Got a Real-World Weapon or Armor Question? Mk. VI

[JaronK]

Florentine style just means dual wielding. Reversing the grip has nothing to do with that word, as I understand it.

And reversing the grip, from what I know, is more about throwing something surprising into your style that your opponent doesn't know how to deal with. It's weaker than holding your swords normally, but it's a bit unexpected, so it's something you can try against experienced opponents if you really want. I wouldn't really recommend it as a main style though. It limits your range, forces you to almost exclusively actively block with that hand (as opposed to simply holding the sword where it protects you), and limits your attack options. It's just not necessary.

JaronK

[Subotei]

At Kursk, the Wehrmacht concentrated everything it had, threw all its reserves at a valuable target... and failed completely, because the Russians Ultra saw it coming a thousand kilometers away and piled up more force than the Germans could possibly beat. After Kursk, no one really believed that the Germans being able to do anything other than retreat and lose the war.

Got that one for you

The most relevant bits are....

The tank in question might be a flimsy joke by the standards of great tank battles like Prokhorovka. But on the strategic scale, the widespread availability of light to medium armor for infantry support is likely to be at least as significant as the narrowspread availability of a handful of tanks that can individually kill any enemy tank on the field... in the few locations where one of them can be found.

So ignoring the Soviet light armor might not be such a good idea.

An excellent point - well made, Sir. Quantity has a quality all of its own, I believe Stalin said. Tank Vs Tank the Sherman may have been inferior, but lets not forget 90% of the German Army was infantry, and in war its not meant to be a fair fight.

Well, that would tend to explain why they stopped using BT-7s in 1944...

More likely they had enough T-34s to go round by then, and it would simplify logistics by not having different spares, ammo etc.

[Galloglaich]

I'd question even that; it's a quantity/quality thing. If the Germans had replaced their entire Stuka force with 10% as many Mosquitos, for example, it is very unlikely that they would have done better, and they probably would have done much worse.

But that depends heavily on combat conditions. Imagine both sides use identical aircraft, but one side has twice as many of them and therefore has air superiority. The guys with the small air force lose a plane after X missions; the guys with the large air force lose a plane after 2X (or, more likely, 4X missions). Does that mean that the same plane is two or four times better in Bigistani service than it is in the Ducal Air Force of the Duchy of Littleburg?

Lets break this down a bit further.

Lets say Bigistani has 100 Stukas in Theater at the start of a Summer offensive. The DAF has 10 Mosquitos.

Both are flying 5 missions per month, per aircraft, a very moderate number, in support of their armies. Both nations have roughly the same production capacity and can send one aircraft per week to the front lines in this sector as a replacement.

Now according to these websites:
http://www.2worldwar2.com/bombers.htm
http://www.dhmosquito.com/
http://www.rodanair.ca/mosq.html

...the Mosquito had the lowest loss rate of any Allied bomber (and the highest precision). The actual percentage, according to this book was 0.63%.
Now we know by comparison the Stuka had a high loss rate. I found some discussion threads which had estimates between 7.9% and 21% (at the height of the Battle of Britain). But lets say 5% average.

So to crunch the numbers. 5 missions per month, per aircraft...

May
In the first month Bigistani flies 500 missions, losing 25 aircraft. They get 4 replacements. They now have 79 left.

DAF meanwhile has flown only 50 missions, but only loses 1 Mosquito (actually 0.315), and gain 4 replacements. Now they have 13.

June

Bigistani flies 395 missions, losing 20 aircraft (19.75). With their replacements they now have 63 Stukas remaining.

DAF flies 65 missions. Lose 0 this month (averaging for the last month) and gain 4, now they are up to 17 Mosquitoes.

But by now, the DAF has located all the Bigistani bases. They are able to devote 10 of their missions to raids on Bigistani airfields. These raids are able to destroy an additional 5 Stukas. Now Bigistani has 59 Stukas remaining.

The DAF bases of course, are positioned outside the range of the Stuka so Bigistani cannot retaliate.

July

Bigistani flies 295 missions, losing 15 aircraft (14.75). They gain 4 replacements but lose another 5 to Mosquito raids again, bringing them down to 43 Stukas.

DAF flies 85 missions, losing 1 aircraft. Adding 4 replacements brings them up to 20 Mosquitoes.

August
Bigistani flies 215 missions, losing 11 Stukas (10.75), they gain 4 replacements but lose another 5 to air raids. They are now down to 31 Stukas.

DAF flies 100 missions, losing 1 aircraft. 4 replacements brings them up to 23 Mosquitoes.

September
Bigistani flies 155 missions. 8 Stukas are shot down. They get 4 replacements and lose 5 aircraft to raids. They are now down to 22 Stukas. Morale has begun to decline in the Stuka air-wing which has lost many of it's skilled aircrew during the summer offensive...

DAF flies 115 missions, still losing only 1 aircraft. Their 4 replacements bring them up to 26 Mosquitoes. They now outnumber Bigistani in bombers.

Now Bigistani flew an impressive 1560 missions, while the DAF flew only 350. The Duchy's armor and infantry divisions took a pounding from the Bigistani Stukas, and lost a lot of ground over the summer. But winter is coming now, and the DAF airforce now out-numbers Bigistani in this Theater, and they also have a higher morale in their bomber forces. What's more, they have been able to fly many more types of missions, disrupting communications and supply lines, even deep raids all the way back to the Bigistani capital. They can fly unescorted, which means they can use more of their fighters for air-defense, to attack Bigistani Stukas, and as fighter-bombers.

