Are we evil?

[OldTrees1]

I'm not sure about the prescriptive/descriptive split. I mean, at the base of it we try to make inferences about the underlying truth of things, which we can never directly perceive. But such statements are describing something. 'One ought to do X' is an attempt to describe the morality function of, well, someone - most probably the speaker. It can be true or false only in relation to the concept of morality being referred to. So it is the same as saying 'Two plus two is four', which is true or false in relation to the concept of mathematics being referred to.

1) Have you considered what they are trying to make statements about? Ethics is the study of the question "What ought one do?". As a prescriptive question, the answer will be a prescriptive claim (what one ought to do rather than what one will do).

2) Why do you presume someone saying "One ought to do X" is an attempt at describing someone's morality function? It may in fact match with someone's morality function but the speaker is making the prescriptive claim "One ought to do X" not the descriptive statement "I believe one ought to do X". This difference of word choice is not without meaning. The first is a claim about how people ought to act while the second is merely a statement about what beliefs this one person has at this time. The first can be true or false only in relation to reality as a whole while the second only needs to confirm if the person did in fact have those beliefs at that time.

Listen, this difference is rather important. If you are still unsure about the difference, then go do some research (I have been using the terms so you can go and independently verify). I will only continue this conversation if there is evidence you have acquainted yourself with the difference.

[Murska]

1) Have you considered what they are trying to make statements about? Ethics is the study of the question "What ought one do?". As a prescriptive question, the answer will be a prescriptive claim (what one ought to do rather than what one will do).

2) Why do you presume someone saying "One ought to do X" is an attempt at describing someone's morality function? It may in fact match with someone's morality function but the speaker is making the prescriptive claim "One ought to do X" not the descriptive statement "I believe one ought to do X". This difference of word choice is not without meaning. The first is a claim about how people ought to act while the second is merely a statement about what beliefs this one person has at this time. The first can be true or false only in relation to reality as a whole while the second only needs to confirm if the person did in fact have those beliefs at that time.

Listen, this difference is rather important. If you are still unsure about the difference, then go do some research (I have been using the terms so you can go and independently verify). I will only continue this conversation if there is evidence you have acquainted yourself with the difference.

But there is literally no possible way for anyone to speak of the first layer of reality, 'one ought to do X' means 'I believe one ought to do X'. This is because we can never leave our subjective perspective.

[Red Fel]

But there is literally no possible way for anyone to speak of the first layer of reality, 'one ought to do X' means 'I believe one ought to do X'. This is because we can never leave our subjective perspective.

Which is the basis of the entire study of theoretical morality - the search for and dissection of absolute morality, assuming it exists, irrespective of subjective experience. Any theory of morality based on "I personally believe," like any other theory based on "I personally believe," is not scientific. It is an abstract, a proposal; absent some sort of logical argument that allows it to extend from "I personally believe" to "and therefore, others should as well," it contributes nothing to the field, and cannot be examined or debated to any reasonable degree.

While it's true, as has been debated in this thread and elsewhere, that it is virtually impossible to conclusively argue for any moral absolute, the more common and more well-established moral theories go beyond merely "I personally believe" by offering justifications, explanations, and arguments in favor of themselves. They try to leave the realm of purely subjective experience; whether they succeed is a matter for debate.

[OldTrees1]

But there is literally no possible way for anyone to speak of the first layer of reality, 'one ought to do X' means 'I believe one ought to do X'. This is because we can never leave our subjective perspective.

I claim "One ought to do X" means, usually, I believe "One ought to do X".
This is miles different from I claim "I believe one ought to do X".

See what is inside and what is outside of the "" marks? The claim "One ought to do X" =/= the claim "I believe one ought to do X".

Lamarck believed in lamarckian evolution. He made 2 claims
1) "Lamarckian evolution is true." (This statement was later shown to be false)
2) "I believe in Lamarckian evolution." (This statement was still true despite statement 1 being false)

[Murska]

Which is the basis of the entire study of theoretical morality - the search for and dissection of absolute morality, assuming it exists, irrespective of subjective experience. Any theory of morality based on "I personally believe," like any other theory based on "I personally believe," is not scientific. It is an abstract, a proposal; absent some sort of logical argument that allows it to extend from "I personally believe" to "and therefore, others should as well," it contributes nothing to the field, and cannot be examined or debated to any reasonable degree.

While it's true, as has been debated in this thread and elsewhere, that it is virtually impossible to conclusively argue for any moral absolute, the more common and more well-established moral theories go beyond merely "I personally believe" by offering justifications, explanations, and arguments in favor of themselves. They try to leave the realm of purely subjective experience; whether they succeed is a matter for debate.

