive use of crossbowmen, including mounted crossbowmen, Richard was able to neutralize well led and highly organized Arab cavalry forces and was able to maneuver his army with impunity, avoiding the kind of disasters (i.e. Hattin) that other Latin Monarchs faced. He made effective use of diplomacy among the Arabs while achieving his somewhat limited goals. Though he didn't change the course of the Crusades in the Levant, he temporarily reversed the decline of Latin fortunes there.

Ghenghis Khan, 12th-13th Century - fine tuned and tightened the organizational and battlefield tactics of the Mongols. The most important element of which was an iterative but ultimately revolutionary fine tuning of C3I - command, control, communications and intelligence. He established 'arrow riders', which included systems of whistling arrows, colored flames, semaphore flags and other innovations, which gave him an unprecedented level of battlefield / situational awareness as a leader. All of these elements already existed, either among the Mongols themselves or among the Chinese, but he combined them together very effectively. He also reorganized military units on the basis of the decimal system and streamlind the integration of nominal allies into effective assets (the Romans did much the same thing). Finally he added a raft of dirty tricks, new weapons and techniques with an eye toward disruption of enemy C3I and harming enemy morale. This included chemical and biological weapons, systematic war-atrocities, and gunpowder weapons among other innovations.

Jan Ziska and the Hussites, 15th Century - Reorganization of the army. Faced with a massive international Crusade about to launch an imminent invasion into Bohemia, the highly experienced veteran Jan Ziska (who had fought at Agincourt with the English and Grunwald with the Poles) helped orchestrate a revolutionary re-organization of Bohemian forces which proved extremely effective. Using wagons as moving fortresses, he organized burghers as marksmen and peasants with militarized flails, and effectively integrated them with existing assets (heavy cavalry, marksmen and infantry), as he collaborated with the large University town of Prague (with it's huge number of skilled artisans and well developed industries) to produce military innovations, especially cannon and other pyrotechnic devices. He also organized the systematic training of mounted crossbowmen to use as scouts and screening forces. The new Czech war-system proved spectacularly effective and smashed the 5 Crusades organized against them, then when neighboring Kingdoms refused to sign a peace treaty, went on devastating invasions until the Pope ultimately agreed to the Prague Compacts, effectively allowing them to continue as a heretic Kingdom.

More broadly you can also look at how the Cossacks adopted Czech Hussite and Ottoman / Tartar tactics and developed their own combined-arms force which proved to be the key to the gradual undoing of Muslim control of Western Asia, and similarly how the Swiss - especially Zurich and Berne, adopted new tactics and weapons (modifications of existing axes and spears into halberds and pikes) and built them into combined arms (if infantry dominated) forces for home defense (as distinct somewhat from their foreign adventures as mercenaries where they tended to fight more purely as infantry). Also how the Spanish invented the Tercio system to deal with the Swiss, among other challenges, and how the German Landsknechts were organized to mimic Swiss tactics under Emperor Maximillian I.


On a smaller scale, someone noted the challenges of scouting when you can't see from above. I know that Strasbourg and other towns which had large Cathedrals (Strasbourg's was 460 feet high) used them as high altitude observation platforms. Strasbourg made critical advantage of this during pitched battles against a very large force of French mercenaries in the 1440's. They were able to identify smaller foraging parties of a few hundred at a time which left the main mercenary camp in a nearby town to go find fodder and supplies, and then sent fast-moving columns to attack them, following up with (larger) secondary columns to hit their relief forces. For Strasbourg, the Cathedral, from which you can apparently see ~20km on a clear day, was almost like having an observation balloon like you would see in the 19th Century or WW 1

G

[Brother Oni]

I recommend reading the art of war. the actual, original text is only a few thousand words, which is much shorter than most young adult novels, for a frame of reference. anytime you see a copy of the art of war that is larger than your hands, most of what your looking at is commentaries by various authors.

their is also the Thirty Six Stratagems, another historical Chinese work, which are a series of sayings that encapsulate a lot of what Sun Tzu thought about strategy.

I'd say the the Art of War is more about logistics and running a war (The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice; Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs), while the 36 Stratagems has a primary focus on deception in general not just military, although as the quote in the OP says, war is just a continuation of politics by other means.

[PhoenixPhyre]

Semi-on-topic question:

How big should a border garrison be?

So how big were the forces stationed in frontier watch towers/posts? 10 men, max? 20 soldiers? 1-2? I really have no clue here.

Setting details (if needed)
Time/place: pseudo-medieval, Khmer analogue. It's the furthest outpost for this civilization, about 30 miles from a regional center. No major known threats except "savage" hunter-gatherer tribes (who aren't particularly known for raiding settlements). Jungle environment with substantial unfriendly wildlife (including dragon-like but unintelligent beasts).

The garrison is located in a village (~200 people, although that can be changed) and would be responsible for patrols and security against wildlife (mostly). The civilization is military-oriented, so I figure they'd have more than normal, but this is probably somewhat of a punishment post. There is a silk-analogue plantation a few miles to the south, but most of the village is subsistence farming and fishing (on the local lake). Relatively low magical resources--at most a level 1-ish wizard or cleric.

[gkathellar]

A big thing is training. One easy way to portray your strategist as skilled is to have them make improvements in the drill, discipline, and general preparation of the soldiers, as well as to their kits. This is on the one hand very concrete, and on the other hand doesn't require you to depict ttheir matching wits with others directly. It's also a very real part of what made famous commanders throughout history so successful - creating the types of human resources that would become necessary to them in the field.

[Kiero]

They also were strict and generous, with a harsh care for discipline, but paying the citizen professional soldiers very well. To make an example, during the first hundred years of Roman rule, Gallia paid Rome less taxes than what Rome paid its soldiers stationed in Gaul, which essentially turned Roman occupation into a century long economic stimulus package.

Just on this, until the time of Marius, they didn't pay soldiers at all, because they were a citizen militia doing their duty in return for all the rights they were granted. They got a share of plunder, and that was it. These men were yeoman farmers and upwards, expected to be able to equip and support themselves on campaign.

By contrast when Marius started recruiting from amongst the urban poor, they had nothing and had to be both equipped and paid. However, they were also not tied to the farming seasons, and didn't have to be back home in spring to plant and autumn to gather in the harvest. Thus they could be signed on as professional, full-time soldiers.

[Galloglaich]

Nova made a close replica of some 16th C. tempered Greenwich armor, with some legit people involved.

The replica stopped a musket ball at short range.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ancient...ng-knight.html

[fusilier]

Nova made a close replica of some 16th C. tempered Greenwich armor, with some legit people involved.

The replica stopped a musket ball at short range.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ancient...ng-knight.html

I saw that, it was very good. Showing the complete construction of the armor, beginning with the raw iron, and explaining the use of a placard(sp?) on armor of that period. Unfortunately they don't go into the details of the musket (caliber, weight of ball, amount of gunpowder used, etc.). Nevertheless, it showed how much more effective the laminated armor with the placard was compared to a more typical steel breastplate. The bluing process at the end was very cool too.