Bigistani meanwhile has been essentially limited to close-air-support and some shallow raids near the front. They have lost more fighters to the DAF because escort missions are dangerous. Many of their crew are dead, others are losing morale, except for Hans Ulrech Rudel who is becoming a fanatical stuka experten and still flies despite severe injuries, with two wooden legs. But he alone cannot carry the squadron.

I think Bigistani has blown it's wad, they were tough right out the gate with their so-called "krieg-blitz" tactics, but they were very rough to the Littleburg civilians and resistance has stiffened. Some people think the tide of the war is turning, and Bigistani is now going to start losing ground. Over time, if they stick with the Stuka, they may be in serious trouble. In fact if the war drags on another year or two, the 10 Mosquitoes may turn out to be a much wiser investment than 100 Stukas. Maybe even by another order of magnitude...

G.

[Dervag]

An excellent point - well made, Sir. Quantity has a quality all of its own, I believe Stalin said. Tank Vs Tank the Sherman may have been inferior, but lets not forget 90% of the German Army was infantry, and in war its not meant to be a fair fight.

Thing is, "quantity has a quality all its own" is so often imagined as meaning "Our ten thousand tanks will overwhelm their two thousand!" In practice, it's at least as likely to mean "Our ten thousand tanks mean that in hundreds of battles, some of our tanks will physically show up, while none of the enemy's tanks will be there at all!"

More likely they had enough T-34s to go round by then, and it would simplify logistics by not having different spares, ammo etc.

Could be both. For a force of 5000 BT-7s, it's worth maintaining the spares and ammo for them. After heavy attrition in years of intense combat, you're down to a much smaller force... at which point you start thinking seriously about retiring the last few hundred, or however many are left.

Lets break this down a bit further...

Galloglaich, forgive me, but this scenario strikes me as... well, painfully contrived. Reasons:

1)You're using the loss rate for Mosquitos that historically flew many of their missions against relatively soft targets (deep precision strikes) or in friendly airspace (night fighters), against an enemy whose fighter force was vitally needed elsewhere. And comparing it to the loss rate for Stukas that historically went after heavily defended targets over the front lines, in the thick of enemy fighter activity. If Mosquitos had been used for close air support, you can bet that a lot more Mosquitos would have been shot down.

2)You're giving a nation which somehow amassed 100 Stukas identical ability to replace Stukas as a nation which could only amass 10 Mosquitos to replace Mosquitos. This artificially inflates the qualitative advantage by making it trivial for the Ducal Air Force to replace their (rare) loses to their small force: they have to suffer 10% casualties to lose one plane, and you're giving them the ability to replace 40% casualties a month, while the Bigistanis get the ability to replace 4% casualties a month.

That's not a reasonable comparison: if one Mosquito is worth ten Stukas, then getting one Mosquito delivered to the front should be worth getting ten Stukas delivered to the front, and the DAF should still come out even if the Bigistanis can build Stukas ten times faster than the Duchy can build Mosquitos.

3)You're neglecting the same factor that arises with tanks that I pointed out earlier: as often as not, it's not a question of whether to get a good bomber or a bad bomber, but of whether to get any bomber or no bomber. Littlebergian troops who want close air support and generals who want targets fifty kilometers behind the front destroyed will get virtually none of what they want from the Ducal Air Force, which is flying an average of about 1.5 sorties a day. Bigistani ground forces are far more likely to get the support they need, because their nation's air force doesn't consist of less than a dozen planes optimized for heavily planned deep penetration air raids.
_______

All told, this strikes me as an extremely contrived scenario, one that was, if not intentionally rigged, unintentionally biased to optimize the Mosquitos' simulated capabilities while ignoring the effect of the Stukas on the tactical and operational levels, and the impact of that effect on the overall war. So I'm not convinced.

[Galloglaich]

Galloglaich, forgive me, but this scenario strikes me as... well, painfully contrived. Reasons:

1)You're using the loss rate for Mosquitos that historically flew many of their missions against relatively soft targets (deep precision strikes) or in friendly airspace (night fighters), against an enemy whose fighter force was vitally needed elsewhere. And comparing it to the loss rate for Stukas that historically went after heavily defended targets over the front lines, in the thick of enemy fighter activity. If Mosquitos had been used for close air support, you can bet that a lot more Mosquitos would have been shot down.

I never said the Mosquitos would be used exclusively for close air support. I think because they had a lot of versatility, they would do a variety of missions, some CAS some intruder missions, some raids etc., flying at a much higher speed and therefore safer (much like the fighter bombers the Allies used to such excellent effect). Speaking of which, because the Mosquito can fly many unescorted missions, the DAF fighters can be used for CAS missions as well as fighter-bombers.

The bottom line is, the Mosquito had a reputation for being very good at surviving missions, including bombing missions in some of the most dangerous and daring raids of the war. The Stuka had the opposite reputation. The Stuka was simply too slow to be safe in an unescorted bombing raid.

2)You're giving a nation which somehow amassed 100 Stukas identical ability to replace Stukas as a nation which could only amass 10 Mosquitos to replace Mosquitos. This artificially inflates the qualitative advantage by making it trivial for the Ducal Air Force to replace their (rare) loses to their small force: they have to suffer 10% casualties to lose one plane, and you're giving them the ability to replace 40% casualties a month, while the Bigistanis get the ability to replace 4% casualties a month.

I think it's you that is bending things here. Why would you assume that the production rates would be drastically different? The 10 to 100 odds were simply to illustrate a point. The math would have been even harsher for the Stuka side if they had started out with equal numbers (which in fact was the case since the Germans were fighting against much larger economies).