Success, however, is logically impossible. It's much more fruitful to study scientifically answerable statements like "The majority of people believe that X is good, and doing Y increases X". Don't bother nitpicking that particular example, that's not the point.

I claim "One ought to do X" means, usually, I believe "One ought to do X".
This is miles different from I claim "I believe one ought to do X".

See what is inside and what is outside of the "" marks? The claim "One ought to do X" =/= the claim "I believe one ought to do X".

Lamarck believed in lamarckian evolution. He made 2 claims
1) "Lamarckian evolution is true." (This statement was later shown to be false)
2) "I believe in Lamarckian evolution." (This statement was still true despite statement 1 being false)

Yes, you are correct. I don't see why something that obvious needs to be stated.

But the claim, as stated by a person, 'One ought to do X' means 'I believe one ought to do X' and the claim 'I believe one ought to do X' means 'I believe I believe one ought to do X', and there's no way for any speaker to reach into the very first layer where some statement would mean 'One ought to do X' and nothing else. To return to your example, we have been convinced to believe that "Lamarckian evolution is false", but we still have no access to the truth value of the statement sans belief.

Not to mention that there is no coherent definition for 'ought'.

[OldTrees1]

Yes, you are correct. I don't see why something that obvious needs to be stated.

I stated the oh so obvious because you
1) Don't understand what "prescriptive" means
2) Added "I believe" after the "I claim" to only 1 of 2 statements to justify claiming both usages of the word "Morality" in English are the same
3) Don't understand what "prescriptive" means
4) Continue to pretend a prescriptive claim is a descriptive claim

Morality is a word with 2 meanings. It is used both to talk about prescriptive claims "I claim one ought to X" and descriptive claims about prescriptive claims "I claim he believes one ought to X".

But the claim, as stated by a person, 'One ought to do X' means 'I believe one ought to do X' and the claim 'I believe one ought to do X' means 'I believe I believe one ought to do X', and there's no way for any speaker to reach into the very first layer where some statement would mean 'One ought to do X' and nothing else. To return to your example, we have been convinced to believe that "Lamarckian evolution is false", but we still have no access to the truth value of the statement sans belief.

Not to mention that there is no coherent definition for 'ought'.

The inability to reach the Nth layer (any argument about being unable to reach the 1st layer is an argument for being unable to reach the Nth layer for all finite values of N) does not change a prescriptive claim into a descriptive claim. Is this within your ability to accept?

Finally, the inability to perceive the Nth layer does not stop me from making claims/statements that act at that layer.
Ex: I claim 1+1=/=2 & I claim 1=1
Not only is the first something that I don't believe to be true(and thus removing this ("I believe")^N before the "I claim ...") but both of their truth values remains independent of my beliefs on the matter.

[Murska]

(any argument about being unable to reach the 1st layer is an argument for being unable to reach the Nth layer for all finite values of N)

This is untrue.

Finally, the inability to perceive the Nth layer does not stop me from making claims/statements that act at that layer.
Ex: I claim 1+1=/=2 & I claim 1=1
Not only is the first something that I don't believe to be true(and thus removing this ("I believe")^N before the "I claim ...") but both of their truth values remains independent of my beliefs on the matter.

This is also untrue. In the first case, you claim to believe it but you don't believe you believe it. And even if the statements have a truth value independent of anyone's beliefs, we can never discuss those truth values or reach them in any way.

[Red Fel]

Success, however, is logically impossible. It's much more fruitful to study scientifically answerable statements like "The majority of people believe that X is good, and doing Y increases X". Don't bother nitpicking that particular example, that's not the point.

Most philosophical pursuits are impossible to resolve. As good as we are with diagrams, I'm pretty sure you can't start writing things out on a whiteboard until, after seven weeks of calculations, erasures, and double-checking your proof, you reach the solution, and the philosophical community proceeds to laud you for discovering the Conclusive Philosophical Equation. It doesn't work like that.

That doesn't mean we don't pursue it. It's gradual forward motion towards a destination that is, at best, indefinite and distant, but it's still forward motion. The fact that we can't reach a perfect objective solution doesn't mean we don't keep trying.

Or something. To be honest, I'm kind of losing track of where we are here.

[OldTrees1]

This is untrue.

Disprove me with a counter example then. For any argument you have that you use to discredit knowledge of the 1st layer, I will apply to "knowledge" of the 2nd layer. I will be able to repeat.

Aka if you say "No, you only believe that" then I will say "No, you only believe you believe that".