In this scenario, the other 90 Mosquitoes could have been used for Strategic bombing, recon, or on another front. Or maybe they had just gotten a slower start at producing weapons (as in fact was the case in the war) and had to catch up.

The point is, all things being equal, a factory can produce only so many aircraft once the war has started. The mosquito in fact was made from non strategic materials (wood!) to be cheaper to produce. It was quite cheap to produce by WW Ii standards. The leaders of each nation choose whether to produce an obsolete bomber (a Stuka) or a modern one like a Mosquito.

I just checked the wikis. Interesting facts:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito

Total Mosquito production was 7781 of which 6710 were built during the war

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_87

An estimated 6,500 Ju 87s of all versions were built between 1936 and August 1944.

Not saying it proves anything, there were many factors, the British had financial and material support from the US, but the Stuka was also in production for much longer. All in all I think it equals out but you may disagree.

That's not a reasonable comparison: if one Mosquito is worth ten Stukas, then getting one Mosquito delivered to the front should be worth getting ten Stukas delivered to the front, and the DAF should still come out even if the Bigistanis can build Stukas ten times faster than the Duchy can build Mosquitos.

I really can't follow this logic. Why would a Stuka be built ten times faster? I don't think that is realistic. Even if you said the Stukas came out twice as fast, the higher loss rate would mean the Mosquito would eventually be the better bet. Actually I think Stukas were a big waste of materials, they kept putting larger and larger engines in them in the forlorn hopes of improving performance (the same engines which could have gone into high performance fighters, 1400 hp and more), but it never helped.

3)You're neglecting the same factor that arises with tanks that I pointed out earlier: as often as not, it's not a question of whether to get a good bomber or a bad bomber, but of whether to get any bomber or no bomber. Littlebergian troops who want close air support and generals who want targets fifty kilometers behind the front destroyed will get virtually none of what they want from the Ducal Air Force, which is flying an average of about 1.5 sorties a day. Bigistani ground forces are far more likely to get the support they need, because their nation's air force doesn't consist of less than a dozen planes optimized for heavily planned deep penetration air raids.

Yes, in the scenario above the Stuka side has the advantage initially, but due to the higher attrition rate, the Mosquito side will ultimately win out because there will be more Mosquitos than Stukas, not to mention more trained aircrews. This is exactly in fact what happened historically in WW II. Both the Japanese and Germans had qualitative and quantitative advantages in aircraft in the beginning, especially with fighters, but they failed to modernize fast enough, thinking they could rely on their old designs, while the Allies modernized as quickly as possible. This left them with increasingly obsolete designs increasingly manned by quickly (badly) trained crew.

All told, this strikes me as an extremely contrived scenario, one that was, if not intentionally rigged, unintentionally biased to optimize the Mosquitos' simulated capabilities while ignoring the effect of the Stukas on the tactical and operational levels, and the impact of that effect on the overall war. So I'm not convinced.

I'm not surprised you aren't convinced, nobody wants to be wrong in an argument me included.

But it's not contrived. It's just an effort to show you (and others reading the thread) how attrition can effect the overall numbers. I just took the example you created and ran with it. Yes, quantity has a quality all it's own, as Stalin famously said, but with technology there is a limit to that where you start to get diminishing returns. With aircraft and tanks especially. (more on the latter in another post)

And for the record, I respect your knowledge on WW II aviation, and Fusiliers as well. It's nice to find people who are informed on these subjects, as they are fascinating. We all have our opinions formed over years of pouring over books etc., and we are bound to disagree, but I don't take it personally (and I'm ok with people thinking my theories are blinkered). But I'm also going to defend my points, because they are not just made up out of thin air.

G.

[Mike_G]

I would like to add that, as an infantry Marine, I would be thrilled to get support from a hot air balloon if I were pinned down by superior numbers of enemy infantry.

Light tanks or obsolete planes that couldn't take on the best enemy tanks or fighters can still keep the screaming Chicom hordes from overrunning your perimeter.

It's all about where you sit. I'd rather be in a Tiger than a Sherman, since better armor and a bigger gun make tankers feel happy, but I'd rather carry a rifle in the army where any tank, even a Stuart or Pzkw Mk I could be depended on to show up at my call.

I'd rather be a general in the army with the best logistics and supply, since more plentiful resources mean I can make up my losses faster than the enemy, but being a humble front line soldier in the army where the General feels comfortable he can replace you easily doesn't give you a warm fuzzy feeling.

So, I guess I'm saying that the right answer on which equipment is best all comes down to who is asking the question.

[Galloglaich]

The flipside of the Sherman / Tiger analogy is the Zero / Wildcat / Hellcat analogy.

The Zero had an incremental edge over the Wildcat initially, and there were more of them. The Japanese figured they had a good thing going so only made minor improvements to the Zero, while the Americans invested in a new design and came up with the Hellcat.

They also made both the Wildcat and Hellcat heavily protected and implemented an aggressive pilot rescue program so retained much more of their trained aicrews.

As a result, the attrition rates skyrocketed for the Japanese by the time the Hellcat arrived. The Hellcat had a significant edge over the zero.

By the end of the war, the Japanese grunts were fighting with no air-cover, the Americans had bombers and fighter-bombers available in every battle.

G.

[Galloglaich]

Anyway we all got our pet theories about WWII, it's a very complex subject, the Stuka is kind of a pet peeve of mine but there is room to interpret the data different ways. I just have a different perspective on it than a most people. I think a lot of the German equipment was terrific quality, but alot of it was also kind of crappy, and the Russian, Italian, and Japanese gear tends to get downplayed more than is realistic. Even some of the US and UK kit.

But who knows maybe I'm just crazy. I definitely think about all that stuff too much.

G.

[fusilier]

Hmm, I've been out of the loop for a little while here, so I'm just going to jump in here quickly.

Galloglaich:

I think the stuka was cool plane in it's day, but dusk was falling by 1941. My point wasn't that it was some great airplane, but even after it was "outdated", the germans still found it useful. That's not to say that it was still a super plane, or that something else wouldn't have been more effective, but simply that the plane continued in service in a useful manner. (This is why I shy away from the terms "obsolete" and "outdated" -- to me they connote uselessness).

Actually I think Stukas were a big waste of materials, they kept putting larger and larger engines in them in the forlorn hopes of improving performance (the same engines which could have gone into high performance fighters, 1400 hp and more), but it never helped

You need to be careful here, very few Axis fighter airframes could be readily adopted to take the powerful DB 603 engine (the Fiat G.55 was one of the few -- the G.56 prototype). So those more powerful engines couldn't have gone into fighters, at least not into any fighter design that the Germans could get into production quickly. That's not to say that the materials couldn't have been used more effectively elsewhere, but the Germans didn't seem to have a satisfactory ground attack/dive bomber design available to them -- so it may simply have been the best thing that they could produce to fulfill that role. (Also, don't forget fascism, they had a tendency to "reward" those companies that played ball with them).

The Axis were wholly out-produced by the Allies, so the fact that there were more Mosquitos than Stukas is hardly surprising.

Also why are you comparing loss rates between the Stuka and the Mosquito? While they both provided ground support, to my knowledge the Mosquito didn't enter the war in significant numbers until the Allies had wrested air superiority from the Germans. So it's not entirely fair. I do think the Mosquito was an awesome plane, but I'm not sure why the comparison is being made. It's significantly more modern.

It looks like most tactical support aircraft suffered from higher loss ratios, that I think it's just to be expected when air superiority is lacking (and probably to be expected when good ground defenses are in place). As for the Mosquitos, their speed would certainly help them, but they couldn't "loiter" long if they lacked local air superiority (they could run though). Also, they performed a bunch of different missions, not just low level support, which may skew their losses. While, I'm not certain, I have the impression that low-level missions were typically more dangerous.

All this aside, the more primitive nature of the Stuka may have actually helped its longevity by allowing it to operate in conditions where other planes couldn't (this is reported to be the case with Henschel Hs 123's in Russia). The ability to operate from rough fields in all kinds of poor weather, when other planes would be grounded could be very beneficial. Today, helicopters would probably fill that roll, but at the time that's what they needed.

[fusilier]

Anyway we all got our pet theories about WWII, it's a very complex subject, the Stuka is kind of a pet peeve of mine but there is room to interpret the data different ways. I just have a different perspective on it than a most people. I think a lot of the German equipment was terrific quality, but alot of it was also kind of crappy, and the Russian, Italian, and Japanese gear tends to get downplayed more than is realistic. Even some of the US and UK kit.

I agree with you. German equipment tends to get overhyped, and that of other nations' often underrated. I think there's also a lensing effect that takes place (which is what I was trying to get at earlier), and that's relatively minor technological superiority gets inflated in our evaluations of the effectiveness of certain weapons. Often I think many people get bogged down in the details and fail to look at how these things fit into the bigger picture.

But who knows maybe I'm just crazy. I definitely think about all that stuff too much.

On this board, you're among brethren. ;-)

[Galloglaich]

Hey! I'm glad to be among bretheren :)

G.

[Dervag]

I would like to add that, as an infantry Marine, I would be thrilled to get support from a hot air balloon if I were pinned down by superior numbers of enemy infantry.

Light tanks or obsolete planes that couldn't take on the best enemy tanks or fighters can still keep the screaming Chicom hordes from overrunning your perimeter.

This is kind of my point.

It's all about where you sit. I'd rather be in a Tiger than a Sherman, since better armor and a bigger gun make tankers feel happy, but I'd rather carry a rifle in the army where any tank, even a Stuart or Pzkw Mk I could be depended on to show up at my call.

Well... a Panzer I might be a little too light, because it has no cannon and therefore can't bunker-bust or take out enemy tanks worth a damn. A 10% chance of Tiger (or Sherman) support really might be better than a near-100% chance of Panzer I support. But even then, it's chancy.

I'd rather be a general in the army with the best logistics and supply, since more plentiful resources mean I can make up my losses faster than the enemy, but being a humble front line soldier in the army where the General feels comfortable he can replace you easily doesn't give you a warm fuzzy feeling.

In this case, being the humble front line soldier in the army with good logistics means always having plenty of ammo (and if that doesn't give you a warm fuzzy feeling you've probably had your warm-fuzzy feeler surgically removed). Also means more reliable armor support, because the tanks always have fuel. Which I know gives you a warm fuzzy feeling; see above.

So, I guess I'm saying that the right answer on which equipment is best all comes down to who is asking the question.

Since armies still rely primarily on their infantry, I'd say that asking the infantry is a good idea, bearing in mind issues that are simply outside their scope because they don't see the big picture. Or, better yet, telling them the big picture.

I never said the Mosquitos would be used exclusively for close air support.

No, they won't. That's the point. Even making liberal assumptions about the proportion of DAF Mosquitos sorties dedicated to close air support, they are providing effectively no CAS, while the Bigistani Napkinwaffe* is providing quite a bit of CAS.