This is also untrue. In the first case, you claim to believe it but you don't believe you believe it. And even if the statements have a truth value independent of anyone's beliefs, we can never discuss those truth values or reach them in any way.

Where did I claim to believe 1+1=/=2 rather than merely claim 1+1=/=2? Please point it out specifically or demonstrate your powers of telepathy (oh, and powers of memory modification too since I don't remember ever believing something like that).

All beings capable of metacognition are also capable of thinking about claims they don't agree with. This implies the ability to state and then consider a claim that the speaker does not believe in.

Just to screw with you (since you are claiming that making a claim necessarily = believing that claim):
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.

[Murska]

Disprove me with a counter example then. For any argument you have that you use to discredit knowledge of the 1st layer, I will apply to "knowledge" of the 2nd layer. I will be able to repeat.

Aka if you say "No, you only believe that" then I will say "No, you only believe you believe that".

Well, fine. Let's take a function x = n, x > 1, n = [1,2,3,...]. You can't reach n = 1, because the function is undefined in that spot, but you can reach all the other layers.

Where did I claim to believe 1+1=/=2 rather than merely claim 1+1=/=2? Please point it out specifically or demonstrate your powers of telepathy (oh, and powers of memory modification too since I don't remember ever believing something like that).

All beings capable of metacognition are also capable of thinking about claims they don't agree with. This implies the ability to state and then consider a claim that the speaker does not believe in.

Just to screw with you (since you are claiming that making a claim necessarily = believing that claim):
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.
I claim 1+1=2.
I claim 1+1=/=2.

I am saying that making a claim necessarily means claiming to believe that claim, even if you're obviously lying about that and don't actually believe you believe that claim. It's not such a difficult distinction, come on.

Starting from the basics:

We can only observe from our perspective and never leave it.
Therefore, everything we observe is observed from our perspective.
Therefore, everything we state about what we observe is stated to be as such from our perspective.
Therefore, we cannot, purely by thinking, reach any 'truthful' viewpoint that would be beyond our perspective.
Truth is that which, when you stop believing in it, does not go away.
Therefore, we should update our beliefs according to their predictive power.
This in theory should make them correlate with truth.
However, the only thing it actually does that we can know is makes us able to predict the future.

Most philosophical pursuits are impossible to resolve. As good as we are with diagrams, I'm pretty sure you can't start writing things out on a whiteboard until, after seven weeks of calculations, erasures, and double-checking your proof, you reach the solution, and the philosophical community proceeds to laud you for discovering the Conclusive Philosophical Equation. It doesn't work like that.

That doesn't mean we don't pursue it. It's gradual forward motion towards a destination that is, at best, indefinite and distant, but it's still forward motion. The fact that we can't reach a perfect objective solution doesn't mean we don't keep trying.

Or something. To be honest, I'm kind of losing track of where we are here.

But there's no reason to believe objective morality exists, and there's no reason to believe it'd be better than what we can come up with in our own subjective thinking, so why search for it instead of working on creating a functioning society based on subjective morality?

[Red Fel]

But there's no reason to believe objective morality exists, and there's no reason to believe it'd be better than what we can come up with in our own subjective thinking, so why search for it instead of working on creating a functioning society based on subjective morality?

I think I answered this one. Because that's what we do.

It's the same reason we go into space or search for aliens or split the atom or try to develop light speed transportation or any number of other things.

There are philosophies that hypothesize an absolute morality. They're debatable. Some embrace them, some dispute them. Your argument, "Well, we can't do it," presumes that it is impossible. The fact that we haven't done it doesn't make it impossible. Even if there actually is no absolute morality, the pursuit of it - the study and debate and analysis - improves our understanding of morality, absolute or otherwise.

Dismissing the entire field simply because it's too hard is missing the point.

[Murska]

I think I answered this one. Because that's what we do.

It's the same reason we go into space or search for aliens or split the atom or try to develop light speed transportation or any number of other things.

There are philosophies that hypothesize an absolute morality. They're debatable. Some embrace them, some dispute them. Your argument, "Well, we can't do it," presumes that it is impossible. The fact that we haven't done it doesn't make it impossible. Even if there actually is no absolute morality, the pursuit of it - the study and debate and analysis - improves our understanding of morality, absolute or otherwise.

Dismissing the entire field simply because it's too hard is missing the point.

Hmm. Well, I can't consider myself infallible, but even if through some quirk of the laws of physics we end up with an absolute morality that is also better than subjective morality, wouldn't searching for it be better done through developing our understanding of physics - that is, experimental study? Debates and analysis without experiments can offer no new information, so I don't really believe they substantially improve our understanding of morality.