Moreover, the Mosquitos will be hard pressed to inflict damage faster than the enemy can repair it; their force is that small. Remember that destroyed targets are rarely if ever permanently put out of action; if you can't put enough explosives on target per unit time to "keep the grass mown," the effectiveness of your bombing raids declines rapidly.

The bottom line is, the Mosquito had a reputation for being very good at surviving missions, including bombing missions in some of the most dangerous and daring raids of the war. The Stuka had the opposite reputation. The Stuka was simply too slow to be safe in an unescorted bombing raid.

Yes, you've said this, and I don't deny it. But the idea that this makes the ratio of "quality" so lopsided in any real sense is absurd. It's as unreasonable as the people who claim that, say, one German Tiger was worth ten Shermans. Even if one Tiger could often kill ten Shermans in direct combat before being killed itself, this would not make up for the inferior quantity. You'd still be faced with the fact that one Tiger can only be in one place at a time, affecting the outcome of one small battle, while the Shermans can be in half a dozen places up and down the line, affecting the outcome of several small battles. The Tiger might paint a huge number of kill stripes on its gun barrel, yes, but what good does that do if your army's infantry line has to keep falling back for lack of armor support?

Likewise, the Mosquitoes of 6.33 Squadron may have the greatest battle record in the history of aviation... but that only carries them so far in a war against overwhelming numbers, even overwhelming numbers of second-rate opposition.

I think it's you that is bending things here. Why would you assume that the production rates would be drastically different? The 10 to 100 odds were simply to illustrate a point. The math would have been even harsher for the Stuka side if they had started out with equal numbers (which in fact was the case since the Germans were fighting against much larger economies).

You, not me, were the one that asserted that one Mosquito was worth ten Stukas. However, to prove this, you came up with a case that was based on some very bad assumptions: chiefly that while on Mosquito on the front lines is worth ten Stukas, one Mosquito fresh from the factory is worth only one Stuka.

You could equally well have tried to show that zero Mosquitos were worth a hundred Stukas that way, by having the DAF start with no Mosquitos and have to start building their force at four aircraft a month in March or April. This would have made little difference to the outcome of your calculations, but the conclusion would be absurd- it is impossible for zero aircraft to be worth more than anything.

The point is, all things being equal, a factory can produce only so many aircraft once the war has started. The mosquito in fact was made from non strategic materials (wood!) to be cheaper to produce. It was quite cheap to produce by WW Ii standards. The leaders of each nation choose whether to produce an obsolete bomber (a Stuka) or a modern one like a Mosquito.

To be sure. And a Mosquito is better than a Stuka... but not better than ten Stukas, because that would be ridiculous. However, this does not make Mosquitos less economical than Stukas, since the cost ratio isn't 10:1.

I am not asserting that the Stuka was superior to the Mosquito, or cheaper, or more cost-effective. I am merely asserting that the Mosquito was no so devastatingly superior as to make it worth ten Stukas. I think you'd have to go well into the Jet Age to find an aircraft that was worth ten Stukas by itself. Or any other aircraft of the era, for that matter. This isn't because Stukas were good; it's because it is very hard to build one aircraft that, by itself, is worth a squadron of the enemy's.

I really can't follow this logic. Why would a Stuka be built ten times faster? I don't think that is realistic. Even if you said the Stukas came out twice as fast, the higher loss rate would mean the Mosquito would eventually be the better bet.

The logic is purely meant to address the proposition that the Mosquitos are better than the Stukas at a 1:10 Mosquito:Stuka ratio. If that were true, then replacing Mosquitos and Stukas at 1:1 ratios would be ludicrously lopsided and would effectively rig the test in the Mosquito's favor, and the replacement rate would cancel out the point of the test.

The reason is simple: as I note above, you could equally well use the same math to prove that zero Mosquitos are better than 100 Stukas, assuming equal replacement rates. Because at four Mosquitos a month the DAF will eventually have a Mosquito force of a few dozen planes, while at four Stukas a month and with a flat percentage of its aircraft lost per month, the Stukas have no chance of staying anywhere near replacement rate.

I'm not surprised you aren't convinced, nobody wants to be wrong in an argument me included.

But it's not contrived. It's just an effort to show you (and others reading the thread) how attrition can effect the overall numbers. I just took the example you created and ran with it. Yes, quantity has a quality all it's own, as Stalin famously said, but with technology there is a limit to that where you start to get diminishing returns. With aircraft and tanks especially. (more on the latter in another post)

I submit that you made some very questionable assumptions in the process of running with my example. Without those assumptions, your argument would probably have to be pared back, to the point of estimating the worth of a Mosquito as equal to... well, somewhat less than ten Stukas. I'd guesstimate at two or three, myself. Maybe as high as five, even. But ten is so extreme as to defy plausibility.

Anyway we all got our pet theories about WWII, it's a very complex subject, the Stuka is kind of a pet peeve of mine but there is room to interpret the data different ways. I just have a different perspective on it than a most people. I think a lot of the German equipment was terrific quality, but alot of it was also kind of crappy, and the Russian, Italian, and Japanese gear tends to get downplayed more than is realistic. Even some of the US and UK kit.

Of course. I only object to taking this peeve of yours to the point of rhetorical excess.

[Galloglaich]

Dervag, I thought this was obvious from the example, but I guess it wasn't so I'll spell it out.

Given a higher attrition rate, a large number of obsolete aircraft is going to rapidly deteriorate while the modern aircraft low-attrition rate (which can keep up with production) will gradually build up in numbers.

In other words, in the example above, if you kept going another 3 months, the DAF would have a huge numeric advantage of (better quality) bombers than 'Bigistani'.