I mean, I'm only dismissing the field because it shows no promise of ever producing any results, not because it's hard.

[Red Fel]

Hmm. Well, I can't consider myself infallible, but even if through some quirk of the laws of physics we end up with an absolute morality that is also better than subjective morality, wouldn't searching for it be better done through developing our understanding of physics - that is, experimental study? Debates and analysis without experiments can offer no new information, so I don't really believe they substantially improve our understanding of morality.

I mean, I'm only dismissing the field because it shows no promise of ever producing any results, not because it's hard.

What do you think the field of philosophy is? I mean, we can't perform a controlled experiment with beakers and electrodes and blind subjects, but we can engage in theoretical disputes, using hypotheses and examples and counterexamples. It's not hard science; it's a more theoretical field, like some forms of maths and physics. We'll know we've reached a solution once we've reached it; until then, we just keep pondering, debating, and challenging.

And there have been a few experiments in the study of morality, which generally tend to reveal that people are more likely to do as they're told than consider the ramifications of their actions. But that's another matter.

[OldTrees1]

I am saying that making a claim necessarily means claiming to believe that claim, even if you're obviously lying about that and don't actually believe you believe that claim. It's not such a difficult distinction, come on.

Since "I claim X" =/= "I claim to believe X", but you are deluded into think they are. I guess you are not saying "I claim "I claim X" = "I claim to believe X" " but rather "I claim to believe "I claim X" = "I claim to believe X" "* which is true in that you do believe that claim. Your claim to believe that claim is true despite that claim itself being false. However since you are merely claiming to believe the falsehood rather than actually asserting the falsehood, why should I care?

I recognize your claim to believe in a falsehood. The fact that you believe in it does not impact its truth values. So good day and goodbye.


*Well actually you cannot be claiming "to believe "I claim X" = "I claim to believe X" " because that is claiming "Y" and you believe that one cannot claim "Y" only "to believe Y". So in actuality you are claiming the limit as N approaches infinity of "(to believe)^N "I claim X" = "I claim to believe X" ".

[The-lost-Byte]

Are we evil?

we are humans, what did you espect?

[Formless Entity]

So some background, I was watching this new fall anime Parasyte -the maxim- where these parasites come to earth, bond with existing lifeforms (usually humans), take over their bodies and then proceed to eat people. When the main character asks one of these parasites "You guys are monsters, why are you doing this?" the parasite responds with "We're not monsters, we're eating humans for food." At this point there have been about 80 of these strange murders caused by these things. The parasite then asks "Aren't humans really the monsters? How many millions of things do you kill each year and eat?" Its this statement that prompted this post.

Picture a world where these ravenous creatures existed that enslaved and consumed the other, less intelligent creatures of that world. So great was their hunger that entire species went extinct in an attempt to satiate them. They forced the ones that didn't die out to mate in order to produce more food. They ate creatures of every gender and age, young, old, the strong, the weak and even the unborn.

Now realize that thats humans. Is there any horror story that can compare to what humans do on a daily basis? Don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating a vegan lifestyle, meat tastes too good. Its just that this parasite thing kind of had a point, we justify doing what we do to animals because we're at the top of the food chain. If we found out there was something else above us, can we really complain if they do the same to us?

These parasites do feed off of sentient beings unlike the vast majority of animals.

Though some studies have called into question the level of intelligence of dolphins and some non-human primates.

[joshspace]

We're not evil, just hypocrites.

[Aldarin]

Evil and good don't fit as well in the real world as in D&D. We're surviving off of other organisms, that's all there is too it. Also, another thing to consider: the parasites in that movie were killing sentient creatures--humans--with complex thoughts and actions. We're killing animals. It sounds pretty cold-hearted when I put it that way, but the things we're eating are just bags of meat filled with the urge to mate, eat, and live--and not much else. I'm not saying that animals are worthless, just that they don't really get we're killing them until they're dead.

[Devils_Advocate]

You make a very good point in this post, I agree, as long as the premises are granted.

Which premises?

The trivialization of evil is still repulsive, but I understand the animal discussion now that I've read the rest of the thread.

Sentience is one thing, and what it is entitled to is up for debate (which is happening). Sapience is another, and I refuse to debate the mistreatment of sapient beings. I don't stand for the mistreatment of animals either, but the outrage is not as strong, I suppose.

Well, um... That rather sounds like you're refusing to get all that worked up about some things that you recognize are wrong. But that also seems to be what you were criticizing others for. What do you mean by "trivializing evil" if not that?