So while 'Bigistani' has more aircraft initially, which theoretically translates to a battlefield advantage, by the time 3 or 4 months have passed they have lost their numeric superiority and within 6 or 7 months they will be badly outnumbered. So if the DAF can survive the first few months they will ultimately come out ahead. This actually mirrors hat happend in the war, the Russians, British and Americans gradually produced better aircraft than the Germans and Japanese had (this discrepancy most exxagerated in the case of the Stuka) and this ultimately led to a victory in the Attrition war and more numbers on the battlefield. (It was not just a matter of higher production capacity because the Germans were producing a huge number of aircraft)

You can quibble about the actual rates of attrition but I think there is no denying the Mosquito has a better survivability rate than the Stuka, an aircraft with a realistic tactial speed of 180 kts is much more vulnerable than one with 300 kts.

As for loitering, the loitering for Close Air Support is done a few minutes away from the battlefield not right in the 'hot zone', the aircraft come in when they are needed (airstrikes are called for by Forward Air Controllers.) this was the system originally pionnered by the RAF in North Africa, and refined by the USAAF in 1944:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward...l#World_War_II

As for the production rates, we know that historically, the Stuka and the Mosquito were produced at a similar rate in fact. You could argue it would take more money, time etc. to develop a new aircraft, but once production starts the payoff is in a lower attrition rate and therefore, ultimately higher numbers on the battlefield (plus better quality aircraft capable of a wider variety of missions). That is the key difference between something like a Mosquito and a Tiger tank, the Tiger was much more expensive to produce than ordinary tanks, the Mosquito was specifically made to be quick and relatively cheap to produce.

Hopefully that is clear and you don't thnk it's "Rhetorical Excess".

G.

[Galloglaich]

I think this excerpt from the Wiki on Close Air Support is a good summary of my point:

Soviet front
[edit] VVS RKKA
The Red Air Force was not slow to recognize the value of ground support aircraft. Even as far back as the Nomonhan incident, Russian aircraft were given the task of disrupting enemy ground operations. This use increased markedly after the German invasion. Purpose-built aircraft such as the Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik were highly effective in blunting the activity of the Panzers. Joseph Stalin paid the Il-2 a great tribute in his own inimitable manner: when a particular production factory fell behind on its deliveries, Stalin sent the following cable to the factory manager: "They are as essential to the Red Army as air and bread."

German CAS reached its peak on the Eastern Front during the period 1941-1943. Their decline was caused by the growing strength of the Red Air Force and the redeployment of assets to defend against American and British strategic bombardment. The introduction of improved Soviet tanks, the T-34 and KV-1 reduced the effectiveness of close air support, even after the adoption of 30 mm cannon and shaped-charge bombs. While German procedures for CAS led the way, their loss of air superiority and technological advantage, combined with a declining supply of aircraft and fuel, crippled their ability to provide CAS after 1943.

G.

[Galloglaich]

Hmm, I've been out of the loop for a little while here, so I'm just going to jump in here quickly.

Good points fusilier a few small comments.

I think the stuka was cool plane in it's day, but dusk was falling by 1941. My point wasn't that it was some great airplane, but even after it was "outdated", the germans still found it useful. That's not to say that it was still a super plane, or that something else wouldn't have been more effective, but simply that the plane continued in service in a useful manner. (This is why I shy away from the terms "obsolete" and "outdated" -- to me they connote uselessness).

Like I said before, they still got use out of the Fairey Swordfish long after it was clearly obsolete. A lesser term is 'obsolescent', which probably categorizes the second tier aircraft the Finns used to such good effect in their early battles with Russia. P-40's were still useful in the CBI Theater long after they were obsolete for Europe.

So it's a gray area a bit, but I think it is a valid term, it's an important distinction.

You need to be careful here, very few Axis fighter airframes could be readily adopted to take the powerful DB 603 engine (the Fiat G.55 was one of the few -- the G.56 prototype). So those more powerful engines couldn't have gone into fighters, at least not into any fighter design that the Germans could get into production quickly.

Well, the other major example is the Ta-152C, kind of a soupled-up FW 190. The Fw 190D also used a big inline engine. I think they would have been better off developing those types of fighters a couple of years earlier than wasting those engines on Stukas. But that is obviously subjective...

(Also, don't forget fascism, they had a tendency to "reward" those companies that played ball with them).

I think that was the actual root of the problem with the Me 109, the Stuka, and the Zero in Japan.

While they both provided ground support, to my knowledge the Mosquito didn't enter the war in significant numbers until the Allies had wrested air superiority from the Germans. So it's not entirely fair. I do think the Mosquito was an awesome plane, but I'm not sure why the comparison is being made. It's significantly more modern.

Mossies were used as bombers from 1941, so no they were in the thick of it.

It looks like most tactical support aircraft suffered from higher loss ratios,

CAS was dangeorus, but fighter-bombers had much lower loss ratio than slower aircraft like Stukas. The Mosquito is more like a fighter bomber due to it's speed.

they couldn't "loiter" long if they lacked local air superiority (they could run though).

The loitering was done a few miles on the safe side of the front lines, in the case of the Mosquito that could also be done at high altitude. When called by a FAC, it could get there quickly, another advantage of being fast.

All this aside, the more primitive nature of the Stuka may have actually helped its longevity by allowing it to operate in conditions where other planes couldn't (this is reported to be the case with Henschel Hs 123's in Russia). The ability to operate from rough fields in all kinds of poor weather, when other planes would be grounded could be very beneficial. Today, helicopters would probably fill that roll, but at the time that's what they needed.