I'm not...exactly sure why you quoted me because none of this is actually...really addressing any point I made.

Um... In that case, what was your point? Did you even have one? I assumed, as one does, that what you posted was supposed to be relevant to the conversation, and thus that you meant to imply that eating babies is evil because "babies grow up to be existential beings". If not, then what was the relevance of what I quoted? How was it addressing any point that Donnadogsoth made?

I take your criticism and turn it back upon you!

But you know what they say about assumptions.

"I do not. And yet you're confidently asserting that I do. Check and mate."

Seriously, though, is this supposed to be directed at the last paragraph of what you quoted? If so, what assumption did you (ironically) assume I'm making?

I did consider that meaning, but rejected it on the grounds that it seemed incoherent. "Solely to cause panic and despair", in the sense that you're interpreting the phrase, isn't a "reason" for anything, because it doesn't promote any end save itself. It's a random event, not a planned one.

The problem here is that this too is highly theoretical. Almost any action will end up coming back to fulfilling some sort of need by the person committing it. People, for the most part, don't just act randomly for no reason. If someone decides to cause pain and suffering, they're going to do so for SOME reason. Committing that act fulfills some sort of need that person is experiencing. In doing so there is clearly SOME sort of benefit that the person in question receives.

The idea is that someone who values panic and despair as ends in themselves might kill someone in order to cause panic and despair in much the same way that someone who values happiness as an end in itself might eat ice cream in order to experience happiness. That's not "acting randomly for no reason". It's a "random" thing to want in the sense of being an unexpected desire for someone to have, granted. One could certainly argue that no real person is like that and perhaps even go on to make a persuasive case that unambiguous evil doesn't exist in the real world. But refusing -- or simply failing -- to acknowledge that the hypothetical scenario has even been put forward is hardly a refutation.

Tangentially, I just remembered a question I once saw posed: Would you brutally torture an adorable and innocent puppy if doing so would completely eliminate and prevent any and all bizarre hypothetical moral dilemmas?

'One ought to do X' is an attempt to describe the morality function of, well, someone - most probably the speaker. It can be true or false only in relation to the concept of morality being referred to. So it is the same as saying 'Two plus two is four', which is true or false in relation to the concept of mathematics being referred to.

Is mathematics subjective?

I am saying that making a claim necessarily means claiming to believe that claim, even if you're obviously lying about that and don't actually believe you believe that claim.

Murska, I'm sorry, but you seem to be using the word "claim" in a decidedly non-standard fashion. According to common usage as I understand it, saying "The sky is blue" is making a claim about the color of the sky, and in no way a claim about one's state of mind. It implies that one believes the sky is blue, certainly, but that's not the same thing as claiming it.

And anyway, even if "claim" isn't the right word for it, saying "The sky is blue" is doing a thing regarding the color of the sky that one is not doing regarding one's beliefs, in just the same way that e.g. saying "One plus one equals two" is not doing that thing regarding the composition of baseballs. Doing that thing is plainly the difference that OldTrees1 was getting at, whatever you want to call said thing.

It's not such a difficult distinction, come on.

Uh, yeah, exactly.

"Identify with the proverbial pot much?"

but the things we're eating are just bags of meat filled with the urge to mate, eat, and live--and not much else.

Um, citation needed? I'm pretty sure that that's not true. I'm pretty sure that the behavior of food animals is fairly complex, and that programming a robot to act exactly like a pig, for example, would be a huge undertaking. Like, possibly difficult enough that the most efficient approach would be to develop a seed AI and have the resulting superintelligence program the robopig for you.

I'm not an expert, but I'm guessing that you aren't either. Partly because I'm pretty sure that most people who make claims about animal psychology aren't animal psychologists, but also because I'm fairly confident that most animal psychologists would describe things differently than you.

I haven't really dug into the research, but the articles I found a through a bit of googling on the subject tend to say that pigs, cows, and chickens are surprisingly intelligent. Pigs are described as "social" and "empathic" and compared to chimps. Mind you, I only skimmed what I found.

But, frankly, of course animals minds aren't as simple as you're suggesting. Nothing is that simple.

I'm not saying that animals are worthless, just that they don't really get we're killing them until they're dead.

Is that ethically relevant, though? Is it better for assassins to kill their victims in their sleep so that they don't stress about being murdered?

... Hmm, that does seem more humane. Touché, I guess?

[Celticbear]

sorry in advance I have to post some more to get a link to the dm

[Celticbear]

hi hi hi hi hi

[Celticbear]

one more to go and I'll be all set