More advanced aircraft (or tanks) which were so far advanced that they cost a lot more and are more difficult to maintain (like the Tiger or the P-38 in it's earlier incarnations) are not good candidates for higher production. I think the Tiger was in fact less cost-effective than the Sherman for example.

A modern equivalent to the Mosquito might be the F-16. Designed to be a low-cost expedient, it turned out to be very effective as both a fighter and a bomber, but relatively cheap to produce. It had a high survivability / low loss rate in combat. In the 80's and 90's, it probably made more sense to buy F-16s than say, MiG 21s or F-4 Phantoms, or Mirage F-3s. Or so my theory goes.

G.

[Ozymandias9]

Yeah I don't know of any Reniassance fencing manual where you hold a sword in a reverse grip.

Using the scabbard for defense does exist, as does using a cloak, (very popular in the 16th-17th C. manuals) a dagger, various other implements.

G.

I think it was Filippo Vadi's "De Arte Gladitotia Dimicandi" that came to mind when I read the section I was posting on. In particular, I seem to recall the the section on dagger defense mentioning short swords as an alternative (specifically, I seem to recall a mention of a Cinquedea in contrast with the then-still-current Rondel). But it's possible I'm conflating one of the sword defense chapters with one of the later sections of dagger defense: it's been a while.

[Faleldir]

Question: If you decided to fight with a spear and a javelin, how would you hold them?

[Spiryt]

Can you clarify a bit?

If you mean a hold on the spear or javelin, there were many different grips - most basic division would be underhand or overhand grip.

The exact use would depend on very many things.

[Faleldir]

No, I can't clarify without answering my own question. What is the most realistic way to wield those two weapons at the same time?

[Galloglaich]

Throw one and stab with the other?

[Yora]

I'd say there is no realistic way of wielding a polearm in each hand.

[Galloglaich]

I think it was Filippo Vadi's "De Arte Gladitotia Dimicandi" that came to mind when I read the section I was posting on. In particular, I seem to recall the the section on dagger defense mentioning short swords as an alternative (specifically, I seem to recall a mention of a Cinquedea in contrast with the then-still-current Rondel). But it's possible I'm conflating one of the sword defense chapters with one of the later sections of dagger defense: it's been a while.

Not sure, but Vadi talks about using a dagger that way, he specifically recommended having one which reaches from your hand to your elbow partly so you could use it to block with in a reverse grip.

G.

[Lapak]

No, I can't clarify without answering my own question. What is the most realistic way to wield those two weapons at the same time?

Given that the javelin is by definition designed as a thrown weapon, I'd say for realism purposes you're looking at 'throw the javelin with dominant hand, switch to two-handed grip on spear.'

[Faleldir]

Okay, what's the second most realistic way to wield a 3-foot spear and a 5-foot spear? Would the longer one be held above your shoulder or below?

[Mike_G]

Okay, what's the second most realistic way to wield a 3-foot spear and a 5-foot spear? Would the longer one be held above your shoulder or below?

Well, I suppose you could wield the long spear in your right hand, like you would use it with a shield, and grip the javelin at its center in you left, using it mostly for defense, with the option of striking or stabbing with it if the opportunity presented itself. Using a scabbard as a parrying object is common enough, I guess a javelin could work.

This doesn't seem like it would be a good choice, but I could see a style that used the spears that way.

[Dervag]

Okay, what's the second most realistic way to wield a 3-foot spear and a 5-foot spear? Would the longer one be held above your shoulder or below?

I don't think it's possible, mechanically.

My advice when thinking about weapon styles, since I myself am not an expert, is to try it. Get a couple of decently heavy sticks (broomhandle weight, at a guess) and try to wield them effectively, remembering that you are stabbing with each one because they are simulating spears.

I suspect that you will not be able to find a way of doing it that will give you any real advantage over another guy who uses only one spear. So that, yes, your best bet is to throw one spear at the enemy and then use the other spear in hand to hand combat. Keeping the second spear in hand offers little or no advantage, and complicates your fighting style unnecessarily.

Dervag, I thought this was obvious from the example, but I guess it wasn't so I'll spell it out.

Given a higher attrition rate, a large number of obsolete aircraft is going to rapidly deteriorate while the modern aircraft low-attrition rate (which can keep up with production) will gradually build up in numbers.

Yes, but at this point you're comparing replacements on a one-to-one basis, which completely throws away any question of whether the merits of plane A are such that X of A are worth Y of B... which is what we were originally talking about.

It's not that attrition rates don't matter, quite the opposite. But if you're going to cap both sides to the same replacement rate, then of course the side with the larger force is going to decay faster; this has nothing to do with the quality of their hardware. By not scaling the replacement rate to the size of the forces involved, you artificially convert the entire question into one of attrition rates.

The argument you actually used to demonstrate the Mosquito's superiority over the Stuka is valid in and of itself, but it can't be used to prove what you seem to have set out to prove, because it could equally well be used to prove that it's better to have zero Mosquitos than to have a thousand Stukas. Just wait for the Stukas to take casualties, and eventually you'll reach parity with them, right?

The question is how much damage gets inflicted before you reach parity, and whether you can inflict casualties at above replacement rate. Historically, the Allies could and did- but took a lot of damage before obtaining air superiority.

So while 'Bigistani' has more aircraft initially, which theoretically translates to a battlefield advantage, by the time 3 or 4 months have passed they have lost their numeric superiority and within 6 or 7 months they will be badly outnumbered.

Yes, but this relies heavily on the assumption of identical replacement rates, which will always favor the smaller force.

Historically, this is reasonable... but historically, no one was fool enough to claim that a Mosquito was worth ten Stukas. One Mosquito was better than one Stuka, absolutely, but ten? Really.

You can quibble about the actual rates of attrition but I think there is no denying the Mosquito has a better survivability rate than the Stuka, an aircraft with a realistic tactial speed of 180 kts is much more vulnerable than one with 300 kts.

Yes; I'm not denying this. But even from an attrition standpoint, one bomber that lasts a long time need not be better than ten bombers that last for several months, especially if we don't grant the enemy of the ten bombers automatic air superiority- the attrition rate for Stukas was so high partly because the Germans were forced to keep flying them long after they'd lost the ability to contest the skies on even terms. Assuming air parity in all arms besides the choice of light bomber, that's not going to be true; the Stukas will still take far greater casualties than the Mosquitos, but not as enormous as historical Stuka forces took in 1943-44.

Hopefully that is clear and you don't thnk it's "Rhetorical Excess".

Oh, it's fine, now that you're sticking to facts- that Mosquitos were cost-effective, that they were good planes, and so on. All those things were true, after all.

It's just that the reason the Mosquitos were better than the Stukas was not that they were vastly superior qualitatively, to the point where one Mosquito was worth ten Stukas. It's that they were significantly better planes that could be produced on a one-to-one basis. One Mosquito is better than one Stuka, and that's the decision people would actually be making.

[Actually, since the cost of manufacturing planes depends very heavily on the number of engines, since those are the most difficult bit to make... you'd probably be choosing between one Mosquito and two Stukas, since the Mosquito was a twin-engined plane. The Mosquito still wins, if you ask me]

I only have problems with what you're saying when the premise is taken too far, to the point where it ignores questions of numbers by saying "but look at the quality!*" That's the same error that people who try to boost the Tiger and Panther at the expense of the Sherman and T-34 make, and it's as wrong with planes as it is with tanks.

So I'd still take 100 Stukas over 10 Mosquitoes, if that were a realistic option (which, of course, it isn't).

*Survivability is part of quality, just for the record.

[Galloglaich]

Dervag, you still aren't quite seeing my point, but I think we are getting closer.

It's not that attrition rates don't matter, quite the opposite. But if you're going to cap both sides to the same replacement rate, then of course the side with the larger force is going to decay faster; this has nothing to do with the quality of their hardware. By not scaling the replacement rate to the size of the forces involved, you artificially convert the entire question into one of attrition rates.

No, you are getting lost in the math here Dervag. The size with the larger force is not at any disadvantage, to the contrary. In this case it's not the replacement rate that matters, it's really the attrition rate, which we know was much higher for the Stuka. If the Stuka had the 0.6% attrition rate, the number of Stukas would be growing not declining.

Additionally, in my example, the attrition rate for the Stuka is even higher because the Mosquito's are based outside of their range, whereas the Stukas bases are in range for the Mosquito and can be bombed. This is another way in which the quality makes a big difference.

My point is that a high attrition rate will fairly quickly (in the matter of a few months at the most) cause the Stuka side to have much lower numbers. In other words, I was trying to demonstrate to you how a small diffference in attrition rate makes a huge difference in the ultimate numbers on the battlefield. This is especially true with aircraft. And it is in fact what happened in the war.

Which makes quality a major consideration but one which has to be balanced against production cost. The Mosquito was a great plane because it was in that 'sweet spot'. Generally I think the allies stayed closer to this sweet spot than the Axis did and that is one of the major reasons they won, the Axis were depending on the quick victory and lost their gamble.

better to have zero Mosquitos than to have a thousand Stukas. Just wait for the Stukas to take casualties, and eventually you'll reach parity with them, right?

Only if Stukas get shot down much faster han Mosquitos. Which they did.

So I'd still take 100 Stukas over 10 Mosquitoes, if that were a realistic option (which, of course, it isn't).

Well, we'll just have to agree to disagree, but perhaps now at least you can see my point.

G.

[Mike_G]

till wins, if you ask me]


So I'd still take 100 Stukas over 10 Mosquitoes, if that were a realistic option (which, of course, it isn't).

If I were an infantryman asking for close air support, I would too.

Good support that shows up is better than great support that doesn't.

[Galloglaich]

If I were an infantryman asking for close air support, I would too.
Good support that shows up is better than great support that doesn't.

Yes, and the problem is, if you don't win the war outright in the first few months, the "good support" i.e. second rate aircraft that you used to count on won't show up after they are all shot down. And then the other sides infantrymen will be calling down airstrikes on you with their "great" support, and you will get to experience the joy of being under near constant air-attack, having no supplies, and only being able to move at night.

Because you will have gone from having a numerical superiority in aircraft (and pilots) to a drastic numerical inferiority.

Which is in fact what happened to the Germans and the Japanese in WW II by 1943.

G.

[Lapak]

Yes, and the problem is, if you don't win the war outright in the first few months, the "good support" i.e. second rate aircraft that you used to count on won't show up after they are all shot down.

Well, no. It's not ALL about attrition rates, it's also about replacement rates as others have said. Without winning the war outright, if you damage the enemy's production so that you can build X times as fast as they can, you could maintain your relative aircraft levels.

In the historical example you're using, the side with lower-quality planes was suffering from both problems at once: faster attrition AND it was their terrain that was being fought over, which meant their production was the one suffering. If I had 100 mediocre aircraft to your 10 good aircraft, and that allowed me to use 50 of them to protect my air force manufacturing while the other 50 bomb out your facilities? I might lose 10 planes a week and build 12, while you lost 1 plane a week and built none. It's more complicated than you're suggesting.